The analysis of the British think tank Chatham House poll across the Kashmir by David Watts (Paradox of a conflict: two Kashmirs, two voices)  grossly underplays a major finding of the poll. While he gives enough space to the finding that 50 per cent of those polled in AJK on the Pakistani side wished the whole of Kashmir to join the Islamic state of Pakistan, he almost dismisses in a few words the finding that only two per cent in J&K on the Indian side voted for joining Pakistan. The finding underscores that 98 per cent of those polled in J&K voted against joining Pakistan.

He fails to mention that even in the couple of districts of  Kashmir Valley, the epicentre of  separatist inspired violence and hired stone pelters' activity, only about seven per cent favoured joining Pakistan. As the Chatham House report records: “In the Valley of Kashmir, the only region with anyone intending to vote to join Pakistan, the highest proportions, 6% and 7%, were in Srinagar and Badgam districts.” This is an important detail missed by your journal. For all the separatist propaganda which feeds on the television and print media attention, those wanting to join Pakistan constitute a minuscule minority.

All the more important because the Valley which is the most populous region of the entire state is a Muslim majority area. Clearly the voting pattern sends out the message that an overwhelming majority of people of the state, including the Muslim majority, are against joining Pakistan. That lends an entirely different colour to the whole issue. 

All this is not to deny the existence of genuine grievances like lack of jobs and opportunities, especially among the youth. Comparatively, however, conditions in J&K are a tad better than in other states of India, certainly much better than those prevailing in AJK on the Pakistani side.

Jagdish Kumar
Jammu

Apropos the article: US policy: Deeper into the Quagmire (Asian Affairs, July 2010), it has now become a trend with the Americans to run into some weak and vulnerable nation on some flimsy grounds or the other with some ulterior motive. Once its purpose is served, it makes no bones about its inclination to beating a hasty retreat at a critical juncture when it is needed the most for rehabilitation and restoration effort. It seems the sole superpower has learnt no lessons from its Vietnam experience, nay Vietnam misadventure.

As was the case of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan too are heading towards similar fate when the invader would call it quits in a huff leaving these countries in a mess of its own making.

Historically, winning armies used to adhere to a certain unwritten code that imposed on the conquerors the responsibility of the vanquished nation after a war. They would have a duty to ensure that normalcy returns to the conquered lands once the dust of war settled down. This is too much to expect from the civilized countries of today which proclaim from the rooftops that they are the torch bearers of justice and fair play.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, if the US had undertaken the responsibly of an arbiter it could have ensured long lasting solution to the Afghan question. After all, the US at that time had the advantage of being a mentor of the Taliban and become the sole superpower in the world after the downfall of Soviet Union. Taking advantage of its position it could have easily brokered peace among the warring mujahideen factions. But it chose to make a exit from the scene leaving the war ravaged nation at the mercy of the religious clerics.

If the US had used some discretion at that time the subsequent turn of events would not have landed it in this quagmire.

Arthur Wheaton
Northampton

. top