The countries seemed back on square one.
The contrast between the press conferences of Rao and Bashir could not have been greater. She was positive and polite. She did admit that Pakistan had raised the Kashmir issue, river waters and alleged Indian interference in Balochistan but the Indian side had reaffirmed its known positions on these subjects. In all, the Delhi meet had centred on terrorism. She also stated that the Delhi talks were a prelude to re-engagement between the two countries though this would not mean a resumption of the 'composite dialogue' Pakistan sought insistently, as it had done during the conversations.

At his press conference, Bashir repeated this demand and vehemently criticised India in regrettable tone. He asserted that the 'core issue' of Kashmir and the river waters problem (which really results from Pakistani Punjab's 'water greed' and the consequent deprivation to the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan) were discussed 'extensively'. He was often sarcastic or dismissive of Indian concerns over terrorism. He did say that Islamabad would study and respond to the three dossiers given to him by the Indian side, including the one demanding the custody of two serving Pakistan Army majors and several other alleged terrorists. For the rest, Bashir told India not to 'lecture us' or read out 'sermons', adding that some Indian dossiers were 'more literature than evidence in legal sense'. He objected to Pakistan being called the 'epicentre of terrorism' and while underlining the utility of 'composite dialogue', he added sneeringly that Pakistan 'wasn't desperate' about it. It is also possible that during the two hours he took to hold his press conference, Bashir — who is normally an accomplished diplomat — had been in touch with his government and was acting under instructions. Sadly, he has caused serious and avoidable damage to India-Pakistan relations, such as they are, and to the prospect of repairing them.

In all fairness, it must be admitted that both foreign secretaries were addressing their own countrymen.
Of course, Bashir and those directing him — and the wide world knows that Pakistan's Army, and not the fragile civilian government of President Zardari, decides the India policy — haven't acted in a fit of absent-mindedness. Bashir's performance in Delhi fits nicely into the overall and overconfident strategy of Pakistan's Army Chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. He has been riding high since the London conference on Afghanistan and his own meeting with Nato commanders in Brussels. Kayani is convinced — correctly enough in the opinion of many across the world — that the United States and its allies want to leave Afghanistan as early as possible after arriving at some kind of a deal with the Taliban or simply by declaring victory. The collapse of Denmark's government over the issue of the continuing presence of its troops in Afghanistan is a telling straw in the wind. Kayani has therefore told the Americans that he and Pakistan are in the best position to help them reach an agreement with Taliban. He has also hammered home the message that Pakistan's main concerns about its security are India-centric. Until the Kashmir issue was solved, he has   added, India's existential threat to Pakistan would not disappear. He therefore wants the U.S. to help resolve Kashmir by mediating between India and Pakistan.

Kayani also demands 'primacy' of his country in post-war Afghanistan. Thus it would be able to keep India out of Afghanistan on the one hand, and to realise its old objective of getting 'strategic depth' (against India) under a 'friendly regime' in Afghanistan, on the other. It is in this context that the notorious ISI's cooperation with the CIA in arresting no fewer than 124 terrorists, including the number two commander of Afghan Taliban, Maulana Baradar, and some members of the Al Qaeda, must be viewed. The only puzzling feature of this situation is that Afghan or Pakistani Taliban have not yet retaliated against the Pakistan Army's cooperation with the U.S.-led Nato troops and the CIA that has kept up the use of drones to eliminate those Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban elements finding sanctuaries within Pakistan.

The key question therefore is what impact the Delhi drama would have on the Indian government's well-meaning attempts to restore 're-engagement' with Pakistan that has been ruptured since the Mumbai outrage. The answer sadly is that any such effort has been made exceedingly difficult for quite a long time to come. No one can forget the country's strong and crippling reaction to the Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart, Yousaf Raza Gilani, which had de-linked terrorism and dialogue. When the invitation to Bashir to come to Delhi became public — unfortunately on the day of the Pune terrorist attack — there was a lot of criticism of Dr. Manmohan Singh's 'untimely' and 'hasty' initiative. Even within the Congress party there was scepticism. Now the critics have become greatly emboldened, ironically thanks to Pakistan. Bashir has sharpened this trend, wittingly or unwittingly, by repeated commending Dr. Singh's 'vision of a prosperous and peaceful subcontinent'. Already there are strong voices that the prime minister must hold wider intra-party and inter-party consultations before making any move in relation to Pakistan.

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