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March 2010
Post-Afghan conference
India wary and watchful
The prospects of Taliban's return to power and Pakistan's accrued clout in Afghanistan are causing some concerns in New Delhi.
By G Parthasarathy
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AT ODDS: India's External Affairs Minister Krishna (left) and his Pakistani counterpart Qureshi were part of the January 28 London conference on Afghanistan and their deep differences were evident |
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The recent London International Conference on Afghanistan focused on the future course of action by the international community on issues ranging from economic assistance and debt relief, to training Afghan civil servants and improving levels of governance in Afghanistan. But three key decisions of the conference were viewed with interest, seriousness and even a measure of concern in New Delhi. The conference sought to assure Afghanistan that the United States-led forces in the country would not abruptly withdraw, but there would be an orderly transfer of responsibilities to Afghan security forces.
It was decided that the strength of the Afghan National Army (ANA) would be raised to 171,600 and the Afghan National Police to 134,000 by 2011. It was also decided to set up a 'Trust Fund' to facilitate a programme of reconciliation and reintegration of those members of the Taliban who renounce violence, severe links with terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and join the democratic processes in the country. While New Delhi is sceptical of the process of 'reconciliation' with Taliban cadres, the External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna has gone along with the proposal, primarily out of deference to Afghan President Karzai's advocacy of it. Moreover, concerns that public opinion in the Western world may compel governments to act against their better judgement remain. |
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New Delhi has also carefully noted reactions in Pakistan after the London conference. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi remarked: 'Pakistan is perhaps better placed than any other country in the world to support Afghan reintegration and reconciliation.' After a meeting in Brussels with fellow generals from Nato member states, Pakistan's Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani informed that he had told his Nato counterparts that Pakistan was ready to train officers of the ANA, adding: 'If we get more involved with the ANA there is more interaction and better understanding.' Spelling out Pakistan's strategic goals he said: 'We want strategic depth in Afghanistan.' He, thereafter, pointedly remarked that unless this happened, a 250,000- strong ANA could pose a security threat to Pakistan.
Pakistani political commentator and an expert on the Taliban, Rahimullah Yusufzai, responded caustically to General Kayani's and Qureshi's observations. Reacting to the general's comments on training the ANA, Yusufzai said that the Afghans would naturally fear that 'the ISI would recruit Afghan Army officers it they are sent to Pakistan, and would then use them for its strategic goals in Afghanistan.' He also noted: 'India's emphasis on building roads, hospitals, educational institutions, electricity systems and other projects of public welfare is paying rich dividends and earning it tremendous goodwill in Afghanistan.' One of Qureshi's officials had earlier commented: 'We do not see India playing any role in Afghanistan. Any role for India in Afghanistan can only be problematical.' Yusufzai also remarked that the international community was hardly likely to trust Pakistan as an intermediary with the Taliban and added that the Taliban leadership had already rejected President Karzai's offer of reconciliation.
Meanwhile, America's Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, testifying before the National Intelligence Committee of the Senate on February 2 said: 'The Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda and Pakistani militant groups continue to use Pakistan as safe haven for organising, training and planning terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies in Afghanistan.' More significantly, he added that Pakistan 'still judges it does not need to confront groups that do not threaten it directly and maintains historical support for the Taliban. It has continued to provide support to its militant proxies such as the Haqqani Taliban, the Gul Bahadur group and the Commander Nazir group. Indeed, as is well known, the Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan militants' safe haven for the insurgency in Afghanistan is in Pakistan. The safe haven is an important Taliban strength and unless it is greatly diminished, the Taliban insurgency can survive defeat in Afghanistan.' New Delhi has taken careful note of Blair's comments and appears convinced that Pakistan's military establishment will continue its backing for the Taliban in Afghanistan. There are also misgivings in India about the role of the British Labour Party government in Afghanistan.
The London conference and consequent fears that the stage may have been set for the early return of the Taliban to power raised some concerns in New Delhi. But there is a realisation now that the situation is more complex than earlier envisaged and that India has to invest in retaining the goodwill it has built by its imaginative and effective interaction with and assistance to the people of Afghanistan. New Delhi will review and is likely to respond positively to requests from the Afghan government for more facilities for training officers of the ANA in India. Diplomatically, it does appear the stage is set for India to act in concert, and not exclusively, with Nato, but after close consultations with Russia and Afghanistan's neighbours — Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan — who share Indian concerns about any rise in Taliban influence in Afghanistan. Ideally, India would like to see the international community guaranteeing the neutrality of Afghanistan, together with binding and verifiable assurances of non-interference in its internal affairs by all its neighbours. This has to constitute the core of any 'regional approach' to the situation in Afghanistan.
However, the Kabul attack in which six Indians were killed could spoil things as the Afghan intelligence, like in the past, could accuse Pakistani intelligence agency, ISI, of involvement in the bombing and India could follow suit. Both Kabul and New Delhi made the same accusation twice in the recent past when the Indian Embassy in Kabul was attacked. They alleged that the Afghan Taliban at the behest of Pakistan carried out these attacks to harm India and its interests in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban immediately claimed responsibility for the attack in Kabul and threatened more such strikes against all foreigners supporting the Karzai government. The latest attack would bring Afghanistan and India closer and contribute to the mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul. It would also contribute to the growing proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan.. top | |
