Pakistan

The fractures widen

Many Pakistanis see Musharraf as one who colluded in the return to the country’s politics of a woman, corrupt and ineffectual, who exemplified the Western (read anti-Islamic) worldview, with her Oxford and Harvard education, comments David Watts

  There are no winners in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto except those who wish to see Pakistan become a theocratic state.
   The fallout from her death could impact upon all the regional states, including Afghanistan and India. But the most immediate casualty is the Anglo-American policy on Pakistan. Ironically, her death may bring on the scene what her return to Pakistan was intended to forestall: the radical islamisation of the country.
   Once again the West has failed to learn that attempting to manipulate the politics of developing countries is risky, especially for those on the scene.

  At the very least, London and Washington should have ensured that Pervez Musharraf, the recently civilianised leader of the country, gave her the same kind of protection afforded him when he was targeted by assassins. Enough warning signals were given when her convoy was attacked on her return to Pakistan.
   But Musharraf had no particular interest in her political success. He agreed to her return only under strong Western pressure. Had she done well in the planned elections she would only have detracted from his power and influence in their coalition that the West had hoped would follow the election.
   Now the strategy of the West for conducting the so-called war on terror is in tatters. The Taliban are consolidating not only in Afghanistan but in Waziristan, where the writ of the Pakistan government carries little weight. United States Defence Secretary Robert Gates acknowledges that al-Qaeda has ‘regrouped’ in the northern areas of Pakistan.
   With the future of Pakistan in the balance, Western policy in Afghanistan is also unravelling. Both the British and American governments have been suggesting that it is time to talk to the Taliban. The writ of the Hamid Karzai government is confined to Kabul, the capital. Recently, the Karzai government expelled two United Nations diplomats for having contact with the Taliban, a contact facilitated by the British Army. In Helmand in the south, where the British Army has been attempting to win support away from the Taliban through a hearts-and-minds campaign, there is little result to show. Some reports suggest that the army may have been protecting the interests of regional power figures heavily involved in the drug trade. Trade in opium is flourishing. The British seem to be taking towns but not able to retain them.
   So, instead of benefiting from a stable or potentially stable Afghanistan to the west of a crisis-hit Pakistan, Western policymakers are now faced with the prospect of both countries undergoing realignment at the same time.
   Across the border in India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said he was deeply shocked by Bhutto’s assassination. He added that she was ‘no ordinary political leader, but one who left a deep imprint on her time and age. Her contributions to a previous moment of hope in India-Pakistan relations, and her intent to break India-Pakistan relations out of the sterile patterns of the past, were exemplary. In her death, the subcontinent has lost an outstanding leader who worked for democracy and reconciliation in her country.’
   Policymakers in India are well aware that an unstable Pakistan bodes ill for India in its long-standing rivalry with its Islamic neighbour, including their nuclear competition. With between 60 and 100 weapons believed to be at the disposal of the Pakistan military the fate of this capability is a key question for all who have an interest in the area. The central element of the equation is whether the Pakistan Army will hold together or whether some of its more radical elements will seize the opportunity to realise a radical Islamic state on Pakistan soil or to supply nuclear weaponry to their al-Qaeda co-religionists.
   The strong degree of support within the army for anti-Indian Islamic guerrilla warfare in Kashmir has been clear for a long time but when he was chief of staff of the army Musharraf seemed to manage to ride over the contradictions of supporting the United States in its struggle against radical Islam while tolerating the same kind of activity at home. Will General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the new COAS, be able to hold the army together in the new circumstances? No longer COAS, Musharraf seems unlikely to retain the earlier respect in the military. After all, he is seen by many Pakistanis as one who colluded in the return to Pakistan politics of a woman, corrupt and ineffectual, and who exemplified the Western (read anti-Islamic) worldview, with her Oxford and Harvard education.

top