Pakistan after Benazir

Extended electoral revelry sans Benazir

If the PPP splinters on account of Zardari’s de facto assumption of power, the post-poll political uncertainty will become even more chaotic in Pakistan, comments Ashok K Behuria

   Benazir Bhutto’s assassination on 27 December 2007 has plunged Pakistan into a political crisis. The interim administration managing the elections under President Pervez Musharraf’s tutelage was quick to engage itself in a vigorous face-saving exercise. Its first move was to try its best to disprove the claim that Benazir was not provided with adequate security in view of the threats she faced from the Islamists. The second was to tackle the street violence in Sindh ahead of the polls. The Election Commission took the excuse of this violence to claim that the polling stations in Sindh were ravaged during the violence that followed Benazir’s assassination and argued that it would be impossible to conduct the elections, as scheduled, on 8 January.

  After three days of deliberations with the political parties and security officials the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), Qazi Mohammed Farooq, announced on 2 January that the polls had been postponed by six weeks. The polls are now scheduled for 18 February 2008, after the month of Muharram (the first month of the Islamic year), which lasts from 10 January to the second week of February.
   The CEC also argued that Benazir Bhutto’s sad demise affected every walk of life. In the violence that followed, 11 district election offices were destroyed in Sindh, which included Ghotki, Jackobabad, Kashmore, Qambar, Shahdadkot, Jamshoro, Sukkar, Thatta, Dadu and Noshehroferoz. In view of the tense conditions prevailing in the country, the elections had to be postponed, the CEC said.
   The Central Executive Committee of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), anticipating the announcement, met in Larkana and decided to take part in the next general elections whenever they were to be held. The Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) is also expected to follow suit. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) (Fazlur) had earlier demanded postponement of the elections.
   Soon after the CEC’s announcement, President Musharraf endorsed the postponement of elections in a nationally televised address, while also dwelling at length on the riotous situation in Sindh and justifying his decision to deploy the army in the troubled areas. He also expressed his readiness to seek the help of Scotland Yard in the process of investigation into Benazir’s assassination. This was largely done to silence the critics who suspected the hand of his administration in her killing following nationwide rumours that she was about to provide the US with concrete evidence of pre-poll rigging by the Musharraf administration. Musharraf also duly emphasised his commitment to hold free, fair, transparent elections and added that he would ensure that the elections were peaceful.
   These developments have thrown analysts out of gear with pollsters reassessing the post-assassination electoral situation. In the immediate aftermath of the assassination analysts expected that the PPP would garner more votes out of sympathy for Benazir in areas outside Sindh. The postponement of the elections has cancelled out such calculations. Nawaz Sharif was seen to be swinging nervously from one extreme to the other. Soon after the assassination he said his party would withdraw from the elections, only to eat his words two days later to say that the elections should be held on time and his party would duly participate. Did he anticipate more trouble in case of postponement than losing some seats to the PPP in case of a possible sympathy wave in rural Punjab? Most probably, he would suspect that the postponement would provide the administration with more time to manipulate the elections in favour of the ruling party, PML-Q (PML-Qaid-e-Azam).
   As of now, the electoral prospects are hazy. Even after Benazir’s son Bilawal Zardari was renamed Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and elected chairman of the PPP, but with Zardari as co-chairman, popular support for the PPP in Punjab may decline. The PML-Nawaz and PML-Qaid will wage a pitched electoral battle in urban Punjab. As in every election, Punjab continues to hold the key to the elections with 148 out of 272 seats in the forthcoming contest, representing 55% of the total. By comparison Sindh has only 61 seats, followed by NWFP (North West Frontier Province) with 35, Balochistan with 14, and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) with 12 seats. This means parties with a strong base in Punjab have more opportunity to dominate the political life in Pakistan.
   As of now with religious parties divided over their approach to the elections, the PML-N and PML-Q are likely to divide the spoils in Punjab, while the PPP is likely to sweep Sindh minus the pockets where MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement) is likely to retain its hold, especially in constituencies traditionally dominated by mohajir (refugees from India during and after partition). The NWFP is very likely to back the Islamist forces, unless of course they fight suicidal internecine battles. The same holds for FATA. It is presumed that the radical extremist forces may not back politicians like Fazlur Rehman or Samiul Haq but they may not obstruct people voting for them. In this case, even if the MMA (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal) does not turn out to be as formidable a force as it was in the 2002 elections, the religious elements may manage to come to power in NWFP for yet another term at the provincial level. The Baloch political scenario is likely to be dominated by the PPP and the nationalists.
   Against this probable scenario, Nawaz Sharif has made the right political move by inviting the PPP into a post-poll political alliance. The PPP leadership has yet to take the bait. There are rumours of differences brewing within the party around Zardari’s de facto assumption of power, even if Makhdom Amin Fahim has been chosen as the PPP’s prime ministerial candidate. If the PPP splinters, the post-poll political uncertainty will become even more chaotic.
   The fractured political space in Pakistan does not hold any promise of a strong political force emerging from the elections. Benazir has, in fact, left the scene much worse than when she entered it in the name of reconciliation. Ironically, many forces that preferred confrontation to reconciliation jumped into the electoral fray when they saw Benazir at the head of the queue for elections. Some political parties, with marginal electoral influence but strong nuisance potential, will not participate in the elections. Fear of the army will also minimise their nuisance potential.
   A hung verdict is what Musharraf and the army would prefer at the end of the day. The party Musharraf has raised may not have the numbers required to form the government, but in a hung House anybody securing about 40-50 seats could call the shots and provide Musharraf with enough political clout to withstand any possible assault from the legislature. The hybrid power-sharing arrangement tilted in favour of the army will continue till the political forces sink their differences and make common cause to bring about lasting change in the political dynamics of the country — an unlikely event. Meanwhile, in Sindh following Benazir’s assassination there could be a rise of Sindhi nationalist sentiment, which Musharraf may find difficult to combat and contain.
   All in all, Benazir’s death has only extended the period of electoral rivalry in Pakistan, without altering the country’s political dynamics in any significant way. The political parties stand as divided as before. Musharraf, backed by the Army, stands firm and unyielding. The Islamist militants have demonstrated their ability to survive all kinds of assaults by the security forces and seem to be going from strength to strength. Vital institutions such as the judiciary, the legislature and the media, that could revive real democracy in Pakistan, are smarting under the pressure exerted on them by the Musharraf administration. The silent majority, otherwise hailed as the civil society in Pakistan, remains torn between the host of political options churned out by the very crop of politicians they abhor, yet turn toward, for want of any better alternative.

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