Nepal

Lurching towards election

If the elections take place in Nepal as scheduled, the first agenda item of the Constituent Assembly is expected to be a vote on the monarchy as an institution, comments
Peter Burleigh

  After a roller-coaster ride of missed and switched signals between the main political actors in the country, Nepal appears to be lurching toward its Constituent Assembly election, now scheduled for 10 April 2008. Long plagued with a Maoist insurgency, by far the most successful and far-reaching in South Asia, Nepal has also faced severe challenges from political groups, armed as well as peaceful, representing the Madhesi people of the Terai, the flatland bordering the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal.
   The Maoists scuttled the earlier scheduled November 2007 election but in December an agreement was signed between them and the government, which triggered the Maoist party’s return to government, with five Cabinet ministers as before, and an agreement to go forward with an April vote. Next came militant Madhesi demands for a wholesale reform of the political system, focusing on federalism, regional autonomy and guaranteed access to government jobs (civil service, army, police), recognition of ‘martyrs’, and increased use of Maithili, Bhojpuri and Awadhi, regional languages of the southern plains.
   Nepal’s mosaic of ethnic, tribal, indigenous, caste, linguistic and regional groups have all increasingly asserted demands for various degrees of recognition and autonomy. In a country where there is no majority community, the political assertion of up to a hundred recognised groups has created an extremely complex, unpredictable and turbulent mix. (The largest caste/ethnic group are the Chhetris, who compose about 16 per cent of the population, according to the 2001 Census, which is the most recent.)
   Nevertheless, despite continuing violence and intimidation from Maoists, Madhesis and an eastern tribal group (the Limbus), Nepal appears to be inching toward the April vote. As part of the government’s negotiations with political parties and ethnic groups, a complex electoral process has been put in place. It features two votes for each citizen: a constituency-based ‘First Past the Post’ (FPTP) vote among party and independent candidates, who together will compose 40 per cent of the 601-member Constituent Assembly, and a nation-wide Proportional Represen-tation (PR) vote, which will compose 56 per cent. The Prime Minister will appoint the remaining 4 per cent. Though the new Madhesi parties are exempt by mutual agreement, most parties are required to meet quotas for women, Madhesis, Dalits, Janajatis (tribals as well as indigenous peoples), and backward regions on the ground that this will result in an inclusive and representative assembly.
   Meanwhile, despite widespread campaigning and expressed commitment to the elections, worries remain that the Maoists are continuingly ambivalent about the polls. Other parties and political observers assess the Maoist ability to win in FPTP seats as minimal, though some of their leaders, like the charismatic chairman Prachanda and his deputy, Baburam Bhattarai, are assumed to be capable of winning in multi-candidate contests where only a plurality of votes is needed. In addition, most observers think the Maoists should get 15–20 per cent of the PR vote. Combined, this might be attractive enough to keep them in the electoral process, though the Maoists’ continuing, even accelerating, use of intimidation and violence may be a worrisome signal of intentions. Further, it is not clear yet whether the Maoist cadres, especially the former guerrilla fighters, some (but not all) in United Nations-monitored cantonments, would accept a weak third-place election result, behind the mainstream democratic parties, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the CPN-UML (Communist Party of Nepal, Unified Marxist-Leninist).
   Also complicating prospects is the disarray among the three largely non-violent Madhesi parties which, having signed an agreement with the government in late February, have been unable to agree among themselves on an electoral alliance. Without such an alliance, it now seems likely that Madhesi votes will splinter among the three, opening up the probability of weak results for them, to the benefit of the mainstream NC and CPN-UML. If this were to occur, the likelihood of renewed violence in the Terai is high and the credibility of the non-violent Madhesi representatives would be severely impacted. The armed militants (under a variety of names, including JTMM — Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha), who cross back and forth across the India–Nepal border with seeming impunity, would have the initiative.
   If the elections take place as scheduled, the first agenda item of the Constituent Assembly is expected to be a vote on the status of the current king and the monarchy as an institution. At current writing, King Gyanendra appears to be without significant support among the political parties and general public. It is thus highly likely that Nepal soon will be transformed into a republic. Even the Nepal Army, formerly tightly linked to the monarch, appears to have thrown in its institutional lot with the civilian government.
   Given the divisive and complex nature of present-day Nepalese politics, it is assumed that there will be an unwelcome degree of violence and foul play on and before election day. ‘Booth capturing’ and various sorts of voter intimidation have a history in Nepal, prior to the Maoist and Madhesi movements, and all sides can be expected to play such cards where they can. Large numbers of official observers, tens of thousands of domestic election monitors, and about 500 international observers will be on the ground prior to and during the election. However, given Nepal’s challenging geography, limited communications, logistical problems and demoralised police, there will still be scope for intimidation away from the eyes of such groups. Maoist intimidation, especially through its Youth Communist League (YCL) and Madhesi threats, through the various JTMM and other armed groups, can certainly cause localised problems. In recent weeks it has appeared that such voter harassment and focused mayhem may succeed in limiting voter participation but not be sufficiently widespread to cause the elections to be cancelled. On the other hand, if the Maoists get cold feet as they did in November, and withdraw from the process, an election is unlikely to go forward without them.
   Peter Burleigh, a retired US Foreign Service officer, has served and studied in Nepal and last visited Nepal in March 2008. He has been posted as Ambassador to the United Nations, Sri Lanka and the Maldives and for Counter-Terrorism. He is currently Visiting Distinguished Professor at the University of Miami, Florida.

                          
top