Editorial
The Russian bear bites
Bluffing may take poker players to the heights of success but in international politics it is a dangerous game when the gambit is revealed for what it is. And in both pursuits it is advisable to have a full understanding of your opponent's aims and objectives and to analyse them alongside your own to see how they interact. American diplomacy over recent years has been reduced to the level of 'you and who's army' sophistication. Just because Moscow cannot deploy carrier battle groups in all the significant oceans of the world does not mean that Russia does not have significant interests as a major European power. Washington may be not endorse each and every one of them at any given time but the tired cliché that we live in an inter-dependent world is now more true than ever. If every single situation is exploited to the short-term advantage of the West then eventually that policy is going to come up short; not only from the perspective of the West's antagonists but also when the allies come calling for a favour next time.
Washington's consistent refusal, or wilful determination, to ignore nationalisms around the world frequently results in counter-parties feeling short-changed in their dealings with the U.S. Russia had been signalling for a long time that its feelings about its 'near abroad' should be respected. Nothing can excuse the use of brute force in invading Georgia by the Kremlin but the West cannot say that the warning signs were not there – had they chosen to read them. That is not to say that Georgian ambitions to become part of Europe should be denied or ignored but adding the dimension of membership of Nato transforms the equation, potentially putting foreign boots on territory which is home to large numbers of people of Russian origin. And this is the nub of the problem, which westerners did not, or chose not to, understand: the Russians are fighting a battle for the survival of their race. It is not merely a matter of whether or not another patch of the globe is added to the western 'club'. At home the Russian birth rate is in precipitate decline with Aids and alcoholism adding to a problem that some people believe could see the population of Russia reduced to a mere 20 million by mid-century. Russia, struggling to maintain its numbers at home, needs to gather as many of its own kind to the motherland. That means that compatriots in the 'near abroad', particularly in Ukraine and Georgia, must be either attracted back home or retained in situ. Attempts to have expatriate Russians return from countries on the periphery have proved disappointing – the quality of life outside Russia is so often much better – so attempts to tempt countries out of Moscow's orbit become all the more antagonising.
The expansion of Nato to the borders of Russia has always been an unnecessarily extravagant powerplay that did wonders for the sale of American defence equipment but has now been seen to be a bluff because the organisation's raison d'etre and central commitment to mutual defence was not realised in the case of Georgia and was never likely to be. That Washington has a sphere of influence seems to be taken for granted along the Potomac – perhaps because it encompasses the whole globe – and perhaps we should not be surprised by that. But what is surprising is the degree to which American policymakers desegregate one geopolitical issue from another. Georgia is already falling off the global radar while the issue of Iran's nuclear capability is about to return to it. America needs Russian help in the containment of the Iranian nuclear genie, help of a kind that is available from no other quarter. It is based on the mutual interest of Moscow and Washington in Tehran not obtaining nuclear weapons. That surely transcends the merits of Georgia becoming a Nato member and of pushing Ukraine to join the same club when only a minority of Ukrainians are in favour of it and when recent evidence suggests that it would make their lives considerably less safe than they are now.
The next few months will show whether Washington is determined on the creation of a new Cold War enemy – as terrorism loses its terror and fuelled by an aged presidential candidate determined on looking tough – or whether a cooler more rational geostrategic global view will emerge. As the oily smoke from the engines of Russia's T72 tanks clears as they drive out of Georgia, Washington should consider two things: whether a Nato already overstretched in Afghanistan should revert to its core activity of defending Europe and whether its diplomats and military men should start playing chess instead of Monopoly.
top |
