Having signed and sealed a new nuclear reduction treaty with the United States, a pact which seems to have little real value as far as genuine reduction in the nuclear capability of nations is concerned, the Russians seem convinced that any more friendly stance by Washington will only be a temporary phenomenon and that things will shortly revert to George Bush-era business as usual.

That seems more than likely given what is perhaps the Russians' most striking breakthrough with close American NATO ally Turkey. The new friendship has been no overnight development and it appears to have emerged not least because of the European Union's continued hostility to Turkish membership. The hard-headed pragmatists in Recep Erdogan's government have decided to seek support elsewhere and not just in political terms.

In Ankara in mid-month, President Medvedev pronounced: 'Russia and Turkey are strategic partners, not only in words but genuinely.' The Turks clearly feel the same way and the visit produced no fewer than 17 agreements with a combined value of $25 billion. But by far the most striking of them is the opening up of the Turkish nuclear industry to the Russians, which also gives the measure of the depth of the new relationship between the two countries — indicated by the fact that Russia will not only build a $20 billion nuclear plant to begin with but will also be allowed to operate that plant and most probably the four others that are planned for the country's Mediterranean coast.

Since the Russians already supply the vast majority of Turkish energy needs, this puts Moscow in an unassailable position vis-à-vis anyone else on the nuclear front, not only in terms of the investment package but because Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear supplier, will be able to sell on the power that it makes in Turkey. Along the way the Russians talked their way into a possible role in the Black Sea-Mediterranean oil pipeline which had previously been thought to be the preserve of Italian interests.

It would be stretching a point to say that Ankara has just joined the constellation of Russia's 'near abroad' but from the point of view of those leery of Russian aims and intentions, the new closeness to Turkey represents a significant shift in the European political tectonic plates which could well feed into the future of Middle East peace talks — Medvedev arrived in Turkey by way of Syria — and Ankara, with its closeness to Israel and the Arab states, could expand its role and give the Russians some new Middle East options as well at a time when American-sponsored efforts are lagging at best amid the mutual hostility of the Israeli and American governments.

The new Russian-Turkish friendship might not be so striking were it not for the fact that the European political structure was concomitantly beginning to resemble an economic and political car crash.

Membership of the European Union, let alone the euro, is now a far less attractive option for Turkey than it was even a few months ago. With its neighbour and historical antagonist Greece having just been in receipt of the world's biggest bail-out package worth a staggering 750 billion euros and its hitherto biggest ally Germany in something of a panic over the future of the single currency, this is no time to be potentially expanding the arc of potential crisis by talking of early Turkish membership even if there were a majority in favour. With Spain, Italy and Portugal also likely to be in search of European and international largesse before long, the Turks may well be looking at the end of their decades-old dream of being part of the European home.

The hitherto open door policy on the entry of non-EU labour into the European is now being quietly revisited and the new coalition government in Britain, up till now one of the most liberal, has made limits on the entry of workers from outside the union part of its policy framework after an election in which party manifestos had little to say about immigration but voters on the doorstep were extremely concerned. This will certainly impact the present numbers of Turks moving to the UK to work.

Strategically Turkey is certain to remain a staunch member of the NATO alliance but the fact that the Russians are willing to enter into nuclear agreements with Ankara must surely change the image of the Russians among the Turkish population at large.

In terms of NATO out-of-area operations, which are now at the top of the alliance's agenda, Ankara may well start to take a more qualified look at their value, especially if they encroach on the central Euro-Asian region.  
Certainly the global strategic balance is changing more than at any time since the end of the Cold War, a trend accentuated by lack of clarity in the ultimate direction of American foreign policy under a new dispensation.

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