February 2009

Pakistan

Back to old ways

By showing Musharraf the door and bringing in democracy, the beleaguered country had briefly raised hopes, but it has once again got down to hobnobbing with Islamist radicals.

By Ashok K Behuria



COALITION COLLAPSE: President Zardari (left) and former prime minister Sharif; they came together, saw democracy was restored together and then parted ways

The year 2008 was quite an eventful one for Pakistan. It proved many analysts wrong and turned the country away from direct military rule. Nobody had predicted the fall of Musharraf regime so soon. Most seasoned Pakistan watchers had held that Musharraf would never relinquish his position as army chief, and as he had made the post of president too powerful, he would continue with the two offices for some more years. But little did anybody know that Musharraf was under much pressure to quit his uniform first and the presidency next.

 
 

Even when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on a wintry evening in a place not too far from where her father was executed, many analysts interpreted it as a symbolic step taken by the military establishment to invite itself back to power under the pretext that Pakistan was under terrible threat from the radical Islamist forces. When the elections were postponed many thought Musharraf would not hold them any sooner. However, the elections were run as per the new schedule and returned Benazir's party and her much discredited husband, Asif Ali Zardari, to power. The elections showed the popular distaste for radical and religious elements. The liberal-secular and centrist parties secured their hold over the lower house. Nawaz Sharif's party, as expected, trounced Musharraf-backed PML-Q, a party constituted by defectors from his party in Punjab. The left-leaning Awami National Party (ANP) swept the religious combine, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), otherwise known as Mullah-Military Alliance, in NWFP. In Balochistan, Baloch nationalists boycotted polls leaving the field open for the PML-Q to muster up a respectable total.

The results shocked Musharraf and the world. The two main opposition political parties, PML-Nawaz and PPP led by Zardari tied up to form the government with the ANP and the only religious party, JUI, led by Fazlur Rehman. Until this point the developments in Pakistan proved everybody wrong.

But it was too good to last. How long could such an exception go on? Pakistan reverted to its predictable course once the new government set out to fulfil the goals it had framed during the elections. The worst fears of Pakistan watchers now came true. The coalition, described by many as unnatural, caved in under pressure from Nawaz Sharif to reinstate the judges sacked whimsically by Musharraf. But Zardari, beneficiary of the discriminatory reconciliation ordinance by Musharraf that terminated all cases against him and his wife, would not reinstate the dismissed chief justice because the latter had threatened to quash this ordinance shortly before his removal.

In the drama that followed there was a throwback to the past when politicians dominated the scene in the initial days following an election. Zardari assumed control, stole the wind out of the sails of Sharif and perhaps with initial approval of the new military chief, Pervez Kiyani, successfully forced Musharraf to resign. In another dramatic turn of events, Zardari contested and won as president. The unseen but approving hand of the military could be seen in all these political developments. From the middle of 2008, the old rhythm of civil-military competition for power had set in with all its predictable pattern of interaction in Pakistani politics.

The civilian government with its new found confidence after the resignation of Musharraf tested the limits of its power soon after Zardari assumed presidency with all constitutional powers diverted to the office during Musharraf's rule. It issued an order to place the premier intelligence agency, ISI, under the control of the civilian government. However, within 24 hours the order had to be cancelled under clear pressure from the military.

As the political scene was getting back to its familiar pattern of open or closed tussle for power in Islamabad, the Islamist radicals, who were calling themselves Pakistani Taliban, were holding sway in the tribal frontier areas. Musharraf's ad hoc policy of thrusting the army sporadically into the tribal frontier and subsequently bowing to Taliban demands had emboldened these radical forces; and after the Lal Masjid episode, when Musharraf had to intervene under pressure from the Chinese government, they were itching to grab such opportunity to resurface in a major way with their suicide missions.

Musharraf's policy of select aggression against radical outfits he perceived as being against his rule did not help his government in fighting  radical Islam, which he claimed to fight to strengthen the hold of 'enlightened moderation' over Islamists in Pakistan. In fact, the display of their destructive might in the attack on Indian Embassy in Kabul, bombing of Marriott Hotel during Muslim holy month of Ramzan and the Mumbai terrorist attacks, clearly demonstrated their penetrative power and their resolve to go all out to impose their writ in Pakistan. As the year drew to a close, the Mumbai attacks had vitiated the regional atmosphere and created a hiatus between India and Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the shallow economic foundation of the Musharraf regime had started showing up. With the global recession setting in by mid-2008, Pakistan was under tremendous pressure from the world community to toe a line acceptable to the western countries who would be approached to help out the country. The Afghan situation had worsened by then and the U.S. was putting pressure on Pakistan to extend its control to the tribal areas. The Pakistan Army was under tremendous pressure to allow aerial attacks by U.S. drones from across the Durand line on Pak-Afghan border.

By the beginning of 2009, Pakistan has been asked by all countries to do its utmost to rein in Islamist radicals who were seeking to launch their attacks on other states in the neighbourhood. In view of Pakistan's continuing hostility towards India, Pakistan had used these forces as its proxy in a war of subversion vis-à-vis India primarily to keep India internally engaged and to sap its energy and resources. This had led to a close nexus between Pakistani intelligence and the militant outfits, which most regional strategic experts believe survives to this day. The planning and execution of the Mumbai attacks, many argue, would not have been possible but for some collusion by state agencies at certain level.

Indian pressure on Pakistan to conduct proper investigations into the way the Mumbai attacks were planned and launched by Pakistanis from Pakistani soil now has the backing of the international community. Interestingly, the pressure from India has acted as a temporary rallying point for disparate groups in Pakistan. The civilian government and the military have come together in a jingoistic spirit and would likely stay together under the force of the circumstances. They have so far chosen not to be seen to be acting under Indian pressure. After almost two months of denial of any Pakistani involvement in Mumbai attacks, some pronouncement has now been made at semi-official levels to nab the elements responsible.

One only hopes the government understands the consequences of hobnobbing with such elements. These elements, groomed and trained by Pakistani intelligence to launch proxy war against India in Kashmir, have  many ambitious agendas of their own. They have sought to break out of the control of the Pakistan government. They would like Pakistani state to embrace an orthodox and radical version of Islam. They are intensely sectarian in their approach and would keep using violence as an instrument to force their choices on the people of Pakistan. It is high time the privileged elite ruling in Pakistan understands the problem. If they do not, they must know that they will soon be swamped by gun- toting mullahs on the streets of Islamabad. These radicals may not overrun the military of the state but they will certainly pose a critical challenge to the state of Pakistan and make it even more fragile than it is today.

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February 2009

High expectations
Jason A Kermode

 

Learning from 26/11
Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

 

Twofold fight
Inder Malhotra

 

'Mumbai should ring warning bells'

 

Pains and penalties
Rahimullah Yusufzai

 

Trappings of failure
Stratfor

 

Back to old ways
Ashok K Behuria

 

Time for a new deal
Subhash Chopra

 

Strategic separation
George Friedman

 

Challenges ahead
Andrew Small

 

Manifestation of despair
M.J. Akbar

 

The great gas game
David Watts