The government only hopes that Swat Taliban leader, Maulana Fazlullah, the son-in-law of TNSM chief Sufi Mohammad, will fall in line once the elderly father-in-law asks him to sustain the ceasefire declared by Taliban. This also reveals the nexus between radical forces of all hues in the tribal terrain.

Does this mean that Pakistani Army and government have lost their zeal to fight the radical forces? Is it a clever ploy to bring peace to Swat and carry on army action elsewhere? Does it signal lack of will on the part of the government to extend its writ to the tribal areas?

Pakistani state is in a state of wilderness. Its policy of neglecting the tribal areas has, over the years, alienated the people there. Its army is not ready to fight its own people. There is also a sense of fatigue creeping in. Situation has reached such a pass that regular soldiers would rather surrender to militants than fight them.

The Sharia deal was in the making for long in Pakistan. The regulation was imposed in 1994 in Malakand and was modified in 1999. Those were peaceful times and people ignored the move even if it said clearly that Islamic Sharia was imposed in Malakand agency and adjoining areas. It was only after 2001 when the global war on terror isolated Islamist radicals as its targets, one realised that Pakistan had willingly provided the context for raising a constituency of Islamist radicals, which could be effectively used in its Afghan policy during the Taliban years.

During Musharraf's rule the Pakistan state claiming 'enlightened moderation' felt inhibited in associating itself with this regulation. However, as the sense of frustration deepened within the army, the option of a negotiated settlement came to the fore.  Pakistani dilly-dallied with the alternative of imposing Islamic Sharia as per the demands of the local militants throughout 2007 and 2008.

Even the secular, left-leaning Awami National Party (ANP), which won a majority of seats and formed the government in NWFP, has felt compelled to reintroduce the bill and secure the approval of both the civilian government at the centre and the Pakistani military establishment.

Finally, the mullah has won the battle of nerves. The soldier and liberal politicians have caved in. What does it augur for Pakistan?

It is well known that most of the Sunni Islamist radical groups operating under different names (Al Qaeda, Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Ansar etc.) have come together in recent years. They are coordinating their operations more effectively and are not deterred by large-scale army deployment in the tribal areas. They have conducted their attacks in foolproof ways indicating their nexus with some sections of the establishment.

The recent attacks on Indian Embassy in Kabul, Marriott hotel in Islamabad and in Mumbai and Kabul suggest that these forces have fanned out of Pakistan and are moving in all directions.

In this context, Pakistan may be trying out the Swat option as an interim measure to ascertain temporary peace in the region. Swat, known as the Switzerland of Pakistan, was causing grave concern to the Pakistani government over the past few years as it had turned into a mini-Islamic emirate within the country. Islamabad tried for long to integrate it in Pakistani mainstream under the active gaze of international community. But finally it had to appease the mullahs to silence their guns.

But anybody familiar with Pakistani politics would not have much hope in the present arrangement. It may result in temporary truce but given the inflexible attitude of the radical forces, they will not stop at nominal announcement of imposition of Sharia. They have shut down girls' schools, barbers' and music shops and introduced Islamic system of jurisprudence in the area under their sway.

The deal has already claimed its first victim in the form of the Geo TV journalist Musa Khan. The government, however, hopes that the march of thousands of people under the leadership of TNSM chief Sufi Mohammad to Swat will persuade Taliban and other radical elements to declare peace.

The government's bid to woo these forces into the liberal mainstream with an Islamic façade is unlikely to succeed. The leniency shown by the government is being seen as its weakness. It is very likely that the triumphant mullahs will push the government further and get all agreements to their advantage. The government has hope on its side; the mullahs, however, are convinced that they will win the war of nerves. The tug of war will continue.

Vast swathes of tribal areas are swarmed by willing jihadis not only from different tribal agencies, but from interior districts of Punjab. The government's writ is virtually absent there.

Analysts from Pakistan say that these elements are surviving on charity money flowing in through informal channels from the Gulf. They also have Afghan drug money to support their activities. Taliban cadres are much better paid than subalterns in Pakistani Army conducting ground operations in the country.

The popular enthusiasm shown by Swat tribals in the wake of the imposition of Islamic Sharia in Malakand and Swat attests to this fact. They are so used to neglect from the Pakistani state that they view its beneficent attention with scepticism.

In Pakistan, everybody hopes that this phenomenon of assertive and infectious Islamism will stay quarantined within the tribal, Pashtun-majority belt. It may be true that it will not spread beyond some border and interior districts in Punjab. However, such small Islamic emirates dotting the Durand Line, Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, is not a happy prospect at all.

Pakistan is playing a dangerous game. It is playing with fire and hoping against hope that it will manage to control the Frankenstein's monster it has created. It is not yet ready to acknowledge that these forces have come home to roost. They are posing grave threats to Pakistan from within. It has to go the whole hog and root out the menace of terror.

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