The threat of pre-emptive military strikes will make Iran think twice before carrying out a nuclear test, a leading Middle East expert tells Shyam Bhatia of asianaffairs. But Sir Richard Dalton, former British ambassador to Iran, says that Tehran hopes to develop all different parts of a nuclear weapon design that could be brought together in future if the ruling authorities at the time decide they want the bomb.

AA: How seriously do you take recent media reports that Iran has been developing a nuclear initiator, or triggering device for a bomb?

RD: I take it seriously from two angles. The first is that it confirms the picture the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) has been presenting for some time about worrying patterns of information coming out of Iran over some time, indicating that military research and development has taken place despite Iranian denials. Secondly, I take it seriously because one can't be sure if it has been doing work of this kind, but if it's also been doing work on other aspects of the design. Of course we don't know any of that with certainty, but it is worrying if the date on these documents — 2007 — is correct. That means the previous assessment that the Americans have maintained for two years — that the Iranians stopped their military research and development in 2003 — is incorrect.

AA: To what extent then are those earlier American assessments accordingly contradicted?

RD: The American analysis wasn't absolute because they were putting together indications from intelligence sources which didn't point 100 per cent clearly to that conclusion. If it is the case that the analysts now change their picture, that does mean it would be wise to assume that Iran could be capable of having all the elements necessary for a nuclear weapon and sooner rather than later.

AA: When you were British ambassador in Tehran were you aware of FEDAT (Field for the Expansion of Deployment of Advance Technology), acronym for the covert organisation said to be running Iran's nuclear programme and mentioned in a hitherto secret document?

RD: No. Of course one shouldn't build too much on one document and we've grown to be very sceptical about intelligence indications and we've yet to hear any professional assessment of the value of this document, other than a political assessment from one or two foreign ministry spokesmen that this document confirms the urgency of pressing forward with sanctions. Now clearly that is something we have to pay attention to, but I wouldn't want to place 100 per cent confidence in this document until more has been revealed about it and the context of it.

AA: Iran has admitted to enriching uranium, but should this be controversial. What rules or laws has Iran broken?

RD: If we're talking solely about enrichment, I think they're only enriching in one place and that is Natanz and they are in the process of creating a facility elsewhere at Fordow near Qom, but the IAEA reports that Fordow is still at an early stage of construction. The remaining sites they have announced are prospective sites at which work has not yet begun. It's true that the right to enrich is within the rights accorded to states under the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But there's an important point here: with rights come responsibilities and Iran has not carried out its responsibilities and not performed its duties in accordance with the NPT, the IAEA regulations and the Security Council decision.

AA: Is Iran's sense of responsibility connected to the disclosure of its enrichment activities?

RD: Yes, the rules required by the IAEA, which Iran does accept, say that notice should be given at a much earlier stage of the intention to build a facility of the kind that Iran intends to build.

AA: During Saddam Hussein's era in neighbouring Iraq, Baghdad was determined to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Is it surprising that Iran seeks to match Iraq's earlier ambition?

RD: Iraq has no such programme at the moment and I think Iran's motivations relate to its geopolitical situation generally and not just to having a potentially powerful and awkward power, namely Iraq, in its neighbourhood.

AA: When, if ever, in your personal opinion would Iran be capable of carrying out a nuclear test?

RD: I don't think Iran will carry out a nuclear test in the near future. I think it is restrained from doing that by the expectation that it would lead to a military attack on its territory. I think Iran at present wishes to have all the different parts of a nuclear weapon design ready, in other words to have a break out capability in the event of a strategic environment emerging in which Iran decided it needed the ultimate deterrent. But I think it's consistent with their past behaviour for them to want to continue research and development at quite a slow pace and not actually to explode a weapon.

AA: Short of invading Iran, is there any effective deterrent that could prevent a future test?

RD: Short of strikes on Iran — I think an invasion is highly unlikely — I don't think it's going to be easy to dissuade Iran if it has concluded that that is what it should do. And we have no evidence of that at present. We are putting together indications and reaching a conclusion on the basis of probabilities. We are erring on the side of caution, given the potentially fatal consequences of proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region as a whole. It is possible that in theory a package of economic sanctions could be developed which would be so severe as to induce a re-think in Tehran, but it is not looking likely that any such package could be put together.

AA: If Iran were to test at some stage in the future, would that spell the end of the NPT? 

RD: It would be a very severe blow to it, yes, because there is a determination at present among the major powers in the region that they should have whatever Iran has. The historic fears of instability in that region and of an overbearing Iranian neighbour are such that when countries indicate they would seek a countervailing capability, a deterrent capability, equal to that of Iran, we should take that seriously. I would hesitate to say that the actual treaty would collapse, simply because there is never no way back. This is regarded by so many countries as an extremely valuable part of the international mechanism and we have to avert that catastrophe; tremendous efforts would be made to rescue it even if it was in severe peril. And there is no doubt it would be in severe peril in the circumstances you describe.

AA: How would a nuclear Iran affect the balance of power in the region?

RD: At the moment Iran would argue than an imbalance exists because many powers in Iran's neighbourhood have nuclear weapons and there are powers with nuclear weapons that declare themselves hostile to Iran. The fact is I don't believe Israel or the United States would ever use a nuclear weapon against Iran unless there was a prior use by Iran. But the fact is it would be possible to deter prior use by Iran using well tried methods from the end of the Cold War, which we still have. That is, the existence across the geopolitical divides of nuclear capabilities. So I believe Iran could be deterred and contained using a mixture of nuclear, conventional and political means.

AA: Would a nuclear Iran immediately lead to a nuclear race among its Arab neighbours?

RD: I think for some of them, yes. I think others would not; others would seek military guarantees from affected powers. So I don't think one should assume that every small state, however wealthy, would wish to have a nuclear weapon. But some of Iran's big neighbours would believe they have no alternative. I personally think the balance of power currently existing, which is based on the U.S. presence in the region, coupled with significant self-defence capabilities of Turkey, Russia, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, I believe that balance would still be maintained and in the event of Iran having a nuclear weapon there would be additional risk to stability, but I don't believe it would be overwhelming. So my own belief is that deterrence is a reasonable option to envisage in the event of Iran going nuclear.

AA: Could Iran develop a Shia nuclear bomb that might be shared with neighbouring Iraq, which is also a Shia majority state?

RD: I think it is fanciful in that history suggests that if a state obtains the ultimate destructive power of a nuclear weapon, it does not take risks with off shoring responsibility for its maintenance and use. So I find that very far fetched.

AA: There is one small precedent in the Pakistani example with AQ Khan selling his expertise across the world.

RD: Yes, one of the dangers of further powers obtaining nuclear weapons is of the possibility of proliferation.

AA: It's often easier to sell expertise to someone you know well, rather than to a complete stranger. States may ferociously safeguard their newly acquired expertise, but then other considerations can start to apply.

RD: I think it's far fetched for the reasons I gave, but I also think it's unlikely because state interests tend to endure and be fairly stable even though regimes change. So the Iraqi state and the Iranian state are so placed as to be natural rivals and potential enemies. So I would find it most unlikely that Iran would convey a nuclear capability to Iraq. The confessional balance in Iraq is certainly in the Shias' favour, but it may not stay like that forever. Moreover, there is nothing to say that the political power in that country would remain in the hands of the majority community. So I would think it likely that Iran's perception of risk in sharing nuclear technology with Iraq would vastly outweigh any calculation of the potential benefits.

AA: What are the chances of Israel taking pre-emptive action against Iran?

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