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The high price of invasion

Anderson Wilmott reflects on the immense human and economic cost of the Iraq war on both sides of the conflict, and on America's future role in the region.

By Anderson Wilmott

CENTREPIECE: Iraq was to be the focus of the United States' military presence in the Middle East

Hardly had the last American troops left for Kuwait than did the graphic proof of Washington's failure to meet its designs for Iraq become apparent.

For much of the time since the American invasion of 2003, US military and diplomatic efforts have been directed at managing the conflict between Sunni and Shia. Its own troops fought bloody battles against the influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Shia Mahdi Army. Other times the Americans were compelled to intervene to stop fighting between Sunni and Shia.

For the most part Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki managed to appear positive in public about the American engagement but beneath the surface all Iraqis shared a wish that the Americans should leave as soon as possible.
By 2006 a draft plan circulated among Iraqi political groups sketched a programme for the withdrawal of American forces along with the build-up of the Iraqi military.

At that time Maliki wanted foreign troops reduced to fewer than 100,000 by

the end of that year and foresaw the removal of most of the remaining soldiers by the end of 2007.

Even as he was outlining his vision for the future status of American forces, Maliki forbade the US Army from carrying out major operations against the Iranian-backed Shia Mahdi Army, first in Basra, and then later in Sadr City itself in the capital. Each time, it appears, this was done in collusion with the leadership of the Iranian Republican Guard who were active in Iraq in support of their co-religionists.

In each operation Maliki dispatched the Iraqi army instead and each time the operation failed to achieve its objective, leaving the Mahdi Army undefeated and more entrenched than ever, much to Tehran's pleasure.

To say that Maliki's plans for the US military did not align with America's vision would be an understatement.

But believing that the Maliki government was fundamentally sympathetic to Washington's continued presence, the latter drew up its military wish list the following year.

It provided for an unlimited number of troops to stay for an unspecified length of time while hints leaked to the American press revealed US plans for four permanent bases centred around the massive air bases, such as Balad, established at strategic points throughout the country.

The scenario, long hinted at by Washington's enemies, was clear: Iraq would be the centrepiece of the United States' military presence in the Middle East and the ideal focus for its immediate plans, the containment, if not invasion of, Iran.

But Maliki had a shock for the United States: just after returning from a visit to Tehran in summer 2008 he not only announced his own timetable for complete US withdrawal but complained about American plans for indefinite access to military bases, control of Iraqi airspace and immunity from prosecution for American military personnel and civilian contractors.

In the event the Bush administration became aware that the incoming Obama administration would favour an early withdrawal and eventually agreed to have all troops out of Iraq by the end of 2011. But even then Washington still believed it could bank on establishing forward operating bases in the country.

It was unimaginable to think that not only would there be no major military bases in Iraq but Washington was leaving behind not only a government it had created but one that was now, to all intents and purposes, uncooperative with its American midwife.

How embarrassing then that the US has established its largest foreign embassy in Baghdad, and the largest such building in the world, with a staff of more than 15,000 and with a security force of 5,000 private contractors. The $600m building stands on a 104-acre site and will cost an annual $1.2 billion to run.

If that represents the future cost of this ill-starred adventure, what has been the cost of the war in Iraq so far?

The United States itself has lost 4,487 service personnel and an amazing 32,000 troops injured, a figure which takes no account of the number of people returning home who may have been permanently mentally damaged. Although the allies have taken little notice of the human cost to the Iraqis, the estimates run as high as one million deaths. Up to 1.6 million Iraqis have been internally displaced, not to mention the large numbers of those who have left their country never to return.

The material cost has been estimated at $801.9 billion for the direct military costs, while the respected economic commentator, Joseph Stiglitz, has estimated that the true cost, when all related factors are taken into account, will be closer to $3 trillion.

The future for Iraq itself is shaky at best. With vice-president Tariq al-Hashemi essentially on the run from his own government, accused of terrorism, the country is showing all the signs of a potentially failed state, ripe for further Shia incursions from Iran but also possibly fracturing into Sunni and Shia areas. Al-Hashemi, a Sunni, showed the way by taking refuge in the Kurdish north, which already has a degree of autonomy. Other areas must by now be thinking that they would like to follow suit as a future scenario of an Iraq breaking up into regional, confessional fiefdoms becomes a real possibility.

The cost of the Iraq war back home for the Americans is an economy that is on its back and for the military there is little but the prospect of heavy cutbacks in the military budget for the foreseeable future.

For the US military, having been failed by their politicians in the plan to establish Iraq as the centre of Middle East operations, the focus has now switched to Afghanistan. In theory, as a base from which to tackle Iran, the country would appear to be just as suitable but there are substantial political hurdles to be overcome. Already large amounts of money have been ploughed into bases at Kandahar — which is the closest to Iran — and Bagram close to the capital Kabul. There are several other base areas that could be built up.

The problem for US policymakers and diplomats here is that the Afghan central government has even less authority than the Iraqi at its lowest point.

The US blows hot and cold with President Hamid Karzai, as does he with his American sponsors. And given the new froideur between Pakistan and the US, it is unlikely that they would get a warm welcome in Islamabad either.

Just as the current bases in the country have attracted the attention of al-Qaeda, so would anything that threatened to be there on a more permanent basis.
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