July 2009

Iran

Biggest crisis in 30 years

Politics is supposed to be about change, but not when it comes to the Islamic republic where an unprecedented wave of protests against dubious presidential election results invoke a sense of déjà vu.

By Rupert Fisher

THE PARALLEL may be exaggerated, but in 1979 too hundreds of thousands of people took to Iranian streets to protest against the rule of an unpopular Pahlavi dynasty

Some 30 years ago tens of thousands of angry Iranians repeatedly took to the streets to demonstrate against the cronies of the Shah and his Pahlavi dynasty running the affairs of the country.

Fed up with the corruption, phony elections, heavy censorship, torture and execution of thousands of dissenters, the overwhelming majority of Iranians simply wanted the Shah out and his substitution by a regime that was more in tune with their needs.

Then, as now, armed police fired on and killed peaceful demonstrators, thus creating martyrs to inspire yet more demonstrations.

 
 


Then, as now, thousands of Iranians gathered nightly on their rooftops to shout defiant slogans of Allahu Akbar (God is great) in cities like Tehran, Shiraz and Isfahan to show their contempt of the ruling elite.
Then, as now, protestors gathered white flowers of peace to give to the police and soldiers ordered to attack them.

Then, as now, horrified Iranian civilians lamented the role of the secret police (called 'Savak' in the Shah's time). Then, as now, the armed forces found it increasingly difficult to fire upon unarmed demonstrators and, ultimately, it was the loss of support from the armed forces that persuaded the Shah that the game was up.

Of course it is possible to exaggerate the parallels between the last days of the Shah and the current difficulties facing the Islamic authorities.
In the Shah's time there were no blogs, twitter or other Internet platforms from which to launch and consolidate mass protests. If there had been, as there is today, the Shah's downfall might have been much sharper and come much more quickly than anyone anticipated.

The Shah also ruled from a much narrower base. His kingdom of cronies was made up of tiny, self-serving elite and cannot possibly be compared with the genuinely broader-based support that has sustained today's Iranian government.

Some of that support may be now ebbing away because President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is seen by some as rigging his re-election, but that is still a far cry from the last days of the Pahlavis.

Few Iranians were surprised at the results of a recent international news agency survey among the older generation asking if life was better under the Shah. Most of those questioned insisted they enjoyed more freedom now than they ever did under a royal government.

Moreover, unlike the last days of the Shah, when Iranians of all hues united to get rid of an unpopular monarchy, the current unrest is a fight among insiders who have no intention of replacing their theocracy.

Ahmadinejad, the incumbent president, has the support of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Pitted against them is Ahmadinejad's main challenger for the presidency, Mir Hossein Mousavi, as well his many supporters, including former president Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Indeed, if significant parallels are to be drawn between the Iran of 30 years ago and today, a good starting point would be the role of Rafsanjani throughout these tumultuous times.

Back in 1979 when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned home from exile to lead the popular uprising against the Shah, Rafsanjani quickly established himself as an effective and loyal supporter of the elderly Imam. Although a comparatively junior member of the Shia clergy, Rafsanjani's unique quality was his ability to rally the bazari (business community) behind Khomeini.

There was speculation at the time that Rafsanjani was a closet liberal and that he maintained secret contacts with what Khomeini famously described as the Great Satan, his pejorative term for the U.S. But the mud did not stick.
Khomeini rewarded his loyalty by appointing him to the first Revolutionary Council and backing him as speaker of the Majlis. Shortly after Khomeini's death in 1989, Rafsanjani won election as the fourth president of the Islamic Republic, a job he held for the next eight years.

In an ideal world Rafsanjani would have preferred to take on the job for life role as Supreme Leader, effectively Khomeini's successor, but he lost out to Khamenei and there has been no love lost between the two ever since.
Rafsanjani's supporters argue that Khamenei lacks the theological credentials, expertise and gravitas of a Supreme Leader. Khamenei's backers have responded by describing Rafsanjani first as a fox and then a shark looking for any unprincipled opportunity to further his ambitions.

The recently concluded presidential elections have been played out against the backdrop of the bitter fight between the Supreme Leader and the fox/shark arrayed against him.

In a controversial TV debate held on June 4 Ahmadinejad pointedly said, 'Today it is not Mr Mousavi alone who is confronting me, since there are the three successive governments of Mr Mousavi, Mr Khatami and Mr Hashemi (Rafsanjani) arrayed against me.' He went on to claim that Rafsanjani had allied with Saudi Arabia to oust him from power.

Rafsanjani reacted by telling Khamenei, 'I am expecting you to resolve the situation in order to extinguish the fire, whose smoke can be seen in the atmosphere, and to take action to foil dangerous plots.' Khamenei ignored his outburst.

If Khomeini were alive today, Rafsanjani could reasonably expect his protection and help in furthering himself. But with Khomeini's passing more than two decades ago, and following his own constitutional departure from the presidency, Rafsanjani has had to find allies wherever and whenever he can.
He has money (many believe he is the richest man in Iran with thousands of acres of pistachio, almond and walnut orchards) and the support of some politicians and clergy. Khamenei has the backing of the armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij volunteers (pro-government militia) and the state media.

Few expect a quick or easy resolution to the current impasse. 'The divisions within the ruling elite in Iran are making it very hard for the authorities to crack down decisively,' said Mohammad-Reza Djalili, an Iran expert at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. He added in his comment to Bloomberg News that the regime 'is going through its biggest crisis in 30 years. The divisions are getting deeper and deeper

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July 2009
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