In the process, both the president and the army chief ended up being accused of callousness towards civilian lives — and, in the eyes of a section of the West, of committing war crimes. It was a charge both denied.
The end of the Ltte brought about schism between the two men, each of who considered himself the architect of the military victory that decimated a foe who had bled Sri Lanka. Both were feted as heroes by large sections of the Sinhalese majority, a sure guarantee to script political success.

Fonseka felt hurt that he was being denied the credit due to him. President Rajapaksa and his brothers, notably Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, felt the army chief was becoming too big for his boots.
It was the beginning of the end of a relationship that once looked rock solid.

When Rajapaksa, a veteran politician from the Sinhalese south, became the president in November 2005, he was more than clear in his mind that he needed to wipe out the Ltte. The Tigers gave him the opportunity he was looking for by provoking him and the military.

Although he chose, barring some exceptions, his closest advisors and aides mostly from within his extended family, he gave a free hand to Fonseka — not a family member — to build a military that was low on morale and fights it out to the finish.

Rajapaksa aides argue that but for the political leadership provided by him and the way his government warded off intense Western diplomatic pressure when the war was at its peak, Fonseka could never have been able to secure the military victory he ultimately achieved.

Not just this. Rajapaksa supporters argue that Fonseka was out of action for months, seeking medical treatment for serious injuries he suffered when an Ltte woman suicide bomber almost killed him in April 2006; so he could hardly claim credit for leading the soldiers during the entire duration of the war.

But Fonseka fans insist it was his leadership that mattered for the army and it was under his command that the Ltte was forced out of the eastern province (after over a decade) in 2007. The military then made rapid forays into the north to finally crush the Ltte. The president, it is alleged, was jealous of Fonseka's achievement and had him gently kicked up with a view to corner all the glory — for himself and his family.

The Fonseka-Rajapaksa war was the best thing that could have happened to the main opposition United National Party (UNP), which appeared to be in the dumps by the time the war ended, accused of appeasing the Tigers by signing a Norway-brokered, internationally backed ceasefire agreement with the rebels in 2002.

Party strategists grasped the opportunity with both hands. Backing Fonseka in the battle for presidency would do away with the 'sin' of having allegedly given respectability to the Tigers. To its numerical comfort, the Sinhalese-Marxist Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), which had stood by Rajapaksa in 2005, also threw its lot with Fonseka. Both the UNP and JVP were avenging the break-ups Rajapaksa had engineered in the two parties since 2005.

With the Sinhalese votes divided between the two 'war heroes', Sri Lanka is bound to witness a keen battle for presidency in which minorities — both Tamils as well as Tamil-speaking Muslims — will play a key role. In 2005, it was the Ltte's politically immature diktat asking the Tamils to boycott the presidential election that provided a wafer think victory to Rajapaksa, who ended up being Prabhakaran's nemesis. With the Ltte gone, Tamils (and Muslims) are bound to vote — and vote for one who they feel will serve their interests better. Realising the mood, Fonseka is speaking a language that is music to most Tamils. He is accusing Rajapaksa of violating the democratic rights and muzzling the media besides creating a family rule. Some of these happen to be charges the West has hurled at the Rajapaksa regime, only to invite scorn from a Colombo that is increasingly comfortable with Pakistan, China and Iran.

India's worry is Sri Lanka's political future. Will the country embrace a genuine reconciliation after decades of war and co-opt the minorities or not? Notwithstanding the many promises made to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the scenario does not look very bright. In recent times, Rajapaksa had been saying that he needed a sweeping majority in the 225-seat parliament to carry out wide-ranging constitutional reforms to empower the minorities.

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