The advent of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has put a whole new perspective on the issue with his commitment to re-assess alliances old and new and to have the country identify more with its Asian neighbours. The Okinawans are taking advantage of this new stance to demand the removal  of the bases from the island altogether with their relocation as a fall-back position.
To the American military and much of the Japanese political hierarchy the island bases are a vital strategic asset that must not be compromised. There is also the cost of relocation of which Japan would be expected to pay a large proportion.

But whereas in the past the Okinawa issue would surface only to fade away till the next tension point between   Japan and America, this time there is no such relief of the pressure and a series of American officials has been dispatched to try and resolve things. This time the central government in Tokyo appears just as keen to have things change as    are the islanders, or, at the very least, they are doing nothing to alleviate matters with the result that the issue has helped to spark a national re-evaluation of the relationship with the United States and just how Japan benefits and how it does not.

All of this might not mean a great deal were it not for the fact that China has now become Japan's greatest trading partner while the Chinese economy has overtaken Japan's as the second most powerful in the world after the United States, provoking one of the nation's regular spirals into orgies of doom-mongering. There are plenty of gloomy statistics on which they can gorge with  the economy having shrunk more than 5 per cent last year; the national debt an eye-watering 180 per cent of gross national product and the initial gloss having well and truly come off the high expectations of the Hatoyama government. 

Certainly there is a good deal of activity on the Chinese front diplomatically. While it is perhaps too early to say that there is a tilt towards China, the master-mind of much DPJ policy, Ichiro Ozawa, led a delegation of 600 Japanese to China late last year, which included more than 140 members of the Diet, all of whom were received by President Hu Jintao. That visit was swiftly reciprocated by one to Tokyo by the man expected to succeed Hu — Xi Jinping, who enjoyed an audience with the emperor.

That China is going to play a much larger role in the Pacific region is beyond doubt and there are good reasons for Japan to improve ties with the emerging power but it remains unclear to what extent the Hatoyama government intends to undertake a conscious, well-ordered change of policy. So far, after the initial flurry of excitement at a new government with a potentially radically different set of policies, Hatoyama has managed to emulate President Obama and appeared dithering and lacking in direction. Much of the time he gives the appearance of making policy on the hoof against the background of a Foreign Ministry which envisions a quite clear set of aims in Asia — Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada declared 'from now onwards this is the age of Asia' — which do not necessarily seem to coincide. But then perhaps that is to be expected at a time when there is supposed to be a shift of power from the bureaucrats to the politicians.

The re-evaluation of the relationship with the United States has been a long time coming and the rise of China and the relative increase in the technological and economic prowess of South Korea and Taiwan have served to accentuate the urgency of Tokyo's need to re-evaluate its position.

Japan's relationship with the rest of Asia has always been a complicated one with its inability to deal with the consequences of its role in the Second World War making all its relationships with the Asian mainland and Southeast Asia fraught. Historically Japan has felt in Asia but not of it. For years it was not legal to show Japanese films or to show Japanese kanji in South Korea. But that has changed in recent years with showing of a wildly successful Korean soap opera on Japanese television,  many young Japanese learning the language and Seoul becoming a popular destination for shopping trips.

The relationship with China, always at risk of being exploited in negative ways by Beijing, has now become much more stable, assisted by the burgeoning trade relationship and the two countries' mutual interest in keeping the North Korean situation from boiling over. Japanese tourists, too, make the trip to the 'mother country' of their culture always packing their instant noodles with them, just in case.

Although Japan has benefited from the protection of the American 'nuclear umbrella', the rest of the security bargain has largely been in Washington's favour. Japan pays the basing costs for American forces who boast the full range of army, air force, navy and marines from Wakkanai in Hokkaido in the north, a prime location for American monitoring of Russia and North Korea, all the way down the archipelago to Okinawa in the south.

For so long as the Chinese military budget keeps on rising exponentially and the real direction and purpose of    its military build-up remains unclear, particularly with regard to Taiwan, the overall requirement for a strong U.S.-Japan defence connexion is likely to remain valid. But the length of time    that lasts is going to depend largely on how far and how profoundly and  quickly Japan rediscovers its 'Asianness' and allies its interests more and more with the most powerful of the regional  powers — China. Alliances very quickly follow trading and economic interests; so it's a fair bet that the one with    Beijing will quickly move up the diplomatic rankings in the eyes of Tokyo. For, as the old diplomatic saw has it, there are no permanent friendships, only interests.

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