asianaffairs

Scandal exposes Zardari's rudderless rule

An inflammatory memo has called up a political firestorm in Pakistan, triggering a crisis that could have further repercussions.

By Rahimullah Yusufzai

CASUALTY: Pakistan's former ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, has been forced to resign over the memo

The mysterious memorandum that Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz claims to have received from Pakistan's then ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, for onward delivery to the then Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, on May 10 this year has claimed its first casualty. Haqqani was instructed by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani to resign so that a fair and objective inquiry could be held into the scandal now being referred to as 'Memogate'.

Sherry Rahman, a former journalist who is a PPP member of the National Assembly and served as information minister before falling out with President Zardari, was appointed as ambassador in place of Haqqani. She was close to the late Benazir Bhutto and is known for her liberal views and support for progressive causes and women's rights. It appears that the military establishment was on board while making this important decision.

Haqqani was summoned to Pakistan and forced to resign due to pressure from the powerful Pakistani military, which was outraged by the contents of the memo that sought to reduce its role in the country's affairs with help from the US. The drafter of the secret letter, which Mansoor Ijaz claims was

Haqqani, offered a tempting deal to the US in return for support to forestall an army coup in Pakistan in the aftermath of the unilateral operation by the American Special Forces on May 2 in Abbottabad that led to the assassination of the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. The memo argued that 'a unique window of opportunity exists for the civilians to gain the upper hand over army and intelligence directorates due to their complicity in the Osama bin Laden matter'. The contents of the memo are such that the Pakistani military was outraged and its supporters in politics and the media said it amounted to treason as a foreign power was being invited to intervene in Pakistan's affairs.

Among the six offers listed in the memo was replacement of the existing army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) head Lt General Ahmad Shuja Pasha with a new security team that would strengthen the elected civilian set-up and would be acceptable to the US. This would cut the ISI down to size and disrupt its alleged ties to the Taliban, the Haqqani network and other militant groups, so that all irritants in relationship with Afghanistan would be removed, thus normalizing ties with India by bringing the perpetrators of the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai to justice and delivering the wanted Pakistani men to New Delhi, and opening up Pakistan's nuclear assets to more detailed international supervision.

Most Pakistanis felt it was wrong to involve the US on the side of the ruling PPP and its allies to correct the historic imbalance in the civil-military relationship. They thought it was brinkmanship and a recipe for disaster. There was widespread belief that political forces should put their own house in order, meet the expectations of the people and wage a democratic struggle to reduce the hold of the military on the reins of power.

Even after his resignation, Haqqani continued to deny that he planned or wrote the memo on his own or at the behest of President Asif Ali Zardari. He even showed defiance, arguing that he resigned to bring closure to a meaningless and artificially created controversy triggered by a self-centred businessman because it was threatening Pakistan's fledgling democracy. While emphasizing his commitment to democracy, Haqqani added that he had been striving to empower elected leaders as per the Constitution and still had much to contribute to building a new Pakistan free of bigotry and intolerance. It was clearly an attempt to embarrass the non-elected military leadership and win the sympathies of the democratic forces.

On his part, Mansoor Ijaz threw down the gauntlet to Haqqani by claiming that he possessed all records of their phone conversations and meetings. There are confirmed reports that the ISI chief Lt General Pasha flew to London on October 22 to meet Mansoor Ijaz in order to verify the record of the phone and text messages he possessed of his interaction with Haqqani. The military obviously did its own investigations through the ISI to link Haqqani, who was never able to win the trust of the Generals and was widely seen as loyal to President Zardari, to the drafting of the memo before making its move to get him sacked. It also persuaded Prime Minister Gilani to order the detailed inquiry into the matter.

The charge-sheet against Haqqani was long. Thirty-two questions were reportedly put to him during the interrogation session attended by President Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani, Army chief General Kayani and ISI head Lt Gen Pasha in Islamabad. Apparently, he was unable to clear his name and was therefore asked to resign. One should expect the military to take the matter to its logical conclusion and more heads could roll. Ambassador Haqqani has gone but the crisis generated by the explosive memo isn't over yet.

It has been suggested that President Zardari too could be eventually linked to the memo. This would further widen the gulf between the civilian elected government and the military. Still, it appears unlikely that General Kayani would overthrow the democratically elected government and capture power. In fact, there was no threat of a military coup after the Abbottabad incident when bin Laden was assassinated, which necessitated the drafting of the memo, nor is there such a possibility now that the consequences of this explosive non-paper are beginning to emerge. One would not have ruled out such a possibility if someone impulsive like General Pervez Musharraf was the army chief, but Kayani has resisted the temptation to take over despite ample opportunities during the last three and a half years of civilian misrule. One expects him not to do so in future as another coup would only compound Pakistan's problems.

The timing of sending the memo to Admiral Mullen in May could be explained by the fact that the Pakistani military was humiliated by its failure to detect bin Laden's presence in the garrison town of Abbottabad. Another embarrassment was that it was unaware about the US Special Forces intruding into Pakistan's airspace in helicopters from Afghanistan and returning without being challenged after accomplishing their mission. This was no time for the weakened military to stage a coup against the Zardari government. Rather, it afforded an opportunity to clip the military's wings and this could be why such timing was chosen to plot the move against the Generals by writing the memo.

But instead of weakening the military, the scandal has brought the rudderless civilian government under pressure. President Zardari would have agreed only reluctantly to the removal of his trusted aide Haqqani, who had to be sacrificed to avoid further harm and save the government.

Sensing an opportunity to bring down the government or force an early general election, the opposition parties have also mounted pressure on the government to come clean on the issue. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's PML-N has launched a legal battle by filing a petition asking the Supreme Court of Pakistan to probe the matter. Imran Khan's PTI has also threatened to take the government to court over the affair. It wants a judicial inquiry instead of a government one and has accused President Zardari and Haqqani of committing treason. Smaller opposition parties have blamed the Zardari government for sponsoring the memo to invite the US to interfere in Pakistan's affairs, harm national institutions such as the military and the ISI, and make compromises on its nuclear programme.

The memo has caused a political firestorm in Pakistan and triggered a crisis. It has led to Ambassador Haqqani's resignation and could have further consequences. The government won't fall but it has been fatally weakened. President Zardari might keep his job but with less credibility than before. His relationship with the military could become even more untrustworthy. Such an uncertain situation would certainly benefit the opposition parties and could even lead to early elections.

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