It was a pleasure reading Subhash Chopra's article 'Let the Generals talk' (January 2010). In a very clear, concise manner the writer has brought out the Indian dilemma. Who to talk to in Pakistan? There's no 'one power centre' who can speak for the country as a whole. The authority is divided between civil and military establishments, and then there is also the 'unconstitutional and outlawed' Taliban-Al Qaeda network to content with.

But it is difficult to agree with the writer's contention: 'Let the dialogue be resumed at the military level. The army chiefs of both countries could start the ball rolling and thrash out ground level differences.'

While there is no problem if India's army chief were to initiate the dialogue process, there's plenty problem in Pakistan's case. Already Pakistani military wields the maximum clout in that country and if its chief were to take the lead in sorting out vexed issues, the military will only add to its strength. At the moment the military functions under certain checks and balances, though not many. But by initiating the dialogue process, it will add more power to its armoury. And this power the military is unlikely to cede to civilians. In the event, the Pakistani politicians will find it even more difficult to set the tone and agenda of the bilateral relations.

It is in India's interest to promote civilian power in Pakistan, to give a boost to its fledgling democracy, as in fact it is in the interest of the international community by and large. So even if the going is slow and tedious, it is the politicians who should be assigned the task to find solutions to bilateral problems.

Besides, in a situation where continuing conflict with India is in the interest of Pakistani Army, how can one hope the military will try to resolve the differences? Continuing conflict with India is the very essence of Pakistani military, the very source of it power. It is unlikely to give up on that advantage.  

Sukbir Rana
London

Ploy or upshot?

George Friedman is a welcome addition to your list of good writers. His longish, in-depth analysis, in one edition after another, is illuminating to say the least. I liked what he had to say regarding Islamist jihadists in 'The strategic dilemma' (January 2010).

When Friedman says that Al Qaeda began the war with a core strategic intent of sparking revolutions in the Sunni world by overthrowing existing regimes and replacing them with jihadist regimes, he is not far from the truth.

So is the fact that Al Qaeda has failed in this purpose. 'Not a single regime has been replaced with a jihadist regime.' This is rightly so because the Sunni regimes understood that Al Qaeda was a bigger menace than American protection and needed to be dealt with firmly. The resulting confrontation between Sunni regimes and Al Qaeda rendered the terror grouping weak and in disarray. Al Qaeda was made unsuitable for anything more than local attacks and rendered incapable of mounting any major operation against the United States and Europe.

One wonders if this was a deliberate ploy of the West or just a favourable outcome.

Hakimuddin
London

. top