Pakistan created a jihadist Frankenstein that is now out of control, according to former CIA analyst BRUCE RIEDEL, now a Senior Fellow at the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy in the Brookings Institution. Riedel tells Shyam Bhatia of asianaffairs that the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda have declared war on the Pakistani state and are determined to overthrow it.

AA: How unstable is Pakistan and is what happens there is a matter of concern to everyone?
BR: Pakistan is today going through unprecedented political instability at home. We have not seen levels of violence like we're seeing in Pakistan in the country's history. According to one Pakistani think tank last year 25,000 Pakistani civilians were killed or wounded in terrorism related violence. When General Kayani was here last month for the strategic review he told the administration that 10,000 Pakistani soldiers were killed or wounded in 2009 in fighting the militants. Pakistan is seeing a wave of violence unlike anything it has seen in its history. The stability of the civilian government does not look to be in immediate jeopardy, but the long term prognosis for Pakistan, given this kind of violence, is very worrisome.

AA: Is it the appeal of the Taliban that accounts for the present instability?
BR: I think the cause of the instability is that Pakistan incubated over the course of the last 30 years a syndicate of different terrorist organisations. Pakistani Taliban is only the most recent. Going back to the Zia years Pakistan has been sponsoring as a policy of state a variety of militant groups — Afghans, Kashmiris and others — that have created a jihadist Frankenstein. This jihadist Frankenstein has now gotten out of control and part of it — the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda — have declared war on the Pakistani state and are determined to overthrow it. Many, many warned of this over the last few years and we are finally seeing it coming to fruition.

AA: Can you see a military takeover in the foreseeable future?
BR: Well, Pakistan has had three bouts of military dictatorship. Ayub Khan/Yahya Khan is the first, General Zia is the second, General Musharraf is the third. I think anyone would have to say it is certainly possible to have a fourth military dictatorship in Pakistan. I don't think it's on the horizon right now, but I don't think that it can be dismissed as a possibility. I think right now the Pakistani army and the Pakistani army leadership does not want to take over, but that situation is something we certainly have to keep a close watch on.

AA: Would it be a cause for concern if the country were to split up?
BR: There are definitely centrifugal forces in Pakistan. Baluchistan has long chafed under the rule of Islamabad. But I think as long as the Pakistani army retains its integrity, the Pakistani state will continue and the Pakistani army remains the single most powerful institution in the country. So I think that the prospects of Pakistan breaking up are less worrisome than the possibility of an Islamic takeover of the entire country, for example.

AA: To what extent is Pakistan still involved in exporting nuclear know-how on the quiet?
BR: You never know what you don't know. But since the move by the Musharraf government against AQ Khan there has been lots less chatter about Pakistani involvement in proliferation activities. So, it appears that the era of Pakistani proliferation of nuclear technology has at least come to an end for the moment.

AA: If Pakistan were to split up, would worries about nuclear proliferation accelerate?
BR: I think something more realistic to worry about is an Islamist takeover of the entire country, which could come through a military coup by an Islamist general a 21st century version of General Zia Ul Haq. In which case you would have a high risk of export of nuclear proliferation to other extreme Islamist elements. Such an Islamist regime would be an international pariah and it would be looking for sources of funding to go on. Such a takeover is not imminent or inevitable, but it is a real possibility that prudent policy makers in the Unites States and other places need to think about.

AA: When you talk about other extremist Islamic establishments outside Pakistan, what are you thinking about? Iran wouldn't necessarily make sense because it’s Shia. So are you talking about Somalia, for example?
BR: Somalia. An Islamist government in Islamabad would also probably be very supportive of Hamas. It would certainly be very supportive of Lashkar-e-Tayba in India. It would probably be open to supporting the Shabab in Somalia and I think the implications of an Islamic takeover in Pakistan would resonate throughout the Islamic world from one end to the other. It would be a global game changer.

AA: What steps has the US taken to safeguard Pakistan's nuclear materials and technology?
BR: Both the Bush administration and the Obama administration have offered help and advice to Pakistan. Pakistan has a very large military force — over 10,000 men devoted to the protection of its nuclear establishment, the strategic plans division of the Pakistani army. What Pakistan is also very, very careful about is not to give the United States information about the location and size of its arsenal — because they don't trust the United States. At the end of the day the defence protection of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal — the crown jewel of Pakistan's national security — is not in American hands. It's in Pakistani hands and anyone who thinks that there is an American solution to loose nukes in Pakistan is reading too many spy novels.

AA: How do you personally assess the damage done to non-proliferation concerns by AQ Khan?
BR: Oh I think it was a devastating impact. If you look at the top two non-proliferation concerns in the world today — North Korea and Iran — both have AQ Khan written on them, more the North Korean case than Iran, as far as we know now. But there's still much we don't know about what AQ Khan was doing and let us also bear in mind that AQ Khan was never the nuclear pirate that the Musharraf government tried to portray him as. He may have embezzled for his own personal gain, but most of what he was doing was as an instrument of Pakistani state policy rather than as a lone wolf operating by himself.

AA: Is there any evidence that he embezzled for his personal gain?
BR: I think all you have to do is look at the home he has in Islamabad. Quite a nice place for a nuclear engineer to end up with. I think there is every reason to believe that he took good care of himself.

AA: Khan was a bit of a proliferation trail blazer. Were there other scientists who might have been encouraged by his example?
BR: Well, certainly one of the reasons Pakistan has set up the Strategic Plans Division is to keep a close eye on scientists and engineers who may have something to sell on the black market. And again since Pakistan, for understandable reasons, is very careful about not letting outsiders get inside its own nuclear programme, it's very hard for any outsider to say how serious that risk is.

AA: Why did the US in the past make no serious effort to question Khan? It was almost as though Washington deliberately turned a blind eye to his activities.
BR: I think that the Bush administration made a very conscious decision back in 2003-04 that it would accept the mythology that AQ Khan was a nuclear pirate in return for Pakistan getting out of the business of proliferating technology around the world. There was a convenient fiction to blame it all on one man and that allowed us to have a strong relationship with Musharraf while exculpating the Pakistani state and in particular the Pakistani army from its involvement. It was a very cynical deal but given how badly we need Pakistan for many other things, it was a path of least resistance.

AA: So that served US interests?
BR: It’s like so many things with Pakistan. The United States needs a strong relationship with Pakistan. We do not want to see Pakistan descend into chaos. We do not want to see a return to military dictatorship in Pakistan. The virtue of the process that the Bush administration did with AQ Khan is that it did seem to shut down Pakistan's involvement in the proliferation of nuclear technology. We don't know what we don't know, but as far as we can tell the problem seems to have abated.

AA: Is Khan still considered a threat to world security?
BR: I think the US and other intelligence communities keep a pretty close eye on Mr Khan and on his previous associates, just in case. His networks continue to be monitored very closely for any sign of activity.

AA: Is it conceivable that Khan's network was infiltrated by US agencies and could Khan have been turned for example by the U.S?
BR. I don't think so because Khan is vigorously ideologically opposed to the United States of America. I think he could be turned by someone like the Libyans if the price was right. But I think for ideological reasons Khan was very opposed to the US

AA: He has come across in the past as an opportunist.
BR: Anything is possible but I think for ideological reasons it is unlikely that Khan would get turned by the United States.

AA: There is a perception that David Headley, the Pakistani origin suspect in the Mumbai attacks, was a double agent for US narcotics agencies who turned against his US sponsors. If that could apply to Headley, it could apply to others.
BR: I am well aware of the concerns about Headley, but I think the notion that AQ Khan was somehow an American agent is letting conspiracy theories go off the deep end.

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