With an Iraq-like surge of thousands of new American troops in the offing the U.S. military needs to be certain about two things: that it will be able to supply the troops on the ground in Afghanistan and that their operations will be efficiently back-stopped by the Pakistani Army with a parallel commitment to pursue militants within Pakistan's borders and ensure that it is not a safe haven.

The militants have been such a problem in the past that the U.S. military has had to resort to cross-border raids into Pakistan to tackle them. With a view to setting this all in order, General David Petraeus, head of Central Command, has just paid a lightning visit to Pakistan to ensure that the forthcoming surge of troops — up to 60,000 men — into Afghanistan has a reasonable chance of success through best efforts by the Pakistanis to seal the border to prevent it being used as a sanctuary. With the spring fighting season in the offing it is an urgent task for the new commander. But with reports of a new ceasefire being negotiated between the jihadists in Pakistan and the government the immediate prospects for the general are not encouraging.

Although we are not privy to what passed between the leadership in Islamabad and General Petraeus it seems he has such little confidence in the continued total reliance on the Khyber supply route that an alternative supply chain needs to be set up. Much of the supplies for the Nato operation in Afghanistan arrive by sea in Karachi and are then delivered by land through the Khyber Pass. That will continue to be the case for the heavier material which is too weighty for air delivery. Pakistan will also continue to be the source for refined fuels but for other materials a new supply route, which is not subject to the uncertainties of the jihadist movement and the India-Pakistan relationship, needs to be established. The problem for the general and his Nato confreres is that the options are limited and all come down to dealing with countries with which the United States is not on particularly good terms.

The shortest and most convenient route would be through Iran from the port of Chahbahar. But since it is not very long since Washington was threatening to attack in order to demolish the country's alleged nuclear weapons programme it would take some time to get to first base with Iran never mind transfer war material across its territory.

The alternatives all involve engaging with Russia to one degree or another and would, therefore, be at the mercy of Moscow at a time when there has not yet been an opportunity to test out the relationship between the new administration and Russia. But the Nato leadership has no choice but to take the Central Asian route if military operations in Afghanistan are not to die on the vine.

The most friendly, but also arguably the most vulnerable, route would be through Georgia but that would be subject to the potential interference of Russian troops stationed nearby in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The only remaining options are through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and into Afghanistan via Kazakhstan and Russia itself. Only Uzbekistan would be in a position to act without Russian clearance and, in the event, would be unlikely to do so given Russian sensitivities about its former empire. Agreement between Moscow and Washington would lay the groundwork for the new supply arrangements but there remains the still more complex business of where to actually land the materials and how to effect delivery along the various rail networks with their varying gauges.

But such an agreement between Moscow and Washington would be unlikely to be confined to the immediate question of Afghanistan: Russia would be looking for something of a more comprehensive nature covering the broad sweep of the relationship and, recognising America's pressing dilemma, the agreement is not likely to come cheap.

General Petraeus is seeking to replicate his success in Iraq where the surge in troop numbers was accompanied by a concerted programme of winning over the Sunni factions to the American cause while rooting out the elements of Al Qaeda in Iraq who, by then, had made considerable headway in a deeply disillusioned populace. That was followed by the establishment of a withdrawal date for U.S. troops, which has given Iraqis a positive target that they can work towards.
The democratic framework which has now been established is arguably one of the most corrupt in the world with members of parliament who, for the most part, live outside the country in Jordan or Syria and only appear for parliamentary sessions which take place within the fortified green zone. All this is accompanied by sumptuous allowances and salaries which are payable even after the member leaves office. But whatever its shortcomings it is a start in the direction of spreading the benefits of government over a wider range of people than the elitist cronies who benefited under Saddam Hussein.

But the general will find Afghanistan infinitely more complex than Iraq. While Iraq was held together under Saddam by dictatorship and disintegrated into tribal and religious groups after the invasion, Afghanistan has been developing as a fragmented nation led by regional warlords for decades. Its central government is confined to the area around the capital Kabul and is, in any case, seen largely as a western contrivance. It cannot defend itself without western forces while the outlying regions are controlled by warlords benefiting hugely from booming sales of drugs while the Taliban gains in strength and influence.

Over the longer term the general has little option but to negotiate his way out of the country in a sort of ordered, fighting retreat leaving behind a nation which will most likely rapidly become a facsimile of the Afghanistan that western forces first attacked seven years ago.

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