The U.S. idea of 'outsourcing' the war on terror in Afghanistan to the reluctant European allies has only brought out the trans-Atlantic divide. The Afghan Taliban and their 'intellectual' stakeholders in the Pakistani establishment were ingenious enough to realise the idea of resurrecting the Taliban monolith while proposing the thesis of 'moderate Taliban'.

However, against all odds, the Bonn Process fetched for Afghanistan a modern constitution, a democratically elected government and a parliament. It also recognised the significance of traditional Afghan institutions like Loya Jirga. The Bonn Process also played a notable role in civilianising the role of 'warlords' or the regional satraps. The non-Taliban factional leaders and commanders, whether within or outside the government, have largely refrained from making militaristic assertions so far. They have been stakeholders in the new political system, right from participating in the presidential electoral process of 2004 to evolving into a legal opposition within the parliament. A sense of inter-dependence has come to define the relationship between Karzai and the 'former' warlords both from the north and the south of the country. Lack of effective state institutions has worked to the advantage of both 'pro' and the not so anti-Kabul forces alike.

Karzai, in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election, did try to sideline the leaders and commanders of the former United Front only to lean back on them in the run-up to the 2009 presidential election. With the destruction of the traditional centre-province balance of power, and lack of institution-building by a non-committal West, Karzai administration was bound to 'Afghanise' itself much before the West thought of it.  Same goes for Karzai administration's efforts to reconcile with the Taliban and its Afghan allies. There is no doubt that Karzai has been the central figure in the West-sponsored political process in Afghanistan, even when the U.S. was out to 'liberate' Iraqis or when some of the Nato commanders were negotiating with the local Taliban, often paying them to maintain a semblance of stability in their respective area of operation. 

As the Obama administration began shifting the focus from Iraq to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region early this year, it found itself far more constrained in convincing its European and regional allies of its new Af-Pak strategy. The divisions within the U.S. administration too have added to the growing confusion that has come to mark the Western involvement in Afghanistan. The growing friction between Karzai and the West continues to undermine the U.S. efforts, making Taliban and allies far more convinced of their impending 'victory'. It would also impact on Pakistan's ongoing military operations in its tribal areas. Despite all allegations of electoral fraud, West will have to work with the new government in Kabul. Undermining Kabul would only make things worse for the West. The recent presidential election in many ways was a reflection of what has gone wrong with the U.S.-led Western strategy in Afghanistan. There is no doubt that the all-pervasive corruption in the Afghan state structures needs to be fought at all levels, at the same time it has to be understood that it is not achievable in a matter of few years.

A country which has been at war for three decades, and with all its state institutions comprehensively destroyed, cannot be rebuilt without a sustained assistance and an extraordinary patience on the part of the international community. Rebuilding of Afghanistan state has to be a monumental and a generational effort. There can be no two opinions about it.

The Obama administration has rightfully realised the need to reinforce the military component of its Afghan strategy and also the need to press Pakistan to forgo its policy of using radical religious entities to pursue its interests against the neighbouring countries. However, the idea of an exit strategy needs to be calibrated in a manner that it does not send a negative message across the region. It need not be part of the Western public and official discourse. Otherwise, it will not only embolden the Taliban and Al Qaeda but a range of extremist forces active in the South-Central Asia region and even beyond. This is all the more important as the U.S. seeks to expand its engagement with Pakistan on the Afghan issue.

However, as the U.S. deepens its reliance on Pakistan, the significance of sustained regional support for its new Afghan strategy too has to be taken into account. Apart from working closely with India, China, Russia and the Central Asian states, the prospects of U.S.-Iranian cooperation on the Afghanistan issue needs to be explored in a more meaningful manner, especially in view of the U.S. withdrawing its military presence from Iraq. Regional cooperation is also critical to fight against narco-menace which continues to feed into insurgent and terrorist groups active in the region and are also a hindrance to transforming the Afghan economy.

Today, the need to protect the achievements of the Bonn Agreement and the political process that flowed from it, however flawed that may have been, is more than ever. Never before in the history of Afghan conflict has the international community been involved in such a manner in rebuilding a state.    It is also an opportunity for the    Afghans to reconstruct their country anew and retrieve the retrievable. There will be corruption, violence, misunderstandings, dissatisfaction, may be repeated mistakes, but the process has to go on. There are no alternatives to keep pushing for political and economic reforms in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. To keep up the effort, the prospects for a Bonn-II conference by 2011-12 may be explored. In order to take the process forward, the current strategies may then be re-assessed to figure out a future roadmap for Afghanistan 2020.

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