asianaffairs-Feb 2008
                           
                                  Bangladesh

Learning the wrong lessons from Pakistan

The army’s targeting the democratic political parties raises the spectre of the political landscape in Bangladesh altering in a way that brings religious parties, some with extremist agendas, to the fore, comments Prakash Nanda

  In 1999, when chief of the army Pervez Musharraf staged a coup and took over the administration of Pakistan, the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis welcomed it as a change from the corruption and malgovernance by the democratic regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. But Musharraf has belied those hopes and Pakistanis are clamouring for democracy again.
   In Bangladesh, when on 11 January 2007 the democratically elected government was replaced by virtual military rule, Dhaka’s social elite, usually most vocal against human rights violations, appeared most pleased. They were happy over the treatment meted out to politicians. People across the board saw it as retribution for the corruption and abuse of power in the past fifteen years by two former prime ministers — Sheikh Hasina of Awami League (AL) and Begum Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
   The military hand is hidden in the velvet glove of a technocratic team led by Fakhruddin Ahmed, an inter-nationally acclaimed economist. It is described as ‘caretaker government’. Ahmed had promised to organise a free and fair election within 90 days of taking over. Organising elections is the primary role of a caretaker government but Ahmed’s has now become an ‘interim government’. It has undertaken a major reform agenda beginning with a massive anti-corruption drive against the top political figures of the two main parties as well as elements of the business community involved in various financial improprieties. More than 100,000 people have been arrested, including prominent political leaders such as Tareque Rahman, the eldest son of Khaleda Zia and Joint Secretary General of the BNP, Abdul Jalil, Secretary General of the AL, former cabinet ministers, as well as the mayors of four major cities drawn from both parties.
    With popular support, the caretaker government attempted to send both former prime ministers into exile by bringing various charges against them, ranging from extortion to murder. Although it backtracked from the move succumbing to international pressure and strong media intervention, it conveyed a strong message that the former prime ministers’ wings had been clipped. If in Pakistan Musharraf never wanted Benazir and Nawaz Sharif to rule again, the ‘caretaker’ rulers in Dhaka do not seem to be in a mood to allow the ‘two Begums’ to rule Bangladesh again.
   The military has given conflicting signals about its intentions. The Chief of Army Staff, General Moeen U. Ahmed, talked about Bangladesh constructing ‘its own brand of democracy’; but faced with criticism expressed in the media, he quickly assured the public that the armed forces had no interest in ruling the country. However, he and his colleagues have reaffirmed that the military has consistently stood by the agenda of governance and political reforms. What they actually meant is not clear. The army could customise the political landscape to ensure itself a role in future decision-making process under the guise of a national security council, comprising three former armed forces chiefs, civil society representatives, and senior political figures.
   The army chief has, meanwhile, announced that elections — already postponed twice — would be held by the end of 2008. There is speculation that the army would hammer out a deal with the BNP and AL, without Zia and Hasina. On 7 January 2008 Law and Information Adviser Barrister Mainul Hosein launched a veiled attack on politicians, saying that ‘it would be pointless to dream of returning to politics of plunder and anarchy that prevailed before 11 January 2007’. Newspapers have reported the government’s pursuit of a ‘minus two formula’ (without Khaleda and Hasina) to democratise the BNP and AL. For a long time many leaders of these two parties have been chafing under the overweening clout of the two ladies. Some of them are now talking publicly about party reforms without them.
   But these second-rung leaders have not been able to inspire much public confidence, some of them have been notorious for corruption, and may not be able to hold together the warring factions within their parties. Whether the caretaker government can build support among credible political leaders to both back its reform agenda and then sustain it when elected to office remains to be seen. Both Khaleda and Hasina enjoy the support of the rank and file members of their parties. Even if ousted they may be able to control their parties from outside, as Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif did in Pakistan while in exile. In any case, meddling in the factional politics of mainstream political parties will inevitably create a partisan image for the caretaker government. Also, parties formed with government support can only win a government-engineered election.
   When on 22 February 2007 Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus announced his decision to form a new political party, to be named Nagorik Shakti to clean politics, it seemed like a breath of fresh air in the murky politics of Bangladesh. However, after a little over two months, on 3 May 2007, Yunus gave up this initiative on the ground that the various individuals and groups who had encouraged him to join politics had themselves not come forward to publicly join his party. Earlier in 1993, Kamal Hossain, a former Law and Foreign Minister in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s government, broke away from the AL to form a political party, GonoForum, committed to clean politics. GonoForum did not win a single seat in parliament in 1996 and 2001.
For over a year, Bangladeshis have lived under a state of emergency: their constitutional rights have been suspended, civil liberties limited, and hundreds of thousands, ranging from former prime ministers to ad hoc pedlars, have been arrested under the banner of ‘fighting corruption’. Meanwhile, the Taka has lost 10 per cent in value, leading businessmen are kept behind bars, and the price of essential commodities such as edible oil and rice are being forcibly kept down by the army’s experiment in state-controlled economics. The army’s targeting the democratic political parties also raises the spectre of the political landscape in Bangladesh altering in a way that brings religious parties — some with extremist agendas — to the fore.

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