India-US

The still unresolved N-tangle

The Indian government might have done better in pushing the civilian nuclear deal with the US among its domestic audience if it had highlighted the fact that its primary advantage will be ending India’s isolation since 1974 in the field of civilian nuclear trade that had deprived it of the opportunity of developing its nuclear industry to its potential, comments     Atul Cowshish

  The euphoria witnessed in July 2005, when President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on a visit to the US, signed a deal for mutual cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear programme, has given way to despondency. The US administration looks exasperated at the mounting opposition to the deal in India for which it had to do battles with its powerful non-proliferation lobby. Early July has been set as the unspoken ‘deadline’ for the deal by the US, after which the country would be too deeply immersed in the Presidential poll to take up anything else.
   But it is not certain if India can meet that ‘deadline’. The Indian Left, keeping the government afloat in Parliament, has said a firm ‘no’. The nuanced anta-gonism to the deal from the main Opposition party BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), based on political calculations, will persist.
   The Congress-led UPA (United Progressive Alliance) government is in a bind; it is unsure of carrying the deal to fruition. After investing a lot politically in the deal failure to carry it through will be a loss of face for the ruling party and perhaps for the country too. In the near future India will not get a similar deal that overrides the hawkish non-proliferation lobby in the US, no matter who occupies the White House next. The two leading Democrat aspirants in the US, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, have said that the Republican adminis-tration has been needlessly generous to India in drafting the deal. 
   Critics of the deal have tried to overwhelm its supporters in India by raising the fear that it will ‘sell out’ national interests and force India to align its foreign policy with that of the US — not a popular course in most world capitals. That really tells more about the government’s failure to peddle the deal within the country than the success of the Opposition in creating an ‘anti-India’ bogey.
   Critics of the deal have found sympathetic ears in the country by arguing that it will effectively cap India’s military nuclear programme though the deal explicitly excludes the military nuclear programme from its ambit. In fact, that is the main criticism of the deal in the US.
   The fear of a cap on the military nuclear programme is puzzling. After the 1998 test (Pokhran II), the BJP-led government of the day had told the world that thenceforth India was observing a moratorium as it had developed a minimum nuclear deterrent capability. In any case, only the politically naïve will believe that India will escape another round of sanctions — tougher — should it carry out another nuclear test, irrespective of any deal or agreement with any country.
   Those in India who support the nuclear deal have accused the government of reluctance to stand on principle and caving in to the pressure from the Left when only about 12 months away from completing its full five-year term in office. They have also noticed how the government has failed to play on the Left’s ambivalence on the nuclear issue: it opposes India’s nuclear programme but supports China’s, including China’s continuous support to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes, not to mention its prevarication on China’s claims to Indian territories.
   As regards the energy aspect, the deal, while boosting nuclear energy produc-tion in India is not expected to become the mainstay of its energy needs of the future. Nuclear cooperation with the   US — and subsequently with other countries — might help India build more modern, efficient and cheaper nuclear plants but at best they will meet no more than a quarter of its energy needs. Besides, there will remain reservations about the safety of nuclear plants and disposal of nuclear waste. India will need to have as wide a mix of sources as possible to meet its gargantuan hunger for energy.
   The government might have done better had it highlighted that the primary advantage of the deal will be ending India’s isolation since 1974 in civilian nuclear trade that had deprived it of the opportunity of developing its nuclear industry to its potential. It had also denied India access to dual-use techno-logy useful in a variety of fields, including agriculture, meteorology and, of course, defence.   
   Not many in the outside world were prepared to listen to the Indian protests that brought the regime of nuclear sanctions and embargo following Pokhran I and II. Not even India’s clean non-proliferation record, which stood in contrast to neighbouring Pakistan’s nearly open nuclear market, helped remove misgivings about India’s nuclear programme.
   The US had taken the lead in creating these unfavourable circumstances. But its initiative of signing a civilian nuclear deal with India has sought to change the picture and accord India de facto membership of the exclusive nuclear club, by amending its tough proliferation laws to accommodate India. Washington also promised to push its 44 partners in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to follow its lead in opening civilian nuclear trade with India.
   Russia and France have shown keen interest in doing civilian nuclear trade with India. But no country, Russia included, will jump the NSG guidelines unilaterally to help India. The NSG will only listen to the US.

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