April 2010
Redefining the problem
George Friedman
 
Mounting tensions
G Parthasarathy
 
A summer of discontent
Rahimullah Yusufzai
 
Western follies
Andrew Small
 
When dalliance didn't deliver
Inder Malhotra
 
Darjeeling: A Himalayan Splendour
 
Realignment on cards
David Watts
 
Asserting their rights
Shyam Bhatia
 
Lady Pamela, daughter of Lord Mountbatten, remembers India in some very intimate details
Shyam Bhatia
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
April 2010


Redefining the problem

Washington can either accept a nuclear Iran or exercise the military option. If, however, neither is acceptable, is there a third choice?

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Editorial

The Great Game in Sri Lanka

A battle for influence in Sri Lanka invokes memories of the Great Game that started more than a century ago in a different part of the Asian continent. India and China are the protagonists playing out their own version of the Great Game as they seek to strengthen and further secure their strategic niche in the island republic that lies off the south coast of India. This kind of shadow boxing is reminiscent of the power games that engaged the British and Russian empires from the late 19th century onwards. Their rivalry, which historians dubbed as 'The Great Game', was played out in Afghanistan. It was the British who eventually triumphed over Russia in this particular struggle, but a resurgent Russia in the garb of the Soviet Union refused to abandon its ambitions and took the risk of sending its troops into Kabul. The Soviet Union's defeat and withdrawal after fighting a bitter and protracted war against U.S.-backed Afghan nationalists is now a matter of historical record. The Great Game in Afghanistan, however, has not ended. Now U.S.-led forces are battling it out against Islamic extremists and the eventual outcome is anybody's guess.

In Sri Lanka the Indian elephant and Chinese dragon are similarly circling each other, each side wary of the other's moves and each one determined to somehow retain the upper hand. Just as the struggle in Afghanistan between Moscow and the West had profound knock-on consequences, so too will the rivalry in Sri Lanka between Delhi and Beijing — both major Asian powers — matter for the rest of Asia and the world. Sri Lanka has traditionally been part of India's backyard, a hitherto undisputed element in Delhi's zone of regional influence, in the same way that Canada and Mexico are for the United States. The traditionally close ties between Delhi and Colombo have been augmented by the geographical proximity of the two countries, as well as their historic cultural and religious links that are all too evident in the ancient epic of the Ramayana. True, Sri Lanka's majority Sinhalese community are Buddhists, as opposed to India's majority community of Hindus, but the two religions are closely intertwined. Buddhism's roots lie in India and the Sinhalese themselves are believed to be ethnic descendants of Bengali migrants from India who arrived on the island centuries ago.

Notwithstanding these historic facts, the Sri Lankan authorities in recent months have chosen to sideline India and lay out instead the welcome mat for China. The delighted Chinese have responded by pumping in tens of millions of dollars into the Sri Lankan economy. Highlights of Chinese aid include U.S. $1 billion to build the port of Hambantota, which will serve as a docking and refuelling station for the Chinese Navy. Another U.S. $190 million has been committed to building a second Sri Lankan international airport at Matallan and a further U.S. $100 million has been promised to help upgrade Sri Lanka's rail network.

India has also contributed significantly to Sri Lanka's economic development. Some U.S. $400 million of Indian investment makes Delhi the fourth largest foreign investor in Sri Lanka. Yet, however much money India offers Sri Lanka now and in the future, Colombo will never dilute its precious emerging alliance with Beijing. The reasons for this lie in the roots of the recently concluded civil war between the Sinhalese and the Tamil Tigers from the minority Tamil community in the north of the country. When the war started to escalate in the early 1980s, the beleaguered Tamils were the beneficiaries of covert assistance from India. The dynamics changed following the arrival of an Indian peace keeping force and the rebel Tamil Tigers' decision to assassinate former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. The Tigers' defeat was inevitable once India decided to switch sides and throw its weight behind Colombo. The rest of the world community duly followed suit by following Delhi's lead — and the rest is history.

The Sri Lankan authorities have every reason to be grateful to Delhi for its considerable role — said to include military assistance — in helping to end the conflict. But politicians in Colombo have not forgotten that it was Indian help that assisted the Tamils in prolonging their resistance. For this reason alone and to balance any future Indian role in Colombo's internal affairs, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa is determined to keep all his options open. If that means opening the door to countries like China or Pakistan, whether or not they are perceived to be friendly to India, he will go ahead regardless of the consequences.

Sri Lanka's Great Game still has many years to run.

 

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