But not only does the 123 agreement impose several irksome restrictions on India but also the Obama administration is seeking reinforcement of some of these. This has, in fact, held up a new agreement on the establishment in India of a 'dedicated facility' to reprocess the spent nuclear fuel imported from America for use in American reactors that was supposed to be signed during Dr. Singh's Washington visit. Russia and France, the other two suppliers of reactors, have no compunction about their fuel being reprocessed in Indian reprocessing plants that are under the IAEA safeguards.

To be sure, the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, candidly said that the NPT could not be amended to acknowledge India's nuclear weapon power status. But in practice this makes no difference. Russia gave India all help in building its first nuclear missile submarine, Arihant. It indeed supplied the core of the submarine's reactor. Moscow is also leasing to New Delhi a hunter-killer nuclear submarine, as it had done earlier in the eighties.

This surely explains why limelight is on Russia's response to India's nuclear needs. But two other agreements, also signed in the presence of Singh and Medvedev, are no less crucial. One is for defence cooperation between the two nations for the next ten years. Between 50 to 70 per cent of all military hardware needed by India comes from Russia, which underscores the importance of the Indo-Russian strategic partnership. India is also promised full access to Russian R&D in military field. Indeed, the two countries are jointly developing the fifth generation transport aircraft. The second agreement covers cooperation between the hydrocarbon industries of the two countries. India is expected to take part in oil exploration in Siberia.

India is also appreciative of the Russian stand on terrorism. But some Indian commentators have noted with some regret that while denouncing cross-border terrorism, Russia is reluctant to mention Pakistan by name.

Incidentally, Singh's talks with the Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, were as important as those with President Medvedev. Moscow had discreetly informed Delhi in advance of the power balance in Russia. Moreover, in the joint communiqué issued after the talks the Russian side indicated subtly that in its worldview India had precedence over China even though there is a triumvirate of India, Russia and China (IRC) that meets regularly and both Russia and India are included in the Beijing-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). However, Medvedev took the opportunity to suggest that instead of being a mere observer at the SCO, India should be its full member. That is not acceptable to China.

No wonder, the Russian president found BRIC — Brazil, Russia, India and China — a more effective body. In private talks he also hinted that China was doing its best to keep both Russia and India out of as many East Asian organisations — such as Asia-Europe summits or Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Under the circumstances, is it any surprise that while Russia supplies the latest version of equipment like Sukhoi aircraft to India, it sells China less advanced versions of the same weaponry?

Yet there is some concern in Moscow that the hyper-lucrative Indian order for 126 multi-role warplanes would in all probability go to the U.S. India's position is that this transaction would depend entirely on the merit of the aircraft, judged in global competition.

While India's growing relations with the U.S. have added to China's assertiveness vis-à-vis India, they apparently cause no concern to Russia. This is so because India has made it  clear to Russian interlocutors that its relations with America and Russia are not a zero sum game. And, in any case, Russia itself wants better relations with the U.S.

Neither the Russians nor others have failed to notice, however, that between the cooing words exchanged by India and the U.S. and ground reality there usually falls the proverbial shadow. After Dr. Singh's visit to the White House that was notable more for pomp and pageantry than for substance, spin doctors of the governments in both countries worked overtime to claim that the visit had been more productive than was recognised in India. Unfortunately, the activities of the non-proliferation ayatollahs in the Obama administration are not the only ones to dent this campaign. President Obama's new 'Af-Pak' strategy that distinguishes between good Taliban and bad Taliban had not made India happy. Now, America's Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, has publicly stated that a resolution of the Kashmir question is necessary for the success of the U.S. policy in Afghanistan. If this becomes American policy, it would touch India's raw nerve. Any American pressure on this score would invite a bitter backlash in this country.

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