Religious studies experts guide the unit with just the right amount of information and empathy required for the job. The inmates are considered ideologically confused individuals rather than hardened criminals. This helps improve understanding towards them and facilitates communication. The unit works towards strengthening the channels of communication between them and the inmates.

The Detachment is not allowed to use any form of torture to extract the desired information from the inmates. Instead, they are questioned politely and repeatedly in the presence of the Qur'an. The method, simple as it sounds, is said to work. It helps to convert terrorists into obliging intelligence sources. Since the inmates are an abundant source of information regarding terrorist locations and their plans, it makes sense to win their confidence.
In order to extend a hand of comfort, the prisoners often pray in the company of their captors. This brings about a feeling of trust and faith, thus reducing the gap between 'us' and 'them'. The inmates begin to realise their captors are not infidels. As a result, many hardliners have changed their stance and begun assisting the police in apprehending and converting more militants. The families of those who assist the police are taken care of by the government in terms of their children's tuition fees, spouses' employment and wedding expenses.

The unit is given a background of all the inmates to induce empathy amongst unit members. Such information makes it easier for the unit member to treat each inmate differently and understand him better.

This relationship does not end by sentencing the inmate to imprisonment. The Detachment ensures that once the captive is released, he is employed. The government plays an active role in ensuring that the former prisoner is treated humanely, given protection and guaranteed a job. The lure of a better pay package with no assurance does not seem so enticing after all.

The principle of converting a terrorist into an informer is humane and less pain-inducing. Statistics reveal that the method has helped encourage at least 50 per cent of hardliners to renounce violence and/or become police informers. The same principles can be applied to Kashmir while combating insurgency.

For years the Government of India has dealt with the Kashmir issue publicly and has come under the scanner of various human rights organisations. Kashmir has been the bone of contention between India and the Unites States of America, and has been the basis on which India and Pakistan have defined their relationship.  Kashmir has always reaped the benefits of better relations between India and Pakistan during peace dialogues — improved trade and transport routes and the flow of people from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir into India. Kashmiris felt the repercussions of the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 after the Central Government decided to revoke their benefits. This and the constant presence of armed forces in the Valley have led to more than one bloody protest against the Indian establishment.

Successive governments have treated the unrest in Kashmir as a law and order problem that can be solved by suppression and force. Successive governments have failed to see the issue as an identity crisis rather than an anomaly in peace, and have also failed to minimize outside influences that have helped to trigger the turmoil. Added to this, in 1990, the army was called in to bring peace and order.

The government implemented the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (AFSPA) the same year, and have never repealed it since. The Act, given its draconian nature and the atrocities it allows against human rights, has attracted international attention. Local political parties have used the Act as a raison d'être for coming into power. Various youth groups and parties like the Hurriyat Conference have used  it to justify violent protests in the Valley.

The Act has managed to maintain law and order but only for a short period of time. The extent of dissent in the Valley has been difficult to judge, given the increasing number of people in the region coming out to exercise their vote. However, peace in Kashmir will be unattainable unless the Indian government is able to make some serious policy changes towards the state.

The Narasimha government did try to initiate change with the creation of the National Human Rights Commission in 1993. The organisation demonstrated autonomy but has been unable to bring perpetrators to justice, given how information is shrouded under the label of official secrets.

The Army, with much success, have converted former militants into ikhwans or informers. They work to bolster the security of villages and divulge information to the armed forces about terrorist activity within the area. The Army uses former militants, their faces covered by masks, to pick out suspected terrorists whilst keeping their own identities intact.

However, these concepts have clashed with the AFSPA. The issue is far from forgotten. People claim they have been cheated time and again by the local and Central governments resorting to violence. The Government of India seems to have failed in capturing the hearts and minds of people in its struggle to integrate Kashmir into mainland India.

The Kashmir issue is not one that is going to die soon. It will take a while before the Kashmiris are ready to start afresh. A policy change in the right direction, however, could provide the required impetus for the paradigm shift to take place.

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