But the new stance to be pursued by the British in Helmand appears to be the beginning of the end of what has been the de facto reason for the British presence: containing or turning back the influence of the Taliban as a means of creating a solid base for nation-building.

Matters have been complicated by the inability of the British government to be clear in its own mind as to what their objectives in Afghanistan were. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown's constant reiteration that the British presence is vital to prevent terrorism on the United Kingdom mainland has been repeated so many times that one has to conclude that either he really believes it or that he is past dealing honestly with the public over Afghanistan and is now irretrievably locked into playing follow-my-leader with the Americans.

The notion that terrorism in the United Kingdom is not much more likely to emanate from neighbouring Pakistan or be home-grown — as have all the recent incidents — is laughable. The argument that British troops being shot at in Helmand are actively preventing Taliban either trekking to Pakistan to be trained in the urban bombing of Western cities or getting on aircraft to blow them up is specious. That type of terrorism is the preserve of Al Qaeda and the two should not be confused. Indeed the two groups have little in common either in religious belief or ideology though they may make temporary common cause when it suits them on the ground. The Taliban are defending their home turf — remember when the West welcomed their emergence as a counter-weight to the warlordism and corruption of Afghanistan? So it is hardly surprising that they are so determined even though their methods are inhuman.

The mother and father of all counter-insurgency campaigns was that conducted by the British in Malaya when the insurgents — Chinese-backed communists — were denied the support of countryside settlements by sealing them off from the communists and denying the latter the sustenance that could be obtained by trading with villagers. The military campaign was confined to attacking the communist base camps and hideouts in the jungle except when the insurgents came out into the open with terrorist attacks.

The campaign, which the Americans attempted to replicate in Vietnam, was ultimately successful because it prevented the communist campaign from being carried through from the villages into the metropolitan areas. The communists' drive was effectively over before it was allowed to 'infect' the cities.

The point of the Malaya campaign was that it thus secured the countryside first and that, in turn, secured the metropolitan areas. By reversing the process in Afghanistan the British run the risk of leaving the core of the population, and the most vulnerable parts at that, unprotected from the blandishments and the threats of the Taliban.

The reality on the ground is that for many Afghans there is little to choose between the warlords who governed their lives before the arrival of the Taliban and the latter.  In a number of cases throughout Helmand once the Taliban were driven out the people were once again subjected to the corruption of the warlords and their henchmen and their lives seemed to go into reverse in many ways. At least the Taliban bring a kind of stability and summary justice even if many of their other practices are medieval. The Taliban are able to feed on the lack of economic stability in the countryside because they encourage the growing of opium poppies by providing the inputs and then paying the growers with product. So other means of survival have to be found for families.

It is estimated that about 65 per cent of young people are unemployed while growing and shipping the illegal opium crop is worth about half of the country's gross domestic product while the informal sector accounts for about 80 per cent of the day-to-day economic activity.

Surely the first place to start is with a determined and wide-scale attempt to get Afghans into viable jobs so that they can feed themselves. A small, British-funded programme is trying to do just that in Helmand. The Helmand Islamic Investment and Finance Corporation (HIIFC) lends small amounts of cash in kind to traders, farmers and individuals undertaking cottage industries such as embroidery.

The concern already has three offices in the province while its offices in Lashkar Gah have to have an armed guard and their personnel in the field suffer Taliban harassment. The HIIFC gives loans in kind which are governed by sharia law so they are subject to a 2 per cent 'administration fee' rather than interest payments which are forbidden under Islamic law. Since the end of 2007 the credit union has loaned a total of $1m to 1,441 people.

Backers of work creation schemes believe that getting people into jobs is the way to long-term stability and there is certainly a hunger for employment which U.S.AID is trying to capitalise upon with a $250m cash-for-work scheme which aims to put 100,000 Afghans into work in Helmand and Kandahar provinces over the next year.

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