Musharraf’s Legacy

A political obituary

As a spent force, Musharraf is likely to play an ornamental role and stay on; or throw tantrums and shoot himself in the foot, curse the entire world for this and retire; or wait for the political forces to commit some blunder and bounce back with the support of the army, comments Masood A. Alam

  Every system tries to manage the contradictions brewing within in a manner that will contribute to its long-term survival. The military-civilian hybrid system that was in place in Pakistan between 2002 and 2007 also sought to manage such contradictions in its own way. It failed in the long run. There was no way of escaping the fact that at the end of the day it mattered whether you had enough popular support to carry on.
   The civilian mask that the Musharraf government chose to wear to seek popular legitimacy could not fool the Pakistanis. But till the Judges’ issue the military-backed government pulled on reasonably well. The economy picked up. The middle class expanded. Appre-ciable changes were made in the constitution to accommodate women. To reflect the population growth, consti-tuencies were added and the Lower House was reconfigured. The media were largely left free to criticise the government. Musharraf started the peace process with India. He advocated enlightened moderation and backed liberal Islam.
  Musharraf consulted the top brass in the military regularly, more often than the people of Pakistan and their elected representatives, and convinced them about his moves to turn Pakistan into a liberal polity. With equal zeal, he could take on the religious forces, whether on the occasion of Seerat or while engaging them in debates on liberal interpretation of Islam. He made his mark as a convinced liberal. But this good work could not balance the evil that the government let loose in the political domain.
  Originally, the Musharraf government embarked on a reformist path. But soon, it changed tack and made peace with defectors who were as corrupt and self-seeking as the ones it sought to replace. Musharraf almost equated his political survival with the survival of Pakistan and came close to saying ‘I am the State’. Every policy of the government swi-velled around the theme of his survival. The tame legislature, composed of spineless and power-mongering politi-cians, went on buttressing his legal position in the country. He could retain uniform as President.
   He could make Pakistan Army an important constituent of the National Security Council which he went on to establish. He could exercise the authority he assumed through such legalisation of his official position very successfully and divide the political opposition. He stormed through Balochistan and deepened the feelings of resistance among the Balochis. All power flowed from his office. The faulty political process that he patronised alienated many people. The Sindhi and Baloch nationalist forces were on the ascendant.
   However, despite this enormous concentration of power he looked a better alternative to the political lot who could never come together to take him on. The people were apathetic to the appeal of the politicians and enjoyed the fruits of economic reforms. The media criticised Musharraf yet felt obliged to him for helping them find their voice.
   Armed with enormous power and blinded by his sense of self-righteousness, little did he realise that he should not meddle with the source of his popular legitimacy. His battle against politicians the people partially approved; but his move against the Chief Justice they abhorred. As the popular resistance gathered momentum, he realised this and tried to retrace his steps. He restored the CJ. But there were no honourable exits. As a dictator he thought it against his interest to accommodate an assertive CJ. The sacking of the CJ affected his fortunes badly. This proved a boon for the forces who were advocating democracy.
   Musharraf stands diminished as a political force. His ties with the army stand considerably reduced. Even the army will find it difficult to swim against the tide. It cannot do it without spurring another bout of popular upsurge that it is not ready for at the moment. It may not find the spectacle of an ex-General-turned civilian President sheltered within the confines of Rawalpindi General Headquarters too sufferable in the changed circumstances.
   How long will Musharraf resist the mandate? Any political confrontation with Musharraf will require support from the army and the USA. A cornered Musharraf is likely to get closer to the army and convince its top leadership that he is still their best bet as President; that otherwise the civilian authority may render the army powerless.
He has the blessings of the USA at the external level. At home, he will seek credit for holding fair and free elections, the elections that brought his foes to power. He has already advocated reconciliation with the political forces that will come to power. He will now try to stop any effective consensus on critical issues between the two premier political parties.
   As a spent force, Musharraf is likely to play an ornamental role and stay on. Alternately, he may throw tantrums and shoot himself in the foot, curse the entire world for this and retire. He may also stand back, take his time and wait for the political forces to commit some blunder and bounce back with the support of the army. However, the possibility of his entering active politics and emerging as a third alternative does not arise.
   Against this backdrop, there is an opportunity that has to be seized — both for Pakistanis and the world community. The international community in general and the USA in particular ought to take note of the popular mood in Pakistan today. It should not back any move aimed at curtailing the power of the democratic forces. It should rather strengthen the process of civilianisation of adminis-tration. The army would then prove more effective against the extremists in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
   As a winning combine, PML-N and PPP will have to display maturity to create the basis for a larger political consensus in favour of a successful transition to democracy. Their coming together has belied the cynics who said that it would be much like snake and mongoose tying up to get rid of the peacock.
   Many in Pakistan apprehend that the moment Musharraf departs the political scene the two parties will be at each other’s neck. They will muddy the waters for another general to step in. Or will it be the same Musharraf resurrected with the support of the army again?

Masood A. Alam, based in Peshawar, is a civil society activist
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