Pakistan and ‘War on Terror’

Visible American role

Rather than seek to marginalise Musharraf further, the political elements would do well to confine him to his ornamental constitutional position, comments Ashok K. Behuria

  The much-awaited elections are over in Pakistan. The two centrist parties, PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) and PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League, Nawaz) now look all set to form an alliance to form the government. This is being regarded as the first step towards restoration of democracy in that country.
   It is useful here to study the approach of these two parties to the entire issue of elections and democracy during the years of political wilderness.
   The PPP, led by late Benazir Bhutto’s much-maligned husband, Asif Ali Zardari, was the first party to desert the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD), the political combine in 2006. Benazir felt it to be in her own interest as well as that of Pakistan to negotiate with Musharraf for a smooth transition to democracy. Nawaz Sharif had other ideas. He thought it would be tantamount to surrender to Musharraf’s plans.
   Nawaz would rather invest his time and resources in expanding ARD, call it All Party Democratic Movement (APDM) and swear not to join any elections with Musharraf at the helm. However, very soon, he was seen deserting all the forces he had gathered in his favour and against Musharraf, and jumping into the electoral fray.
   Both these parties have reaped good electoral harvest at the end of the day. They would have performed well in any case. But it is the context coupled with the spirit of the times that has made their electoral triumph look so special.
   Much more special has been their decision to come together after the elections. Are they serious? Were they planning for such a climax and befooling Musharraf? Or is it that they could not defy the popular verdict and decided to honour it? Will they sink their differences and work sincerely together in the days to come? Or will they revert to the familiar tale of backstabbing, mudslinging, one-upmanship, and prepare the ground for the Ayubs, Zias and Musharrafs again?
   The political churning taking place in Islamabad has kept analysts guessing. If good sense prevails the alliance would stick. If it sticks and veers towards a final confrontation with Musharraf, will he leave the scene, as reports suggest? Or will he seek to confront the alliance with help from the army?
   Most analysts believe that if they choose to confront Musharraf and get back to agitational politics that will be unfortunate. If Musharraf chooses to resist with some tentative backing from the army in the name of restoring internal order, it may give him a fresh lease of life. After all, the party supported by him has garnered 7–8 per cent more votes at the national level than PML-N, even if it has won less number of seats in the bargain. The best course for the two political parties would be to consolidate their power at the political level and then take on the remnants of the Musharraf-led establishment.
   Much as one would expect the political leadership to stray the pattern and come together, the post-electoral consensus looks weak and fragile. They are united in their common hatred of Musharraf. Musharraf’s departure from the political scene, either voluntary or forced, may rob the alliance of the much-needed political glue that can keep it together.
The two most important actors who would play a critical role in the process of political transition are the Army and the USA. The army, under General Ashraf Kiyani’s leadership, is as much averse to the idea of Musharraf’s continuation in power as the political forces. He has given enough hints to the political forces that he would like the army to get back to the barracks and mind its business.
   However, if the political forces were to roll back the amendments brought about by Musharraf during his nine years of dictatorial rule, the army may have second thoughts. For example, the army may not be comfortable with any move to withdraw institutions like the National Security Council, and even repeal of Article 58(2)(b).
   The USA on its part would not like to leave Musharraf in the lurch. It would try its best to get in place a system where the political parties will conduct the affairs of state while Musharraf will sit in waiting at the top as a referee biased towards the USA and its war on terror. The Americans know well that there will be strong pressure on the new govern-ment to go slow on the war on terror. Pakistanis are distinctly wary of fighting the American war in their territory.
   The latest reports suggest that the Americans have started featuring in the power-sharing arrangement being worked out between the PPP and  PML-N. It is but natural that they would try to increase their influence on Nawaz Sharif and Zardari. Both these wily politicians also know that they will have to have the blessings of the US to survive in the corridors of power.
   At the provincial level the anti-Musharraf forces will have to find some ways of sinking their differences and coming together. No political party commands absolute majority in most of the provinces. They will have to ally with one another. This game of realignment of forces will go on till the new government gets going at the centre.
   Musharraf stands marginalised and cornered. Rather than seeking to corner him further, the political elements would do well to confine him to his ornamental constitutional position. As long as they do not engage in any act of tomfoolery, Musharraf will find it hard to invoke Article 58(2)(b) and dismiss the government.
   They should rather build on and broaden the available political consensus at the national level. The electoral verdict reflects the popular mood. The people are disenchanted with military rule. They have disavowed religious extremism, discarded excessive state action in Balochistan, advocated greater auto-nomy of the provinces, approved of the peace process with India, and longed for a return to representative politics. The political parties should heed this and chalk out their strategies accordingly.
   Will the current political developments strengthen democracy in Pakistan? Well, it is a small step in that direction. In the context of Pakistan, democracy has limited resonance. It means at best restoration of electoral politics. The temptation to stray the constitutional track and assume dictatorial power through all possible means is common to all the actors competing for power.
   The course of politics has so far hardly affected the social structure, which is feudal, blatantly inegalitarian and resistant to change. Neither any political party nor any dictator has ever dared to bring in reforms that would stir the collective conscience in this regard. The political dynamics very much reflects the feudal social order, which appears fixed and immutable.
   If politics broadly means the art of managing power, the elections would, at the very best, alter the existing power equations in Pakistan for the time being. It is too much to expect that they will lead to an open society and strengthen the forces of democracy.

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