Editorial

Hold your horses, India

In an earlier, simpler world any nation even suspected of authoring military action against another would have been the subject of an immediate revenge attack. But these are complex, nuanced times in the relationship between India and Pakistan and the people of India are fortunate to have a government which sees the bigger picture, which does not respond blindly to provocations against them which are not supported by the people of Pakistan at large. To do anything else would be extremely unwise. The reality is that it has never been more important to support the emergence of a civilian government leadership in Pakistan after another period of what was effectively military government. The latest terrorist attack in Mumbai, given the possibility of Pakistani military inaction to stop it or even covert support for it, may be an indicator of just how little things have changed but that does not mean that a stable Pakistan is not in the best interests of India. That must always remain a central tenet of policy.

The problem is that that stability is now becoming less rather than more likely. Pakistan is, and will remain, a theocratic state and until there is a profound change in the status quo which makes it apparent to the Pakistani people that it is in their interests for the nation to be transformed into a more broad-based democratic entity, to wish away government support for religious activity of all stripes is to live in cloud cuckoo land. But while India has no interest in creating a massive area of uncontrolled Islamist activity from its own border to Kabul — that is the potential scenario if it tackles Pakistan head-on and effectively destroys the fragile state — at the same time it needs to be able to assuage public opinion with some sort of response to such an outrageous attack, particularly when its own immediate response was so inadequate. Islamabad has strongly hinted at the potential damage that such a response could wreck by warning that even former president Musharraf is in danger of assassination in the present febrile state of affairs.

Some sort of a revenge attack, therefore, is still a possibility and it may well be only thanks to the United States that it has not happened up to this point. But even Washington knows that there are limits to what it can expect of Delhi in such a situation. Did not the majority of the world give the U.S. carte blanche in its response to the 9/11 attacks? Why should Delhi be prevented from exercising a proportionate kind of response to the horrifying humiliation that the country has suffered? The complication is that with both countries being nuclear powers there is no knowing what the Pakistani response might be and where any potential conflict might end. It is therefore logical that any Indian response could come in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. That would serve the dual purpose of hitting the militants who India blames for the Mumbai attack and carrying out Delhi's revenge attack in an area of constant conflict between the two nations where it can be contained to the military front.

For the longer term, America's plan for a surge of troops into Afghanistan along the lines of the one into Iraq presents new challenges and new considerations for both countries. The U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, has announced that 20,000-30,000 more U.S. troops will be deployed into the country in an attempt to repeat the success of the earlier operation which appeared to bring down the level of violence in Iraq. As the new surge gains momentum this year it will bring the total number of American troops in the country up to some 60,000 and inevitably put greater pressure on Pakistan by likely forcing more Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters across the border into the tribal areas and resulting in more tension and fighting if the U.S. continues with its policy of hot pursuit.

Washington is also likely to maintain pressure on Islamabad not only to bring militant organisations under control but also continue its own military operations in the tribal areas — a policy which in reality forces the Pakistani government to run with the hare and, at least pretend, to run with the hounds. That bizarre balancing act was hard enough to maintain under former army commander-in-chief president Musharraf but it will be even harder under a civilian leader who is given short shrift by the army. It is therefore to be expected that the Pakistan Army will increase in influence in the coming months and that, in all probability, means that the Islamists will continue to demonstrate that they are already beyond government control. India needs to ensure that nothing it does exacerbates the situation or weakens Pakistan. That means it must walk a tightrope between meeting the legitimate demands of its electorate and doing what it can to prevent the collapse of the government in Islamabad. Like Mr Micawber, the Delhi government is once again reduced to hoping that something will turn up. That may sound like no policy at all, but in the current climate it is better to maintain the status quo than have something truly terrifying transpire.

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