Editorial

History's unlearned lessons

The new era of Western governance was supposed to bring change. The era of liberal interventionism was supposed to be a thing of the past as both Iraq and Afghanistan struggled to reconstitute themselves after the depredations of the Bush-Blair era and their facile contempt for international law.

Suddenly the peoples of several European nations awoke in mid-March to find themselves effectively at war with no chance to debate their participation in a new Middle East conflict; not to mention the people of Libya who were the objects of their attention.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, whether or not they are ultimately deemed to have been “successful” operations, the policymakers never troubled to take their history books off the shelf and even if they had no doubt the response to doubters would have been, and indeed in some cases was, “this time it'll be different.”

As they took on the challenges of the Arab spring the planners don't seem to have read last week's newspapers, let alone the lessons of history.

Certainly the Spring has presented the West with some exquisite dilemmas, which explains a lot of the dithering as Washington and others were forced to choose between the obvious interests of peoples seeking to govern their own futures and hard-nosed pursuit of Western interests. It's hard to let go of people who have been “our bastards” for such a long time. The result has been some breathtaking inconsistencies and decisions which will come back to haunt Western governments.

In reality Washington did seem to end up on the “right side of history” by allowing nature to take its course with Hosni Mubarak's stewardship of Egypt. But that stance seemed to come about more by luck than good judgement. Though it may serve the Egyptian people well, it has had the effect of terrifying the region's despots with effects that continue to unfold. A degree of change came about following the protests in central Cairo. Whether there has really been change of the depth and scope that many believe, only time will tell.

What has not changed is the West's almost instinctive belief in intervention, despite the record.

In the case of Libya it appears that President Obama's initial instincts were correct: he was content for America to stay out of the equation with an understandable reluctance to have the US seen to be going into action in another Muslim country no matter how pressing the human rights case. With the US adamant that it would not be front and centre with the operation, it was left to David Cameron of Britain and Nicolas Sarkozy of France to try and put together the political superstructure necessary for an international operation such as this.

To make the whole thing credible Arab political cover was desperately needed in the absence of noticeable statements of support from the big players in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia. For reasons best known to themselves, but perhaps for want of alternatives, the West chose the Arab League as their partners in crime. Anyone who has followed the activities of the League knows that they have trouble choosing the dates of their meetings, let alone taking on an historic military and political campaign against a fellow member. But take it on they did.

It is a measure of the sheer cynicism and, in the case of Sarkozy, the opportunism, that has marked the last few weeks in Europe that rushed into the operation immediately after the approval of Resolution 1973 at the United Nations without negotiating such vital issues as a war plan and command and control responsibilities.

Sarkozy initially insisted that France would lead the operation, with forthcoming elections at the back of his mind, and ended up dispatching his Rafale jets over Libya before the operation had officially begun. Eventually he was persuaded that though this might have all the characteristics of a 19th century colonial adventure it could not be seen as such in the 21st.  Step forward NATO to fill the gap, maybe.

In reality the West has stepped in to what is, at heart, a tribal dispute. It has elected to back a rag-tag group of oppositionists who have no more of a game plan than they do except somehow removing the dictator, a dictator that the West has recently been cozying up to.

But with the stage set for close-in fighting a long drawn out stalemate seems the most likely outcome in which air power will ultimately make little difference. And the most likely benefactor will be al-Qaeda. Curiously Gadaffi started using the language of Osama bin Laden — speaking of a “crusader” invasion by the West — even though he was already claiming that the initial threat came from al-Qaeda.

So why did the West step in to a family argument? Notoriously feuding families then quickly unite to shout   down the intruder. Ostensibly the West is there to prevent further loss of life and there is no doubt that that has been on a tragic scale. But the doubters, which include ostensible members of the coalition such as the Norwegians, believe it has more to do with oil.

It would be surprising if that were not part of the motivation but that level of hypocrisy is nothing beside that being shown by the American stance on other Arab countries whose peoples are seeking a new era of greater freedom. It seems “America's despots” can be excused almost anything.

In Bahrain a Sunni regime massively over-reacted to peaceful demonstrations for a more responsive democracy, killing demonstrators early on in the piece. Saudi Arabia and fellow Gulf Co-operation Council members the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, then compounded the situation by sending in troops and tanks to shore up the al-Khalifa government. But did the West respond with a “no drive zone?” No such thing.

In Yemen dozens have also died in search of a more responsive regime but Washington has had little to say — because the Yemeni government is an ally in the so-called war on terror.

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