| January 2012 |
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A nation of two halves
David Watts
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Hope is no strategy
George Friedman
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How safe are Pakistan's nuclear weapons?
Dr Bhashyam Kasturi
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The high price of invasion
Anderson Wilmott |
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Bad blood and scandal threaten Pak leaders
Rahimullah Yusufzai
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Asia's Joan of Arc
David Watts |
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To Russia with love
Inder Malhotra |
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North Korea's succession: the view from outside Pyongyang
J C Lane |
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Pak nuclear arms could stretch across Gulf
G Parthasarathy |
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Reborn free
Kuldip Nayar |
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Wealth and faith: recalling the roots of Dalip Singh
Shyam Bhatia |
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The rise of mixed- marriage Britain
Dr Ramindar Singh |
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Professor Robert Anderson looks at the causes and effects of India's 1974 nuclear test
Shyam Bhatia
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January 2012
Pakistan
Pak nuclear arms could stretch across Gulf
Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons technology could extend beyond its closest neighbours and threaten stability in the Persian Gulf.
By G Parthasarathy
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DANGEROUS PLACE: Pakistan's currently operational plutonium reactor plant in Khushab |
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A number of scientific and academic organizations across the world like the Federation of American Scientists have referred to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme as the 'fastest growing' nuclear weapons programme in the world. The Director of the Wisconsin Project of Arms Control, Gary Milhollin, has commented: 'If you subtract China's help from the Pakistani nuclear programme, there is no Pakistani nuclear programme'. The rapid growth in Pakistan's nuclear weapons production has been facilitated by China's assistance in building plutonium based warheads in reactors and reprocessing plants located in three towns in Pakistan's Punjab Province, namely Chashma, Fateh Jang and Khushab.
Recognizing that Pakistan required lighter plutonium warheads for miniaturization and fitment on missiles of Chinese origin, China has provided active assistance to Pakistan in the development of plutonium reactors and reprocessing plants. Plutonium weapons are lighter, and have a higher explosive yield than weapons based on enriched uranium, which have been the mainstay of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, since its inception in the 1970s. Plutonium weapons can also be fitted on |
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Pakistan's cruise missiles. China began assisting Pakistan's efforts to build plutonium weapons capabilities in the 1990s. Pakistan today has one operational plutonium reactor in Khushab, whose capacity is estimated to be between 40-50 MW. Meanwhile, the construction of two other plutonium reactors, estimated to have similar capacity, which were inspected by Prime Minister Gilani in February 2010, is believed to be nearing completion. These Plutonium Reprocessing facilities are either under construction or located in Chashma and Khushab.
It is evident that with these capabilities Pakistan not only has the fastest growing nuclear weapons programme in the world, but also has more than enough weapons to constitute a credible deterrent against any attempt by India to invade and seize large parts of its territory. While Pakistan has not formally enunciated a nuclear doctrine, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, Head of the Strategic Planning Division of its National Command Authority, told a team of physicists from Italy's Landon Network that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were 'aimed solely at India'. According to the report of the Landon team, Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India sought to conquer a large part of Pakistan's territory, or destroyed a large part of Pakistan's land and air forces. Pakistan has consistently refused to accede to any Treaty banning the production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons. Given General Kidwai's statement that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India, the logical question that arises is why a country that is on the verge of financial bankruptcy is seeking nuclear overkill capabilities.
The answer perhaps lies in the very basis of Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons. In his memoirs, written while in jail awaiting execution, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto noted that while the 'Christian, Jewish and Hindu' civilizations had nuclear weapons capability, it was the 'Islamic Civilization' alone that did not possess nuclear weapons. He asserted that he would be remembered as the man who had provided the 'Islamic Civilization' with 'full nuclear capability'. In the eyes of Bhutto and his nuclear scientists, Pakistan's bomb was to contribute to the security of the 'Islamic Ummah'.
Pakistan's nuclear scientist Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood was, along with his colleague Chaudhri Abdul Majeed, detained shortly after the terrorist strikes of 9/11. He described Pakistan's nuclear capability as the property of the whole 'Ummah' (Muslim Community). Two other Pakistani scientists Suleiman Asad and Al Mukhtar — both wanted for questioning about suspected links with Osama bin Laden — disappeared after it was claimed that they had gone to Myanmar, bordering China. Mehmood and Majeed are reported to have acknowledged that they had long discussions with Al Qaeda and Taliban officials. A 'Fact Sheet' put out by the White House stated that both scientists had meetings with Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar during repeated visits to Kandahar, with Al Qaeda seeking their assistance to make radiological dispersal devices.
Pakistan's nuclear establishment is known to have had links with Iran, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Efforts by Iraq and Libya to develop nuclear weapons were thwarted by western pressures and invasions. Iran, which obtained uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan over two decades ago, was rattled by the American invasion of neighbouring Iraq in 2003. It thereafter almost immediately agreed to suspend its nuclear enrichment programme and to stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) controls. Ever since then, it has been a cat and mouse game between the Americans and Iranians over controversies about Iran's nuclear enrichment programme. Iran recommenced its uranium enrichment in 2005 and the IAEA declared that it was in violation of its obligations as signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). While Israel has been alarmed by Iranian nuclear ambitions, it is generally agreed that it would take a minimum of three to five years for Iran to commence building nuclear weapons.
Clearly rattled by Iran's nuclear ambitions, Saudi Arabia's powerful Intelligence Chief, Prince Turki Al Feisal, warned that it is 'our duty towards our nation and people to consider all possible options, including the possession of nuclear weapons.' Saudi Arabia enjoys a uniquely close relationship with Pakistan. Its Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, paid an unprecedented visit to Pakistan's nuclear facilities in 1999. Saudi Arabia does not have the technical and manpower skills to make nuclear weapons. It would have to get its nuclear weapons from Pakistan if it is to counter Iran, particularly since any stationing of American forces on its territory would produce an adverse public reaction.
Pakistan could justify deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles on Saudi soil by asserting that such deployment was akin to the deployment of American nuclear weapons and missiles on the soil of its NATO allies. It would not, therefore, constitute a violation of the NPT. Furthermore, Pakistan's economy has been so badly mismanaged that it would take years for it to restructure its economy to meet the needs of its rapidly growing population. In these circumstances, the overambitious Pakistani military could well conclude that providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear deterrent would be an ideal way to bring in billions of petrodollars. The impact that such a development would have on stability in the oil rich Persian Gulf, amidst growing Shia-Sunni tensions across the Islamic world, is something we need to ponder over.
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