asianaffairs

February 2009

India after Mumbai

Twofold fight

New Delhi is revamping its security structure at home and has launched a diplomatic offensive abroad.

By Inder Malhotra

EXTERNAL SUPPORT: India's Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee (left) and Britain's Foreign Secretary David Miliband in New Delhi mid-January; Miliband denied the hand of Pakistan ‘state’ in Mumbai attack but asked Islamabad to 'strike at the roots' of militant groups on its soil

On January 8, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs heard testimony from a number of experts about the lessons learned from the November 26 Mumbai attack. According to Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), the Mumbai attack deserves attention because it raises important questions about the plans of U.S. authorities to prevent, prepare for and respond to similar attacks directed against targets in the United States.

At the time of writing nearly two months have elapsed since the horrific terrorist attack on Mumbai by Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). India has spent every minute of this time vigorously to engage itself in a twofold task. At home it is trying hard to revamp, expand and modernise its appalling intelligence and security apparatus, and abroad it has launched a diplomatic offensive. The purpose of the latter is not just to isolate Pakistan but also to generate enough international pressure to force Islamabad to live up to its promise to punish the perpetrators of the Mumbai outrage and to ensure that Pakistani soil is never again used for terrorism targeting India.

Many in this country feel that the Manmohan Singh government does not have much to show for its diplomatic efforts because Pakistan has got away with defiant denials across the board. So much so that though, after a resolution of the UN Security Council, Pakistan was forced to ban Jamaat-ud-Dawa, an alias for the LeT, Indian TV was showing Jamaat and LeT leaders holding rallies in Lahore. There is a lot of sympathy and support for India without doubt. Powerful countries, especially the United States and Britain, have bluntly told Islamabad that the attackers of Mumbai were Pakistanis, and the Pakistan government should therefore take the necessary action against them. But no action has followed except that Pakistan has had to eat its words, retract its previous denials and admit that Ajmal Qasab, the sole surviving terrorist in Indian custody, is a Pakistani national.

Yet the criticism that all diplomatic effort by New Delhi has been futile — shared by responsible commentators — is an exaggeration. One cannot overlook that China — Pakistan's 'all-weather friend' — had blocked for two years the UN's attempt to declare Pakistani Jamaat-ud-Dawa a terrorist organisation. This time around the U.S. leaned very heavily on both China and Pakistan to get the resolution passed by the Security Council. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), taken into full confidence by India, is due to visit Pakistan and intends to go to Qasab's village, Faridkot.

On the other hand, Britain's Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, on a visit to India in mid-January, did reiterate that the Mumbai outrage was of 'Pakistani origin' and the Pakistan government must 'strike at the roots of the LeT'. But he refused to 'believe' that the attack was 'orchestrated' by the Pakistani establishment. This contradicts the Indian Prime Minister's earlier statement that the dastardly attack was of such sophistication that it could not have been possible without the help of 'official agencies'.

Britain is not alone in doubting the direct responsibility of the Pakistani government. Other governments share this doubt though they haven't expressed themselves publicly. Their argument seems to be that the murderous 'gunmen' would not have killed the nationals of the U.S., Britain, France, Canada and Australia, were they sponsored by the ISI or any other official agency.

It is against this backdrop that the Manmohan Singh government is now thinking of several steps against Pakistan though not military action of any kind. P. Chidambaram, the hands-on new Home Minister, who was shifted to this important assignment from Finance Ministry, has (in an interview to The Times, London) given an authoritative indication of what might be done if Pakistan persists in its totally negative attitude. India, he said, might withdraw the high commissioner in Pakistan, and snap trade and travel relations with the recalcitrant neighbour.

In Indian view, Pakistan thinks now that Barack Obama has moved into the White House, American policy might work to its advantage, even though the new president is strongly opposed to terrorism and has even stated that a 26/11 type of attack is possible, even on the U.S. soil. The reason for the Pakistani confidence is that for Obama the top priority is Afghanistan, and he views the Afghanistan problem to be a regional problem embracing Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. More than once Obama and his aides have said that the resolution of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan would address Pakistan's 'legitimate security concerns' and enable it to concentrate on the western border with Afghanistan where Obama is sending at least 30,000 more troops.

Persistent press reports within the U.S. indicate that veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke might be appointed special envoy to the region. In one interview Obama had stated that the Afghan problem was, in fact, an 'Afghanistan-Pakistan-Kashmir-India-and-Iran' problem. The challenge to Indian diplomacy is thus manifest.

The other side of the coin is that the briefing that the departing Bush administration gave the transition team has emphasised that the problem is 'not Afghanistan, but Pakistan', and the real nightmarish problem President Obama inherits is the danger of a collapsing Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic extremists.

As for the steps that India proposes to take internally, the core difficulty is that all democracies are slow to act. This problem gets aggravated when a huge and diverse country like India is governed by a motley coalition. Even so, there has been little slackness on New Delhi's part. On the contrary, the replacement of the previous ineffectual home minister by Chidambaram has injected the necessary sense of urgency in the sluggish politico-bureaucratic set- up.

Mumbai had turned the spotlight on the lamentable lack of coordination among the various intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies. There has been conspicuous improvement in the situation. It had taken the National Security Guards commandos, based in Delhi, nine long hours to reach Mumbai. These commandos have now been spread at three more centres, Mumbai, Chennai (formerly Madras) and Hyderabad.

Several new agencies, such as one for maritime security and a nucleus of commandos in every state, have been formed. Of these the most important is a National Investigation Agency (NIA) under new and stricter anti-terror provisions in the law. It would tackle all terrorism cases across the country. Remarkably, during the last ten years both the Vajpayee government and the present one were unable to set up the NIA because of objections by state chief ministers that this would 'curtail' state rights. After Mumbai, this opposition evaporated and the necessary law was enacted by parliament in record time and unanimously. At the latest chief ministers' conference there were a few reservations but these were minor. The agency is already in existence and there is consensus that it must be made effective.

There is a pertinent caveat, however. It is vital that unlike the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI) and other central police outfits, the NIA must not become a partisan instrument of the party or parties in power. Only the other day, the Supreme Court rebuked the CBI for tailoring its inquiries according to the prevailing political wind. All political parties seem agreed that the anti-terror agency must not suffer the same fate.