Russia’s Resurgence
Kosovo, the new flashpoint?
This time round, if Kosovo tries to become independent, Russia will not allow itself to be slighted by the US-NATO combine, writes Andrew Small
Dmitry Medvedev with Vladimir Putin
Even Time magazine recognises Putin’s performance naming him their ‘person of the year’ for bringing Russia ‘roaring back to the table of world power’.
When he appointed First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev as his successor Western liberals were uneasy and when Medvedev completed the circle by announcing, barely 24 hours later, that he would have the former president as his prime minister there was something akin to shock.
With Putin’s endorsement Medvedev will certainly be elected president next spring and the former will certainly find a way of influencing his protégé when he takes over the reins of power. Democracy Russian-style may suffer but at least the rest of the world will have a relatively liberal figure with whom to deal and the path of Russian policy will be clear and predictable. It will not be a smooth ride and the Europeans and the Americans will need to accord Moscow the respect that has been lacking since Russia plunged into the abyss in the 1990s.
If the old Soviet Union turned out to be a disaster then what followed was certainly no better — poverty was endemic, unemployment was rife, the institutions were demoralised and so was the military. Salaries went unpaid even in the forces and, as the countries that had made up the union on the periphery began to go their own way, so even Russia at the centre began to show signs of foundering.
And when the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) moved its military frontier right up to the Russian border absorbing all Russia’s European satellites, it revived age-old fears of encirclement. Couple that with the high-pressure liberalisation of the economy at the behest of Western merchant banking advisers who opened the door to opportunistic oligarchs and the national humiliation was complete. Boris Yeltsin may have seemed a friendly bear of a man with a sense of humour to foreigners but to many Russians he was a drunken national disgrace.
President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus
The one element in the national polity that managed to some extent to stay on an even keel were the intelligence services and even they were heavily compromised through widespread corruption. Putin appears to have escaped implication in the misbehaviour of his colleagues in the KGB and survived to see it re-launched as the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) as the standard bearer of national pride. But just as it was originally the KGB that recognised that the Soviet state was on the verge of collapse and did not attempt to prevent it from doing so, it is now the FSB that is in the forefront of Russia’s attempts at rejuvenation.
It is no accident that Medvedev is a businessman and chairman of the board of Gazprom, the massive state energy enterprise, or that he is not a ‘siloviki’ or member of the intelligence hierarchy. That way he is no threat to Putin or others in the intelligence elite around him and yet he has his hands on the real source of modern Russian power, its energy supplies.
Allied to aligning his domestic political arrangements Putin has been steadily asserting Russian power by trying hard to counter American influence in the countries of Central Asia. Here he has enjoyed success commensurate with the decline of Washington’s influence as it has become more and more enmeshed in its Iraqi quagmire.
The Russian government has been working hard at restoring the status quo ante closer to home. In Ukraine it has had only mixed success and the latest manifestation of the government, a pro-Western coalition under Yulia Tymoshenko, is unlikely to warm up relations. Already she says she plans to try and moderate a 38% increase in the cost of Russian gas supplies agreed to by the previous government. In all countries of the former Soviet Union manipulating the prices of energy supplies has been the weapon of choice to bring governments to heel.
The one exception has been Alexander Lukashenko’s Belarus. During the Yeltsin eraLukashenko talked a lot about the union of Russia and Belarus with himself as the vice president of the unified nation — no doubt with half an eye on the fact that Yeltsin could be relied upon not to stay the course allowing him to step in and take the reins. Since he came to power Putin has not only scotched such plans but gradually reduced the Belarussian leader’s power by ending preferential treatment extended by Russia on everything from market access to energy.
Putin has just been to Minsk to explain the 21st century realities of Russia’s relationships with its old clients, one of which is that next year will see the removal of the last of Moscow’s economic props that have been helping to support Lukashenko. Whether the union remains on the cards is unclear but if it does it will certainly be on Moscow’s terms rather than those dreamed up in Minsk. Even if it were a watered down version of the original vision of unity Putin would very likely be looking for a way of putting Russian soldiers back on the soil of Belarus. Not that he needs to threaten Lukashenko directly — that can be done more effectively through economic means — but what better way of getting back at NATO than by putting Moscow’s boots back on the border without Belarus as a buffer?
Ironically, the first new flashpoint that is likely to bring the West and Putin into conflict is the very issue that consolidated Putin’s rise to power, the Kosovo war. The Russians backed the Serbs throughout the war and still do. When the US went to war against Belgrade Moscow was ignored and when it came to the denouement the Russians helped negotiate the surrender of the Serbs. The occupation of the territory was not supposed to be a NATO affair under the agreement and Russia was supposed to be a party to the occupation but was left out of the final plans. NATO treated Russia with contempt.
Now that Kosovo is planning to become independent over the objections of the Serbs history appears to be about to repeat itself. If it goes ahead the Russians will be angered and if the West pays no heed to Russian objections Moscow’s anger at being slighted will once again surface.
Washington’s calculation is no doubt that there is very little that the Russians can do about it and in the immediate future that may well be true. But no-one wants the Balkan wars to be reignited and the Americans need to call upon a modicum of Russian goodwill over other pressing international issues, such as the seemingly endless chess game over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
It is no accident that Medvedev is a businessman and chairman of the board of Gazprom, the massive state energy enterprise, or that he is not a ‘siloviki’ or member of the intelligence hierarchy. That way he is no threat to Putin or others in the intelligence elite around him and yet he has his hands on the real source of modern Russian power, its energy supplies.
Allied to aligning his domestic political arrangements Putin has been steadily asserting Russian power by trying hard to counter American influence in the countries of Central Asia. Here he has enjoyed success commensurate with the decline of Washington’s influence as it has become more and more enmeshed in its Iraqi quagmire.
The Russian government has been working hard at restoring the status quo ante closer to home. In Ukraine it has had only mixed success and the latest manifestation of the government, a pro-Western coalition under Yulia Tymoshenko, is unlikely to warm up relations. Already she says she plans to try and moderate a 38% increase in the cost of Russian gas supplies agreed to by the previous government. In all countries of the former Soviet Union manipulating the prices of energy supplies has been the weapon of choice to bring governments to heel.
The one exception has been Alexander Lukashenko’s Belarus. During the Yeltsin eraLukashenko talked a lot about the union of Russia and Belarus with himself as the vice president of the unified nation — no doubt with half an eye on the fact that Yeltsin could be relied upon not to stay the course allowing him to step in and take the reins. Since he came to power Putin has not only scotched such plans but gradually reduced the Belarussian leader’s power by ending preferential treatment extended by Russia on everything from market access to energy.
Putin has just been to Minsk to explain the 21st century realities of Russia’s relationships with its old clients, one of which is that next year will see the removal of the last of Moscow’s economic props that have been helping to support Lukashenko. Whether the union remains on the cards is unclear but if it does it will certainly be on Moscow’s terms rather than those dreamed up in Minsk. Even if it were a watered down version of the original vision of unity Putin would very likely be looking for a way of putting Russian soldiers back on the soil of Belarus. Not that he needs to threaten Lukashenko directly — that can be done more effectively through economic means — but what better way of getting back at NATO than by putting Moscow’s boots back on the border without Belarus as a buffer?
Ironically, the first new flashpoint that is likely to bring the West and Putin into conflict is the very issue that consolidated Putin’s rise to power, the Kosovo war. The Russians backed the Serbs throughout the war and still do. When the US went to war against Belgrade Moscow was ignored and when it came to the denouement the Russians helped negotiate the surrender of the Serbs. The occupation of the territory was not supposed to be a NATO affair under the agreement and Russia was supposed to be a party to the occupation but was left out of the final plans. NATO treated Russia with contempt.
Now that Kosovo is planning to become independent over the objections of the Serbs history appears to be about to repeat itself. If it goes ahead the Russians will be angered and if the West pays no heed to Russian objections Moscow’s anger at being slighted will once again surface.
Washington’s calculation is no doubt that there is very little that the Russians can do about it and in the immediate future that may well be true. But no-one wants the Balkan wars to be reignited and the Americans need to call upon a modicum of Russian goodwill over other pressing international issues, such as the seemingly endless chess game over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Jan 2008
My friend Benazir Shyam Bhatia |
The fractures widen David Watts |
Growing contacts with the Taliban Vishal Chandra |
Extended electoral revelry sans Benazir Ashok K Behuria |
Speculation on a possible strike on Iran's N-facilites Rupert Fisher |
Kosovo,the new flashpoint? Andrew Small |
Discordant note |
Madurai |
A cautious friendship Walter K Andersen |
The frills of democracy Prakash Nanda |
Virendra Sharma, Labour MP |
No coloureds please, we are white British Subhash Chopra |