She maintained her demand without having brought forward concrete evidence of malfeasance except for what she claimed was parliament's manipulation of the legal scenario shortly before election day.

Sherr warned that Tymoshenko ran the risk of sullying an otherwise first class reputation whereas if she contented herself with playing her role as a strong prime minister she could have a vital role in the country's future.
But anyone who saw the election as a 'souring' of the orange revolution would be mistaken. In the meantime since the polls in 2004 the country had built up experience in how democracy works in practical terms and the public had learned how their own country functioned in the new era of freedom, what its real capabilities were and what was likely to be possible and what not.

Not least there had been a more realistic assessment of the two key foreign policy issues confronting the nation — membership of Nato and the European Union. The former is such a divisive issue that it is best left as a theoretical possibility somewhere down the track while the EU had not evinced a proper invitation to membership, only an associate status which would place Ukraine on the same level as countries with much inferior democratic records, an offer which left Kiev seriously unimpressed. In the view of many observers it is a positive to have the Nato question put on the back burner allowing the organisation to build up its contacts and reputation within the nation quietly, until a more propitious moment. Even Yanukovich, a strong opponent of the Nato link, recognises the importance of the organisation and its institutions.

Overriding those two questions, of course, is the question of the status of the relationship with Russia which is now much more nuanced than it was in the past. Though Yanukovich's party is seen as the most pro-Russian, it encompasses factions which are pro-European and their leader recognises that any help to alleviate Ukraine's dire economic situation — economic activity shrank by some 20 per cent last year — will have to come from the International Monetary Fund or other Western sources. There is nothing Russia can do to help. Indeed Ukraine's production of coal and its heavy industry has to compete with the subsidised products of the Commonwealth of Independent States while Russian oligarchs have been buying into Ukrainian industry at bargain basement prices in the Donbass region countering the interests of Yanukovich's own industrial allies.

Although Yanukovich might be thought to be a natural ally of Prime Minister Putin, the Russian leader in fact finds it easier to deal with Tymoshenko on her visits to the Kremlin.

Yanukovich knows this time that he has a slender majority and needs to govern with the interests of all Ukrainians in mind so that, hopefully, it will naturally limit the influence of extremists and nationalists within his political entourage. But having said that he is already on record as saying that he will 'go back to the beginning.' That would presage some of his old hard-line corrupt policies were it to be allied with the appointment of some hard-line ministers.

Yanukovich would make a good start if he could begin to mend the country's staggering economy with a more efficient tax collection system. It is estimated that as much as 30 per cent of the economy takes place in the shadows out of reach of the taxman. Improving the tax take and convincing others that you are doing so will be an important factor in trying to rescue the country from a national debt, which now amounts to $1,000 for every Ukrainian. The truth is that Ukraine needs to fill a $30 billion-sized hole at a time when there are many competitors for any loan/aid funds available, most of which will be allocated on the basis of friendships, alliances and groupings such as the European Union. The total debt is made up of $20 billion in government and private short-term debt due this year and a further $10 billion of long-term debt.

The Yanukovich government is expected to start renegotiating much of that debt but one of his first tasks will be to try and renegotiate the price the country pays for Russian gas. This is likely to be no easy task at a time when Russia itself is feeling an economic squeeze.

The new leader, however, will be able to offer Moscow a valuable trump card — a lengthy new lease on the Sevastopol naval base, the home port of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Russians' hold on this vital base has been tenuous ever since the Orange Revolution but it remains vital as the country's only access point on the Black Sea, vital to the deployment of Russian naval forces in the European area. 

Reports indicate that Yanukovich will offer the Russians a 25-30-year lease if he can persuade the Putin administration to offer him advantageous prices for their gas. But for that scheme to reach fruition he must be able to get it past his own parliament and deal with some potential constitutional pitfalls. Once again the Russian connexion will loom large over the Ukrainian political landscape but this time it will be a Ukraine which can boast a fully functioning democracy, something that Russians can only dream of.
(Yulia Tymoshenko resigned as prime minister early March.)

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