India-US N-tangle
Fragile Hopes of Revival of Deal

The stalemate induced by the Left Front on the deal has universally affected faith in the Indian government’s ability to deliver on its commitments, comments Inder Malhotra

  Over a month ago, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rang up President George W. Bush of the United States sadly to tell him that his (Singh’s) government was having difficulty in pushing ahead the Indo-US deal on civilian nuclear cooperation, the American reaction was twofold. Publicly, the Bush administration said that the ‘setback’ to the mutually beneficial and highly innovative agreement was ‘unfortunate’, but there were no hard feelings. Privately, the same sources — officials as well as South Asia experts in think-tanks, many of whom are former officials and diplomats dealing with the region and are still plugged into the foreign policy establishment — disclosed that the reality was starkly different. Americans, and Bush personally, were deeply hurt and very unhappy.
   Both the Indian Prime Minister and the US President had invested their political capital into the deal even though it had proved highly controversial in both countries. However, it is undeniable that President Bush’s efforts behind the deal and his stakes in its success were much the greater. He was hoping to have the deal as a major success in his legacy that has been darkened by the unending Iraq War and the escalating confrontation with Iran.
   As time went by, the specifics of America’s adverse reaction became clear: India’s credibility, Washington believed, had been ‘eroded’, and this damage was ‘not confined to the US’. What the officials said politely, CEOs of powerful corporations put bluntly. Investment in India, they stated, was likely to be affected if only because ‘faith in the Indian government’s ability to deliver on its commitments and promises had been shaken’.
   Authoritative American sources also made it clear that no one should expect that the deal could be revived easily or any time soon. Teresita Schaffeur, a former diplomat well experienced about the region, who now runs the South Asia section of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that if attempts were made to renew the deal, both governments ‘will be very cautious’. Another source said, off the record, ‘It will take at least 10 years to get out of this hole.’
   Yet, lo and behold. Against this bleak backdrop things changed in New Delhi to the extent that the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government became hopeful of resurrecting the deal that its critics had pronounced as clinically dead. Domestic politics had nearly killed the deal, and a sudden twist in domestic politics has brought about the change. The Left Front, led by the CPI(M) (Communist Party of India-Marxist), commands 62 votes without which the government cannot survive. Their threat of withdrawing this support if the deal was put into operation had provoked Manmohan Singh to tell them to do their worst. The CPI(M) hard-line general secretary, Prakash Karat, was unmoved. Sonia Gandhi praised the Prime Minister and endorsed the deal. But she obviously worried about the panic among the Congress party’s allies in the UPA, and even among Congressmen. None of them wanted elections before the due date, May 2009. The Congress blinked and backtracked. It formed a UPA-Left Front Committee to iron out differences. That never happened. On the contrary, Karat declared that the Left’s objection was not to the nuclear deal alone but to the entire strategic relationship with the US, of which the deal was ‘a centrepiece’. Manmohan had to make that call to the White House.
   That phone call would not have been necessary if the Left Front was alone in attacking the nuclear agreement with the US. Astoundingly, the principal Opposition party, the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) that, when in power, had initiated the policy of going ‘all the way with the USA’, also turned as bitter an enemy of the deal as the CPI(M). At the root of this conundrum is the implacable mutual hatred between the saffron party and the Congress. Bitter factional warfare within the BJP has made things worse.
   It is all the more interesting therefore, that after the virtual collapse of the deal, the US sent such high-powered emissaries to the BJP as former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, in an attempt to make the Opposition party ‘see reason’ over the deal. Kissinger went so far as to warn that failure of the deal could impact prospects of India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council. This has made no visible difference to the BJP’s approach. A 180-degree change in policy would expose it to ridicule. The impending election in the state of Gujarat, where the Congress and the BJP are in headlong collision, has widened the gulf.
   Amidst such a dismal situation what has come to the aid of the Congress and supporters of the Indo-US deal is that the CPI(M) has shot itself gravely in the foot. In West Bengal, one of the two states it rules, it had been facing stiff opposition to its plan to acquire agricultural land at the remote village of Nandigram for the construction of a gigantic car plant. There were armed clashes. Came a stage when local peasantry — with the backing of several parties including the Marxists — rebelled. No official of the state government or police could even enter the village.
   The Marxists then committed the unpardonable folly of letting loose their armed cadres, followed by the repressive machine of the state, to ‘recapture’ Nandigram. It did not prove easy. The help of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) had to be sought. Many people were killed. The Marxists are not only isolated but also spurned. Shell-shocked and condemned countrywide, they fear that early elections could prove harmful for them. They are therefore playing for time.
   To gain time, they have shown some flexibility. The deal cannot go back to the US Congress for approval until India has first negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and India-specific safeguards agreement and persuaded the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) to change its guidelines. Initially opposed to any discussions with the IAEA, the CPI(M) has now ‘allowed’ the government to hold the negotiations. But it has also laid down that any agreement with the IAEA cannot be initialled, let alone signed, unless the Left Front approves it. The Leftists have also directed the Indian negotiating team to raise questions on which the Vienna-based agency has no competence to pronounce.
   Consequently, in my view, New Delhi is mistaken in assuring Washington that the Marxists are now looking for a face-saver to let the deal go through. Their visceral opposition to relationship with the US remains. They evidently think that by the time an agreement with the IAEA is ready, Nandigram would be forgotten and they can veto the deal.
   Sources in Washington tell me that even if India is able to conclude all the requirements by February the Bush regime will not have the time or the strength to get it passed by the US Congress. The lame-duck US President has lost most of his clout. The aides who helped him persuade difficult Senators and Congressmen in the past have left the White House. Hillary Clinton is already declaring that her first priority would be to get the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) ratified by the US Senate and by China, and then ask all other countries, especially India, to sign it. She is also making demands in relation to fissile material cut-off that India can never accept. The Marxists seem wise to all this. They are telling whoever will listen that they will not allow the deal to be brought into force before the 2009 election, and ‘certainly not during Bush’s remaining term’.

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