Middle East
Mughniyeh killing

Within hours of Hizbullah commander Imad Mughniyeh’s killing, Israel went from celebration to the fear of consequences, comments Rupert Fisher

  On 13 February Israeli parlia-mentarians and reporters noticed that for the first time in several months Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was smiling broadly and was unusually upbeat. Hours earlier, the Lebanese militant group Hizbullah had announced that its top military com-mander Imad Mughniyeh had been killed in an explosion in Damascus. Mughniyeh, who had long been dubbed by the Israelis, Americans and even some Arabs as one of the most dangerous terrorists in the Middle East, was killed when a bomb exploded inside his Mitsubishi Pajero vehicle after he walked out of a secret meeting with a senior Syrian security official.
   Hizbullah and many Arabs are convinced that Israel’s Mossad secret service was behind the assassination. In keeping with its long-standing policy, Israel would neither deny nor confirm its role. The operation was carried out in the heart of the police-controlled Syrian capital.
   Two days after Mughniyeh’s killing Olmert’s office announced that the prime minister had decided to extend the term of Mossad Chief Meir Dagan by another year. The announcement cited Dagan’s extraordinary success and achievements in the seven years he has been in office.
In the eyes of Israeli security analysts, Dagan was being rewarded for Mossad’s success in catching up with Mughniyeh, who had appeared on Israel’s list of wanted terrorists for nearly 20 years.
   The timing of the operation could not have been better for Olmert and many Israelis. The 2006 war with Hizbullah, as far as many Israelis are concerned, led to a humiliating defeat of the Israeli army and the collapse of the myth that it is the strongest army in the Middle East.
   Israel went to that war with three declared goals but failed to achieve any of them: returning two Israeli soldiers who had been abducted by Hizbullah; disarming Hizbullah and destroying its military infrastructure; and removing Hizbullah from Israel’s northern border.
   About 150 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed in rocket attacks launched by Hizbullah on Israeli cities and towns. Even today Hizbullah celebrates its ‘victory’ over Israel, a sentiment shared by millions of Arabs and Muslims round the world. In their view, a tiny Hizbullah militia of several thousand fighters managed to defeat the mighty Israeli army.
   Earlier this year a government-appointed commission of inquiry openly admitted that Israel had lost that war. The committee drew a grim picture of the way Israeli politicians and military commanders handled the ‘failed’ war.
   The commission’s findings sparked off calls for Olmert’s resignation and for new elections. Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah meanwhile appeared confident as he spoke to his supporters in Beirut earlier in February 2008 about the ‘defeat’ of Israel.
   Mughniyeh’s killing has restored many Israelis’ confidence in Olmert and the Israeli army. ‘Israel’s power of deterrence has finally been restored’, declared a senior military analyst. ‘For the first time in many years, Israelis can walk in the street with their heads high in the air.’
   Yet the celebrations in Israel are likely to be short-lived. Hizbullah has announced that it will soon avenge Mughniyeh’s death, prompting Israel and the US to announce tough security measures. Israel may have scored a moral victory by assassinating Mughniyeh, but soon Israelis might be asking themselves whether the operation was worth the price.
  ‘It was like an especially wild orgy: First the great intoxication of the senses, then the bitter sobering up the next morning’, said Ha’aretz commentator Gideon Levy. ‘Within a few hours, Israel went from celebrating the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh to the fear of what would follow. The “great feat of intelligence,” the “perfect execution,” the “humiliation of (Syrian President) Bashar Assad” were replaced in the blink of an eye with a spate of fear-inducing “travel advisories” by the Counterterrorism Office — don’t travel, don’t identify yourself, don’t congregate, be careful, take every precaution — and with states of high alert on the northern border, and at all of Israel’s embassies and consulates, and Jewish community centers worldwide. If these are the dangers that lie in wait for us, one has to ask: What did we need this assassination for?
  ‘Whoever killed Mughniyeh was once again playing with the most dangerous fire of all: He undermined Israel’s security. If it was Israel, one has to ask whether there was any shred of sense in this move. If it was not Israel, our famed intelligence agencies would do well to prove this quickly, before the next disaster. Was the security of Israel’s citizens improved? Was terror dealt a permanent blow? History, with its multitude of previous assassinations, teaches that the answer is no.
  ‘And regarding the purpose of the assassination: Will it prevent terror attacks, or will it actually increase them? Was Mughniyeh one of those rare people who are irreplaceable, or will his replacement be even more dangerous than he was?
   'Imad Mughniyeh has been killed. Wonderful. Whoever liquidated him did “great work,” as they say. But the morning after, additional pressing questions arise, beyond how they got on his track and how they fooled him. “The world is a better place” after Mugh-niyeh’s assassination, a spokesman for the U.S. State Department declaimed poetically. Better? That is doubtful. But less safe? That is certain.’

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