The Central Asian states, especially Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, remain preoccupied with both domestic issues and the external challenge of striking the 'right' balance between Russia and the West. India, perhaps, is the only country in the region which wants the West to stay the course in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and has invested heavily in the reconstruction and rebuilding of a stable Afghan state. In fact, after 9/11, and the subsequent overthrow of the Taliban regime in late 2001, India and the U.S. had for the first time found their interests converging on the Afghanistan issue.

The European partners too have not quite synchronised their objectives and contributions in the escalating U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Added to it has been the growing U.S. discord with both Kabul and Islamabad. In such circumstances, due to a lack of adequate support from most of the regional countries, as well as the European allies, the American role and involvement in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region was bound to expand against all odds.
The preponderance of the U.S. factor in the regional politics has been clearly evident. The response of the regional countries to the Afghan challenge is determined more by the nature of their individual relationship with the U.S./West, than by the potential threat from an emboldened and resurgent Taliban. The growing Western presence in Afghanistan is viewed with strong scepticism in China, Iran, Russia, and now even in Pakistan.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq, Nato's continuing eastward expansion, and the West-sponsored 'colour' revolutions in some of the Central Asian/Eurasian countries, have only added to a general suspicion among the regional countries over the U.S./Western role in Afghanistan. Despite Obama administration's attempt to 'reset' its relations with Russia, the two have so far failed to seek common grounds on the Afghanistan issue. Though Russia has agreed to provide transit facilities for the Nato supplies in Afghanistan, the geopolitical competition for influence over the vast Eurasian space and for control over its resources continue to determine the relations between Russia and Nato or the West. Ironically, for most of the regional countries, the resurgence of Pakistan-backed Taliban groupings has been secondary to their continuing suspicions over the augmented U.S. and Nato presence in Afghanistan.

On hindsight, one could be tempted to argue that unless the U.S./West is involved in Afghanistan, regional efforts to stabilise Afghanistan are not possible; that since the U.S. is not likely to completely withdraw from Afghanistan, a collective regional response to the threat emanating from Afghanistan-Pakistan frontiers is not likely to materialise; that it will remain tied down either owing to many of the regional countries having a different perception of the U.S.-led war on terror, or the negative relationship with the U.S.; that lack of bilateral and regional cooperation on the Afghanistan issue would continue to provide space for the extra-regional powers to play out their agenda in the region; that the Afghan security would remain 'outsourced' partly or fully to the U.S. and may be later to the Pakistan Army and the ISI; and that the return of the Taliban and the ideological threat that it poses to regional stability is imminent. However, at the same time, the futility of being overly critical of the Western approach and strategy towards the Af-Pak region especially as the regional countries have so far failed in adequately responding to the Afghan situation too needs to be taken into account.

The Obama administration has indubitably inherited a tough legacy. Be it the new Af-Pak strategy declared in March 2009 or the revised Af-Pak strategy of December last, the Obama administration has over-all shown a sense of relative realism, clarity, responsiveness and cautious urgency. In the given circumstances, the revised U.S. strategy appears to be bold, forthright and a viable one. However, this is not to negate the Bush administration's contribution in shaping the current U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is markedly reflected in the Obama administration's thinking, however divided, contradictory and piecemeal it may appear to be.

The urgency of placating the American public, the European allies, and need to keep up the pressure on both Kabul and Islamabad, all at the same time, has no doubt confounded the revised U.S. strategy, especially on the issue of a time frame for the withdrawal of Western troops.  Given the fact that the U.S. role and involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan has its own set of dilemmas and paradoxes, the revised U.S. strategy is bound to be flexible and implemented in a phased manner.

The Obama administration must be aware of the fact that pulling out of the Afghan theatre would be a prolonged affair. Even if the U.S. and Nato are able to completely withdraw their forces, say by 2015, the region will be far from stable or free from Al Qaeda's influence. Any hasty withdrawal of Western forces will only strengthen the Al Qaeda and the Taliban and make matters worse for the West in years to come. A scenario where the West may have to come back to Afghanistan sooner than later cannot be regarded as remote. At the face of it, the current U.S. strategy looks like a last push to retrieve the Afghan situation. The Western engagement in Afghanistan seems to be peaking as the three-decade old Afghan conflict enters into a yet another decisive phase.

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