asianaffairs-March 2008

                            Strained Alliances

Kiyani is disgruntled

The religious forces, which have faced electoral defeat, have abiding appeal as opinion makers, have remarkable street power and can sway popular opinion, more so while in opposition than when in power, comments Iqbal Rana Asghar

   The winds of change have swept away the last vestiges of legitimacy that Musharraf had in Pakistan. People are still celebrating in Peshawar, in Karachi, in Lahore and in Islamabad, except perhaps in Quetta. Pakistani people and civil society, for the first time in history perhaps, had been provided with an opportunity to prove themselves. They have done more than that.
   For the larger world, which had got used to the stereotype of Pakistanis as lovers of dictatorship, benevolent or otherwise, the election results may have come as a surprise. But for Pakistanis it was a moment of rare opportunity. Many stayed home and watched it like a long soap opera on television. Others braved it all and went out to cast their votes.
They were the enthusiasts, the people who wanted to bring about change. Rather than caving in to the prevailing cynicism, despondency and helplessness they exercised their right to franchise. The establishment found it hard to meddle. With the media on high alert and international observers standing by, the forces seeking to rig the elections must have found that they were operating in different circumstances. The results confirmed the obvious. The people were never happier during the moments of transition.
   Pakistan has seen three distinct phases of transition from military to civilian rule. The first, in the 1970s, was a by-product of two successive military defeats at the hand of India. Within a span of six years (1965–71) the political dynamics in Pakistan had changed. A centralised state reluctant to share its power with its own people stood mutilated and divided. The military was compelled to surrender power to civilian leadership. The civilian leadership became dictatorial and lost its legi-timacy, soon to be replaced by a General.
   The second transition from military to civilian rule was a little premature, the result of an accident. A dictator who could ward off the threat from political forces succumbed to the quirk of fate. The process of transition found political consensus wanting. Two distinct groups, the PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League, Nawaz) and PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) emerged and fought on incessantly till one of them (PML-N) tried to assume more dictatorial power than the army and was removed from power by a General.
   The third transition from military to civilian rule is happening just now. This time round, the popular consensus is clearly against Musharraf, even if there is a hung parliament at the centre of things. The two dominant political parties (PPP and PML-N) have fought it out rather bravely under the threat of active rigging and manipulation of the electoral process.
   They struck separate deals to get into the race. They started off against each other without any poll alliance. But now that they have come together to form the government Musharraf may be feeling that he has been cleverly tricked into a corner by the wily political forces.
It was common knowledge in Pakistan that some efforts were made to bring non-PML-N elements together with Musharraf as a ‘father figure’ to guide them in future. But people close to Zardari suggest that he was particularly incensed by the wry and discourteous personal remarks made by Musharraf during the course of the elections and had vowed to teach him a lesson. Musharraf apparently made no personal move to repair this sense of hurt if there was any. The dismal show by PML-Q (PML, Quaid), the party Musharraf backed, threw him into a tizzy. He was unpre-pared for such an eventuality, many would say.
   Sources close to Musharraf say that the relationship between him and the new Army Chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani, is on the wane now. Here again they say Musharraf’s intemperate and condes-cending remarks on the army chief both in Pakistan and abroad made the latter furious and there is no love lost between them at the moment. Thus, there is an impression in Pakistan that General Kiyani with his close contacts with PPP might have persuaded Zardari to forge an alliance with PML-N to weaken Musharraf.
   It may appear on the surface that the decision to forge an alliance may have been taken to honour the popular mandate. But there are other forces at work to enable this alliance at the moment and this may not necessarily lead to weakening of the army’s hold on power. By choosing to shed his uniform and become a civilian President, Musharraf may have exorcised the army of the ghost of illegitimate rule under his leadership.
   Back in Pakistan, people are torn between forces of reconciliation and confrontation. The confrontationists are assertive. The lawyers’ movement that generated the fuel for the ongoing political transition is gaining ground. Aitzaz Ahsan, prominent leader of the movement and a well-known PPP activist, is demanding early restoration of the judges.
This may create problems for Zardari, because the assertive judiciary headed by the dismissed Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, had annulled the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that had provided the oxygen of amnesty to the PPP top leadership and enabled the return of Benazir Bhutto to Pakistan. The issue of restoration of judges has the capacity to divide the alliance.
   However, people close to the Nawaz camp say that Zardari is more likely to soft-pedal the issue now, firm up the alliance to get rid of Musharraf and restore the clauses that reaffirm parliamentary predominance, elect a new President and revise the NRO to include Nawaz Sharif at a later date.
   Zardari has, meanwhile, declared his intention to devolve power to the provinces. He has sought forgiveness from the Balochis for the excessive army action during military rule. This has partially mollified ethnic sentiments in Balochistan and other provinces. However, the alliance, if it matures further in the coming days, will have to avoid doing things which lend it an appearance of an alliance between Sindhi and Punjabi feudal political leadership against the rest of Pakistan.
   Last but not least, the electoral failure of the religious forces should not be dismissed as a success of moderation. True, Pakistan is too big in size and liberal in spirit to be overtaken by any Islamist zeal. But the ability of the religious forces to rise as political dissenters is well known. These forces have abiding appeal as opinion makers at the grassroots level. They have remark-able street power and they can sway the popular opinion in favour or against the government — more so while in opposition than when in power. It would require greater political acumen to weave these forces into the political process by involving them in processes of political consultation even when they may not be in parliament.
   Pakistan is poised for a glorious transition. This moment comes very rarely in human history. The voice of the people of Pakistan has come out loud and clear. It now remains for the political leadership to make it or mar it. ‘Sink your differences and make history’ is what the people would tell the leaders today.
Iqbal Rana Asghar is a freelance journalist based in Lahore.

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