Tibet Unrest

Likely impact on Sino-Indian relations

The developing Tibet situation will continue to cast a long shadow on Sino-Indian relations in the coming years, comments D.S. Rajan

   Is the Tibet issue a factor in Sino-Indian relations? This question was set at rest when the former PRC Ambassador in New Delhi, Sun Yuxi, expressed the view that Tibet is no longer a bilateral problem. There has, however, been a reversal of late in Beijing’s position, with Premier Wen Jiabao observing that ‘Tibet issue is sensitive in China-India relations’ and hoping simultaneously that India can follow the ‘broad’ agreements between the two countries and handle the issue in a ‘correct’ way.
   It is obvious that Wen’s reference, by implication, has been specifically to the Dalai Lama issue, which assumed sudden prominence in the wake of the biggest unrest in Tibet in the last two decades. On the other hand, Wen would have been sure of India’s recognition of Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In fact, there has been a steady progression in India’s acceptance of Tibet as part of China. The process started in 1951 itself, when the 17-point agreement was signed between Beijing and the Tibetan side. Tibet is an ‘autonomous region’ of China, was India’s terminology during the landmark visit to Beijing of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. At the time of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, New Delhi went further by calling the Tibet Autonomous Region as ‘part of the territory of the PRC’.
Then why the Chinese mention now about Tibet as a ‘sensitive bilateral issue’? An answer may lie in what appear to be latent Chinese suspicions that India traditionally sympathises with the Dalai Lama and extends tacit support to ‘Tibetan independence’ and that New Delhi’s mindset is for treating Tibet as a ‘buffer’ between China and India. Beijing also sees a connection between the Tibet issue and the Sino–Indian border problem.
   Beijing’s policy lines, as mentioned above, have their origin as early as the end-1950s. In that period, important statements were made by top leaders and key high-level documents were published. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai claimed that the Indian government had connections with the 1959 Tibet rebellion with the backing of the US and the UK. The now-famous Chinese commentary, entitled ‘Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy’, accused Nehru of following a two-pronged approach — recognising Tibet as part of China on the one hand and looking on Tibet as buffer zone between China and India on the other.
   A subsequent paper by an authoritative scholar in 1998 repeated the theme. Nehru was reluctant to recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, the paper alleged. Zhou Enlai accused Nehru of using the Dalai Lama as a bargaining chip on the border issue.
   In the current context, it is true that there have been no high-level Chinese pronouncements critical of India on the Tibet issue. But that does not mean the Chinese attitude has changed fundamentally. Especially to prove the connectivity between the Tibet issue and the Sino–Indian boundary problem, the PRC utilised its scholars to do the necessary articulation.
   Chinese experts belonging to think-tanks affiliated to the government and the party have alleged in 2003 that under the ‘illegal’ British India-Tibet treaty of 1914, Britain took away China’s territory of 90,000 sq km in the border step-by-step and that India inherited the British legacy.
   Shifting to the scenario at this juncture, Beijing would certainly not have missed that India does not share China’s opinion that the Dalai Lama is the instigator of the riots. According to Indian media reports, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rejected China’s claim over the nexus between the Dalai Lama and rioters inside Tibet, during his meeting with the visiting Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi. It also remains to be seen how Beijing will react to the reported planned meeting in New Delhi between India’s Vice President Hamid Ansari and the Dalai Lama.
   A major internal security challenge for China seems to have arisen because of the Tibet unrest. This, coupled with Beijing’s apparent continuing concern over potential of trouble in the Uighur-dominated Xinjiang, is expected to force China to look inward for the present. The stability factor may override development imperatives, which can temper the course of China’s foreign relations. Also, for quite some time from now, Beijing’s primary task will be tackling the international pressure concerning the Tibet unrest.
   In the case of ties with India, such developing situation may cause some slowdown in China-India bilateral engagements, including in the economic sphere. Secondly, on the basis of what has been said above, it looks certain that different perceptions of China and India on the Tibet issue may persist. Both nations would therefore be required to manage their differences with great skill in their own interests. If Beijing ultimately does not find Indian attitude to the Dalai Lama issue satisfactory, it has to react. As a diversionary tactic, it may even resort to some intrusions in the border, say after the Olympics. China may even go to the extent of pressing India to impose severe restrictions on the activities of Tibetan exiles in India and seal the border to prevent the planned march of the exiled Tibetans; specifically on the issue of Indian asylum to the Dalai Lama, tensions may reappear between Beijing and New Delhi. It would be natural for India to keep a vigil over such possibilities. Next, the political instability in Tibet is not going to vanish soon, which may compel China to become extra cautious in border talks with India. The PRC’s ability, demonstrated so far, in projecting its border claims over Tawang, etc., may come under severe strain. This could be advantageous to India, but New Delhi may have to face the possibility of protracted boundary negotiations. Last but not least, the situation may demand Chinese deployment of more troops in Tibet, which may have strategic implications for India. What can be summed up is that the developing Tibet situation will continue to cast a long shadow on Sino-Indian relations in the coming years.

D.S. Rajan is Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies

                          
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