All along, ever since Obama took charge, the US has tried its best to   repeat the Iraqi experiment in Afghanistan which has only indicated lack of understanding of the ground situation in that war-ravaged country. The broad contours of the US security policy has been to corner the Taliban and  force it to the negotiating table; and simultaneously, to build Afghan capacities, train, equip and oversee the functioning of an Afghan security apparatus and then withdraw international forces in a phased manner.

This is easier said than done. It has been next to impossible to corner a resurgent Taliban. The efforts to bring them to the table have not succeeded because of incompatibility of outlook and interests between the infant democratic regime in Kabul and an Islamist Taliban. Moreover, the latter is distinctly unwilling to talk to a retreating force. Other factors are also important. Pakistan, an ally of the US in the war against the Taliban, now finds an opportunity to turn its dream of having strategic depth in Afghanistan into reality. It is also looking for the right opportunity to push India out, despite the latter's commitment to rebuild Afghanistan. It is desperate to create a situation where the US would feel comfortable to leave Afghanistan.

There is a clash of views here. The forces that Pakistan would like to be represented in a refreshed Afghan government apparatus are not so far acceptable to the Americans. There is a precipitate fear amongst the Americans that conceding ground to the Quetta Shura or the Haqqani and other factions close to the Pakistani intelligence would be tantamount to giving away whatever little advantages they have secured until now. If Quetta shura comes back to power, al-Qaeda cannot be far behind. Moreover, the fight against the Taliban has to be a long-term affair, given its determination to wage a 'jihad' against an 'occupying force'. If Kabul is seeking a rapprochement without the US scoring a military advantage against the Taliban, there is little hope of bringing lasting peace to Afghanistan. Most importantly, a majority of the southern Pashtuns sympathising with the Taliban are not ready to take the blame for a system put in place (as they see it) by the Americans.

This calls for long-term engagement if the Americans have patience, determination and resources. However, as the McChrystal episode demonstrates, the US is still in a dilemma over the issue of staying the course in Afghanistan. Its economy may not permit it to have long-term military engagement. Its population may not tolerate a surge in body-bags. There is a sense of fatigue amongst the allies in Europe. The political situation in Afghanistan does not show any sign of improvement. The issues of governance, nepotism and corruption remain to be addressed. The warlords, or regional strongmen as they have been euphemistically renamed, are unlikely to allow democracy to succeed. There is a trenchant fear that as soon as the Americans leave, the majority of the Afghan security forces, numbering about 230,000 now, would melt into the Taliban ranks. The international efforts to develop infrastructure and capacities in Afghanistan are still at a critical stage and would require long-term international engagement and charitable apportioning of funds, which is lacking at the moment because of the global economic downturn.

If one analyses Obama's decision to dismiss McChrystal, it only signals a deeper sense of frustration in Washington about its inability to evolve an imaginative policy in Afghanistan. There has been a realisation now that Afghanistan is far removed from Iraq in terms of its inability to set up any countrywide institutions of governance at any point of time in history. It has largely been a society divided along ethnic lines along the peripheries, held together by a highly decentralised system with minimal control from Kabul. Past experiments with centralised administration (during the phase of Soviet occupation and later during the Taliban rule) have not succeeded in generating the required popular consensus (cutting across regional and ethnic divisions) to keep it going. Iraq was different. Until Saddam's removal Iraq was used to a centralised administrative structure and this was a huge plus in the reconstruction efforts there. In Afghanistan, there was and still is nothing except chaos.

The democratic system that is in place in Afghanistan is sure to crumble if international support is withdrawn in a hurry. As a trouble spot with the tendency to evolve as a training ground for international terrorism, Afghanistan demands greater attention and support. Leaving Afghanistan only to Afghans may prove disastrous at this hour. It will only mean preparing for yet another contingent operation titled 'enduring freedom', or call it as you will.

Unfortunately, the weakest link in the international efforts to bring peace to Afghanistan has been the country which is regarded as the most critical to such efforts: Pakistan. It is still dreaming of converting Afghanistan into its client state. History is witness to the fact that despite its backing of Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s and subsequent support to the Taliban, Pakistan has never managed to have a pliant regime in Kabul which it can keep under its control. The only advantage that Pakistan may gain by re-engineering a Taliban-dominated government in Kabul is its compliance to provide refuge and a training ground to India-focussed jihadi militants posing critical challenges for the Pakistani state today by aligning with pro-Taliban groups. Such diversion, many analysts in Pakistan believe, will bring down the Islamist temperature at home and refocus them against India, which its generals consider as the number one enemy.

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