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July 2010
India-US
Bush-era warmth is missing
Despite much bonhomie during strategic talks in June, existing frictions and the forging of new diplomatic bonds threaten to dampen relations between two of the world's great democracies.
By Inder Malhotra
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Fading friendship?: Obama lacks Bush's warmth towards India |
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In the first week of June in Washington there was a lot of bonhomie between India and the United States. The occasion was the inaugural strategic talks between the two countries at the level of Foreign Minister S M Krishna and US secretary of state Hillary Clinton. However, it was President Barack Obama who went out of his way to assuage the hurt Indian sentiment that, because of its reliance on Pakistan for achieving its objectives in Afghanistan, the US was more respectful of Pakistani susceptibilities than India's. He was anxious to reassure the largest democracy that it had a high place in America's scheme of things.
Breaking protocol, he drove to the state department where Clinton had given a reception in Krishna's honour, and there he used his oratory skills to massage Indian ego. India, he said, was 'indispensable' to the US in 'managing' international order in the 21st century, not because of where it was on the map but because it was a vibrant democracy and a rising power. He climaxed his speech by declaring that he was hoping to 'make history' during his first official visit to India in November. The Indian establishment was pleased but independent analysts said that American rhetoric had yet to catch up with reality. In any case, no serious-minded Indian believes that Obama would ever be as warm to India as George W. Bush was.
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The US presidential visit to India is still far off but such are the stars governing the relations between the two countries that problems crop up rather like mushrooms after a summer shower. Barely three weeks after the strategic talks, three problems have arisen of which only one — that of access to David Coleman Headley, the Pakistan-born American convicted in America of having helped Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba in its savage attack on Bombay in November 2008 — has been sorted out reasonably satisfactorily. After a long delay, representatives of the Indian National Intelligence Agencies were at last allowed to question Headley though in the presence of his lawyer and an officer of the American FBI. The two sides are also bound by an agreement to maintain complete silence on what Headley actually disclosed. But the Indian side seems to have no complaint. In the meantime, some sketchy reports about what was disclosed have started trickling out. According to these, Headley has revealed that he was recruited in aid of the Bombay outrage by Hafiz Saeed, the founder of LeT. If true, this is bound to cast a shadow on a series of talks between India and Pakistan that are taking place at the levels of foreign secretaries, home ministers and foreign ministers between June 24 and July 15. Pakistan has so far resolutely refused to take any action against Hafiz Saeed, despite the ample evidence against him furnished to Islamabad by New Delhi.
Of the other two issues that could cause some friction between the two democracies, one has its roots in the world's worst industrial accident that took place 26 years ago in the Central Indian city of Bhopal in December 1984. There was a disastrous leak of a highly poisonous gas from a factory owned by the Union Carbide Corporation of the US. Its then CEO, Warren Anderson, came to India, was arrested but promptly released and allowed to go back to New York. But he never kept his promise to come back to India whenever required. On June 7, a Bhopal court delivered a judgment sentencing the Indian representatives of the UCC to imprisonment for a mere two years. America has nothing to do with this idiocy. It, like the paltry compensation of $470 million for 15,000 dead and half a million disabled, is the handiwork of the Indian judiciary and the political executive. But the nationwide protest has forced the Manmohan Singh government to demand once again the extradition of Anderson, now 89. The Indian government also wants Dow Chemicals, which bought UCC but refuses to meet any of the former corporation's liabilities, to cough up huge cash to pay additional compensation to victims and to clear the toxic waste that is still lying around the accident site.
Since President Obama is personally demanding the highest possible compensation from BP for the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the US possibly cannot refuse Indian demands out of hand. But it is doubtful if it would extradite Anderson or force Dow Chemicals to pay up. This would inflame Indian public opinion against America.
Overriding everything else is the third and the most serious issue of America's unwillingness or inability or both to prevent China from selling Pakistan two additional nuclear reactors, in violation of the assurances Beijing had given the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) at the time of joining it in 2004. When the Chinese signed an understanding with Pakistan, America was hesitant to be critical of China because it needed Chinese support for the UN resolution for enhanced sanctions against Iran. That resolution has already been passed, and New Delhi was pleased when Washington suggested that China must seek the permission of the NSG. But it soon became evident that the US still needs China in relation to the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. China too has enormous clout internationally, and America does not want to cross it, especially after Beijing's willingness to be 'flexible' on revaluing the Chinese currency.
It is against this backdrop that India is getting some disconcerting messages. The NSG is to meet in New Zealand very soon. But India has been told that either the 46-member body would postpone the consideration of Chinese plans, or give China a 'one-time waiver' or just look the other way. This by itself would have been bad enough. The trouble is that India now faces a double whammy. Not only are the two Chinese reactors for Pakistan a virtual fait accompli, but also within the NSG, opposition to India becoming an NSG member is growing. Furthermore, having given India a 'clean waiver' from its guidelines, the NSG seems to be on the verge of deciding that reprocessing and enrichment technologies are not covered by the exemption given to India. It is a case of triple whammy.
Indian policy-makers are discovering to their dismay that America's relations with China and Pakistan are likely to impinge on America's relations with India — usually to India's disadvantage.
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