Despite quitting the government last year — after their failure to sack the country's army chief — Nepal's former Maoist combatants (members of the CPNM) remain a force to be reckoned with, says Charulata Hogg, Associate Fellow in the Asia Programme of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, London. In an interview with Shyam Bhatia of asianaffairs, Hogg also draws attention to the links between the Nepalese Maoists and India's Naxalite rebels.

AA: Are the Maoists destined to be the dominant political force in Nepal for the foreseeable future?

CH: There is a context to the way the Maoists emerged as a dominant political force and went on to win the constituent assembly elections in 2008. There has been a great deal of disillusionment with the political framework and political parties all through the 10 years of the conflict. This disillusionment within the general public provided a basis of support for the Maoists and became a factor which helped them win the largest number of seats in the 2008 elections. However the Maoists have not proved as effective in power as many had hoped, both in terms of domestic policies and their foreign relationships. They've managed to create a sense of negativity and have undermined a large amount of support that existed towards them. They've alienated two important constituencies. For example they've alienated India, both by appearing to make overtures to China and by refusing to become a pliant moderate force. Yet it is hard to imagine they will not remain a force to reckon with, both because of their numbers and because other political forces lack legitimacy. For many years there has been a lack of governance and the state has been virtually absent in most parts of Nepal which has provided the Maoists the political space to build a strong and committed constituency. Despite the challenges they currently face, they will be a strong force to reckon with in the future political geography of Nepal.

AA: Which parties have challenged the Maoists?

CH: The Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist) have been the main challengers. Following the collapse of the Maoist formed government in 2009, the CPN (UML) — the second largest party in parliament — emerged as the leaders backed by 22 parties and formed the government.

AA: To what extent is the political staying power of the Maoists dependant on party leader Prachanda?

CH: Prachanda has proved to be the ideological unifier of the Maoist grouping. He has provided strong leadership within and is seen as a reasonable representative of the Maoists internationally and domestically. The CPNM started almost 12 years ago, so in that sense his leadership can be compared to a certain degree, but not in the same coercive way, to the leadership provided by Vellupilai Prabhakaran (the former leader of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). He has been relatively unchallenged and, although Baburam Bhattarai and other moderate leaders have emerged, nobody has so far managed to challenge his leadership successfully. The fact that 'Prachanda Path' (a doctrine written by Prachanda) was adopted by the CPNM as its unique ideology to conduct the revolution, five years into the armed struggle in 2001, demonstrates the impact Prachanda has had on the ideological development of the Maoist struggle.

AA: Is the CPNM too top heavy?

CH: The criticism levelled against the CPNM is that despite its committee based structure, it is not a democratic party and the principles it advocates for on the outside, are not implemented on the inside. This issue comes up as far as representation of women in senior cadres is concerned as well. While women are said to form as many as 50 per cent of the force at a lower levels, these numbers are not reflected in the senior leadership.

AA: How would you estimate the achievements of the Maoists?

CH: Despite their almost spectacular win in the 2008 elections, they have not proved to be as effective a power as many had hoped. Their biggest achievement however, was to overthrow the monarchy in 2006. The fact is that it was largely due to the momentum they generated that galvanised the ordinary people of Nepal into the movement that led to the overthrow of the monarchy. Before that — over the 10 years of the conflict — and despite the violations for which they are blamed, they succeeded in creating an alternative stream of thought and political consciousness for the Nepali public. Those 10 years set the stage for the 'Jan Andolan' (Peoples' Movement) that took place in 2006 and led to the overthrow of the monarchy.

The monarchy, through its relationship with the army, remains a source of shadow power in Nepal. The real challenge that exists to true democracy in Nepal and is also an obstacle to the Maoists comes in the shape of an old Nepal represented by old feudal interests and a dominant army.

AA: Could you comment on some of the negative actions alleged against the Maoists, such as executions and recruitment of child soldiers?

CH: Despite having been in power for a year, the Maoists have managed to alienate important constituencies. They have also managed to alienate the Kathmandu middle classes by forcing them to pay taxes and an inability to supply basic services. But the main problem is that they haven't come up with a credible commitment to political pluralism. The fact is that the CPNM and its younger party, the YCL or Youth Communist League, continue to conduct many human rights violations. The Maoists were responsible for a series of extra judicial executions, disappearances and torture during and after the 10 year conflict. They are also responsible for recruiting thousands of under 18s into their ranks, some consensually but mostly by force. The Maoists, even when they were in power, allowed a climate of impunity to continue and failed to bring to justice any of the perpetrators of violations — either before the conflict or after. When they were guerrillas in the hills, their battle cry was to provide justice and accountability but none of these promises were lived up to once they assumed power.

AA: They were only in power for a year.

CH: A year is long enough to demonstrate commitment to change. In the Nepalese criminal justice system torture and enforced disappearances are not criminal offences. The Maoists could have begun the legislative process to criminalise these offences. Further, there are numerous cases where there is strong evidence pointing to collusion and complicity among the Maoists in disappearances and killings. This evidence is now sitting with the police. Criminal cases against Maoists and other political leaders have been dropped by executive fiat regardless of how serious these charges were.

AA: Who are their closest political allies?

CH: The April 2008 Constituent Assembly elections delivered a convincing majority for the Maoists but left them short of an outright majority. While major parties like the CPN (UML) and the Madeshi parties agreed to work with the Maoists, the National Congress which came second refused to work with them in the government that was eventually installed in August 2008. Despite this alliance, the Maoists have behaved like political loners. In Nov 2008, they established four high level commissions with the UML but the partnership remained shaky and failed to inspire confidence so that when Prachanda finally resigned in May 2009 over an attempt to dismiss the army chief, there was little consensus with the other parties including UML and the CPNM decided to push ahead unilaterally on this issue. So, even though ideologically the UML has been the closest ally of the CPNM, in practice the partnership has not always weathered differences well.

AA: How do you evaluate the relationship between Prachanda and the Chinese leadership in Beijing?

CH: It is true that the CPNM under Prachanda has made overtures towards China and they have also entered into some sort of agreement where the Chinese would get involved in the training of the Peoples Liberation Army (the armed wing of the CPNM). Definitely, there is some kind of ideological sharing; there have been overtures during the one year in power to invite more Chinese investment into the hydroelectric sector, something that has upset India. While Prachanda has made overtures to sign a friendship treaty with China, this has not yet materialised.

AA: Prachanda enjoyed Indian support during his years in the political wilderness, yet he himself seems suspicious of New Delhi.

CH: The Indian government was crucial in brokering a deal that led to the CPNM's emergence into active politics after the overthrow of the monarchy. Left parties in India have maintained close relationships with the CPNM. There have always been questions about the role played by the CPNM under Prachanda in supporting the Naxals in India. It is also a fact that Prachanda has always questioned India's legitimacy in Nepali politics — that hasn't gone down well within India. In all fairness India has in some ways played a slightly questionable role in its support of the Nepalese Army, which has been responsible for abuses and has no accountability. Therefore the support that India gives to the Nepal Army is viewed with great suspicion by both Prachanda and the CPNM and the general Nepalese public.

AA: Why do Prachanda and his colleagues talk about unequal treaties signed in the past between Nepal and India?

CH: There are two main treaties involved. The first is the India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship that was signed in 1950. It established a special relationship between the two neighbours. It was an economic treaty and a strategic treaty. In economic terms it laid down that there would be open movement of people and goods across the borders. In terms of defence and security, India would take the lead in helping Nepal because Nepal was the smaller country. India always saw it as a treaty that worked for both countries and a lot of sections within Nepal saw this as something that infringed on Nepal's sovereignty. Prachanda was working towards a similar treaty with China with similar rights if you like in terms of identifying Nepal's strategic interests and providing defence. The treaty hasn't fructified yet, but it was seen as problematic by India. Very recently Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna said India would revisit the treaty. 

The second treaty is the Mahakali Treaty which relates to an area called Kalapani, a border area between the two countries. According to a treaty signed in 1816 under the British, the Kalapani area is seen as part of India. This has been contested by the Nepalese who say that in maps that go beyond the 1816 treaty, it should be seen as part of Nepal.

AA: Would the Nepalese side like to seal the border with India?

CH: Yes, they wouldn't want India to have free access to Nepal. There are a lot of question marks about the way the Indian community has controlled investment in Nepal — the retail sector for instance and also investment in crucial sectors is primarily Indian. The retail sector is controlled by Indians. So it is seen as not giving the Nepalese a true chance to benefit from their own economy.

AA: Could Nepal under the Maoists become a future haven for Asian revolutionary movements threatening India, China and other Asian countries?

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