Editorial

Dumping Afghans to their lot?

Is Mullah Omar preparing for a comeback in Kabul? The one-eyed leader of the Taliban has been hiding along the Pakistan border ever since he and his followers were routed by U.S. forces and their allies in 2001 and forced into exile. At the time the Taliban’s defeat was greeted with relief by the local population. It was not just the Tajik-led Northern Alliance that was pleased to see the back of the Pashtun-led Taliban. Many other Afghans, including the Pashtuns, had tired of the Taliban’s social and political agenda, including the beheadings and amputations, the ban on music and simple forms of innocent entertainment like kite flying, the suppression of women’s rights and the clampdown on female education. Yet, despite their horrific past record, the Taliban are now more acceptable among ordinary Afghans than they have been for years. Among the reasons for their new found popularity is the rampant corruption in the government of President Hamid Karzai, the sky high cost of living and an exploding drug trade underpinned by tons of locally produced heroin that accounts for most of the world’s production.

Equally significant in the revival of the Taliban has been the poor human and civil rights record of western military forces deployed under Nato command in Afghanistan. Leave aside for a moment how they have dealt with those hapless individuals, Afghans and others, who have been branded as Islamic extremists and sold for a handful of silver to the interrogators of Guantanamo. There is also the matter of botched raids and mounting civilian casualties that make ordinary Afghans so yearn for order that that they are even prepared to sanction the return of the Taliban who are now seen as heroic leaders of the Afghan Resistance. Small wonder that men like Ghulam Yahya Akbari, a popular former mayor of Heart province, are trying to build up the Resistance by aligning themselves with the Taliban.

Some Nato commanders still find it difficult to comprehend that the rules of the game have changed and for many Afghans the Taliban are now seen as the preferred alternative to the Karzai government. ‘While they were in power this was the worst administration in the history of the country, so why would the people of Afghanistan want the Taliban back?’, one Nato officer was recently quoted as asking. Far more realistic is the assessment of outgoing U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates who told a Nato meeting earlier this year that the U.S. would ‘ultimately’ be prepared to reconcile with the Taliban to end the conflict in Afghanistan. He laced his comment with the proviso that any settlement with the Taliban on Afghan government terms before adding, ‘There has to be ultimately, and I’ll underscore ultimately, reconciliation as part of a political outcome to this. That’s ultimately the exit strategy for all of us.’ Gates’ assessment preceded that of British Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith who told the UK media that a war in Afghanistan could not be won. Soon afterwards the British Ambassador in Kabul, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, told his French counterpart that the next U.S. president had to be dissuaded ‘from getting further bogged down in Afghanistan.’
It is worth recalling that prior to the September 11 Al Qaeda attacks on the U.S., Washington had no problems of dealing with the Taliban administration in Kabul, which was seen as sympathetic to U.S. oil companies’ interests in Central Asia. The Taliban only became persona non grata in Washington because Mullah Omar and his cohorts refused to sever their ties with Osama bin Laden. Now, faced by what the Pentagon describes as the ‘downward spiral’ in Afghanistan, and burdened by an out of control defence expenditure at home, desperate U.S. defence planners are trying to hammer out a strategy that could possibly lead to some kind of future pull back. That is the brief of the Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT), which has been asked by Gates and U.S. Central Command Chief General David Petraeus to find some new way of stabilising Afghanistan. Instructions issued by Petraeus, according to U.S. media reports, have tasked JSAT to focus on reconciliation with the Taliban, as well as improving defence collaboration with Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours.

One much discussed scenario is that in return for a share of power and the withdrawal of Nato forces, the Taliban will (hopefully) agree to prohibit the use of Afghan territory for international terrorism (for that read future attacks on the U.S.). Even assuming that the Taliban is willing to participate in such a deal, theoretically cutting all ties with the remnants of Al Qaeda, this U.S. initiative is starting to smell like a sellout. The Pentagon argues that it is perfectly acceptable to try and drive a wedge between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and that is the be-all and end-all of any new initiative. But such reasoning begs the question of what will happen in Afghanistan if the Taliban are allowed to return. Will it mean a return to the floggings and beheadings of earlier years? Why not instead deal with the source of the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s power, namely their support centres in Afghanistan, rather than ruthlessly sacrificing the interests of ordinary Afghans to the whims of U.S. policy? Surely the Afghan population has suffered enough and surely it is time for the U.S. to take everyone’s interests into account — not just the wishes of selfish overlords in Washington — when deciding how next to proceed. By helping the Taliban return to Kabul, the U.S. is indeed contributing to the onward march of Islamic extremists and defeating the very purpose for which it waged the war against terror.

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