The spoilers did not leave it there. They forced the Pakistani civilian government to retract its initial bid to make amends. An unprecedented nationalist hysteria was cooked up in the Pakistani media to compel the government to adopt the spoilers' tune. It was not until substantial international pressure was mounted on the government that it admitted to the fact that the Mumbai attackers were Pakistanis. The accused operatives of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) were rounded up only after the United Nations designated them as terrorists, to be released later on the pretext that such designation by the world body was not evidence enough for their indictment. The state of Pakistan did not wish to convict these forces for fear of letting out its close links with them in the event of an open and free trial.

Pakistan has gone to absurd lengths to extricate itself out of the mess it has created for itself over the years. It has reduced the distance between itself and the spoilers once again. As a diversionary tactic, it has started accusing India of fomenting trouble in Balochistan and the tribal areas. The situation is getting murkier day by day with some American intelligence inputs doing the rounds (quoted by Pakistani sources) to prove India's links with Baitullah Mehsud, the most powerful leader of the Pakistani Taliban.

The simple logic here is that any mortal threat to Pakistan has to have an Indian connection. Some sources in the Pakistani media have even claimed that Mehsud may not be aware of the Indian hand, but it is there. Such claims, they believe, would offset Indian allegations of Pakistan's collusion with jihadi elements that are attacking Indian targets from Pakistani soil. Some observers in India even argue that spoilers in Pakistan may go to the extent of inventing links between jihadi elements and India if they slip out of Pakistan's control in future.

It is a pity that the civilian administration of President Asif Ali Zardari seems to buy such logic from the spoilers. It is fast expressing itself as a mouthpiece of these regressive elements. The civilian leadership does not realise that here is an historic opportunity for it to walk out of the army's shadow and establish its hold over the foreign and security policy of Pakistan. Instead of doing that it has sheepishly yielded to pressure from the army every time it has sought to impose some amount of control over the military. This vacillation has come as a rude shock for the Indian authorities who now think that it is useless to engage their counterparts when there is no genuine desire on their part to get going on the dialogue track.

It is well known that the two countries were persuaded by the international community (read the United States) to restart talks. India was distinctly unwilling to engage Pakistan in the face of latter's insincerity in bringing the perpetrators of Mumbai to justice. The civilian government was schizophrenic in its approach, i.e., willing to talk but unwilling (or powerless?) to take action against the terrorists targeting India from Pakistan. However, labouring under an acute financial crisis and dependent on external help, it was forced to demonstrate its eagerness to talk to India with promise to punish the planners of Mumbai attack.

The meetings between the leaders of the two countries in Yekaterinburg (Russia) and Sharm-el-Sheikh (Egypt) were thus expected to restart the talks. But they have again been bogged down by controversies. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's bid to be generous towards Pakistan by agreeing to discuss India's alleged role in Balochistan trouble has been overwhelmed by a spontaneous rebuff it has received from the domestic audience in India. There is a distinct sense of hurt driving reactions of the Indian public to Pakistani apathy towards Indian concerns.

Many Indian observers who would advocate caution and recommend restart of talks to help civilian leaders strengthen their position in Pakistan have found Zardari administration too pussyfooted over the Mumbai issue. The mention of Balochistan in the Indo-Pak joint statement at Sharm-el-Sheikh is thus being interpreted as a big concession on India's part, which Pakistan is likely to exploit against India. It may also provide Pakistan with an alibi to sidetrack the issue of terror by implicating Indian role in internal disturbances in Pakistan. The country's Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani has already linked Pakistan's action against LeT with India putting an end to its alleged covert operations in Balochistan.

There are others, not so patient, who argue strongly that India can do without engaging Pakistan and must not reward it for its misbehaviour. They hold that no civilian leader can ignore the army which nourishes a deep-seated grudge on account of its repeated defeats in all military encounters with India. Since the army will continue to dictate and determine the operational contours of Pakistan's security and foreign policies, it is useless to talk to civilian leadership at this juncture.

While one may understand Manmohan Singh's repeated large-hearted gestures to Pakistani leadership, one should not assume a predictable pattern for Pakistan especially in the wake of heinous attacks like the one witnessed in Mumbai last year. After the 2006 serial blasts in Mumbai, Singh had come to the rescue of Musharraf administration and declared that Pakistan was also a victim of terror and had recommended joint terror mechanism. This time around, after making his dissatisfaction perceptible   in Yekaterinburg, he has agreed in Sharm-el-Sheikh to discuss Balochistan with Pakistan.

One has to remember that the establishment of joint anti-terror mechanism was followed by another bloodier attack on Mumbai. The discussion on Balochistan may well lead to a spurt in violence in Kashmir and elsewhere inside India. It is most likely that Pakistan will use this issue to dilute Indian allegations that Pakistani state is sponsoring terror inside India.

On the Indian side, there has been a welcome trend of subjecting sensitive foreign policy measures to parliamentary scrutiny in recent years. Dr Manmohan Singh, relatively apolitical but a man of principles and impeccable credentials, had earlier demonstrated extraordinary nerve in facing his detractors over the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal. His party had stood solidly behind him over the issue.

However, the issue of India-Pakistan relations is certainly a lot more sensitive and is likely to lead to more impassioned debate in days to come. Singh has clarified his position on the floor of the house. If there is general condemnation from here, this issue has the potential of snowballing into a major crisis for the ruling coalition. This may destabilise the government as well, if as a principled person, Singh chooses to leave the scene rather than continue as a controversial leader. At this juncture, therefore, it is wiser to try to find ways of leveraging on a bad bargain and retrace Indian position than push the country further into crisis.

Whatever that may be, as of now, the composite dialogue is off schedule and talks on terrorism are likely to assume centre stage. If Pakistan's worries about Balochistan can be traded off for its assurances to roll back its project of jihad in Kashmir, Manmohan Singh's policy will succeed in convincing the public in India of his wisdom and farsightedness. However, if it gets embroiled in a controversy that India is raising insurgency in Balochistan, it will lead to further erosion of public confidence in the government.

With many U.S. intelligence officials and analysts willing to fuel Pakistani propaganda that India is indeed engaged in subversion in Pakistan, it is more probable that India may draw international flak on this count. Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. envoy for Af-Pak (Afghanistan-Pakistan), has reportedly asked his Indian interlocutors if Delhi would stop its 'activities' in Balochistan. Underlying all this, there is a Pakistani demand for solution of Kashmir issue which is being projected as the root cause of all trouble in the region. In fact, the U.S. is taken over by Pakistani stand that it cannot divert all its resources towards the war on terror until Kashmir is resolved to its satisfaction. Hence, in days to come there might be more pressure on India to return to the dialogue track on Kashmir and other issues.

All in all, India's Pakistan policy is in for a crucial test in the coming days. So far, India has adopted an ad hoc policy and has not spelt out its priorities as clearly as Pakistan has vis-à-vis India. India has to openly state its non-negotiables on Kashmir and proceed on the path of dialogue. Otherwise, it is only natural that there will be such unwelcome twists and turns on the way. While we may debate over all these issues, it is clear that the spoilers across the borders must be having their last laugh.

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