September 2011
A crisis of political economy
George Friedman
 
Domestic turmoil dampens diplomacy
Inder Malhotra
 
NATO's hollow triumph
David Watts
 
Karachi's fractured society
Rahimullah Yusufzai
 
What next — a Sunni bomb?
Pervez Hoodbhoy
 
Sikandra: Akbar's last resting place
 
Karachi: Pakistan's tinderbox
Rahimullah Yusufzai
 
'Curzonian' Clinton, incredulous India
G Parthasarathy
 
Forming friends from foes?
Kuldip Nayar
 
All credit, no credibility
David Watts
 
Dr S Y Quraishi considers the ins and outs of India's electoral system, and the reasons why the voting process is so protracted
Shyam Bhatia
 
 
 
 
 
   
 

September 2011

Libya

NATO's hollow triumph

As the war in Libya stumbles to a halt and the failings of the West become all too apparent, the struggle for power in Tripoli begins in earnest. David Watts reports.

By David Watts

SHATTERED: Libya's infrastructure has been destroyed
It seems like only yesterday that the West was agonizing over how to reconstitute Iraq into a new, democratic country. Remember how ill-prepared everyone was, particularly the Americans, who insisted that they did not 'do' nation-building?

Well, here we are again: another Middle East war stuttering to a conclusion with nary a game plan in sight; the future of Libya almost literally up for grabs while the West congratulates itself on another interventionist 'success'.
The nation's infrastructure has been shattered because what should have been a pushover took months longer than expected as a result of insufficient force being mustered and deployed by NATO.

Now the struggle for power will begin in earnest with the National Transitional Council (NTC) seeking to extend its control to the whole country. This will not be easy and not simply because its chairman, Mustafa Mohammed Abdel Jalil, was a member of the regime until February, when he became the first to defect and started the ball rolling, declaring the establishment of the transitional government on the 26th of that month.
 
  The fighters in the west will have a strong claim to influence in any government since they have suffered the most grievously in the latter stages of the fighting around the capital and it may be months before the figures emerge regarding who will take the country forward over the next few years. No-one yet knows to what extent radical Islamists have established themselves in the east of the country, though there have been hints that they have already gained some influence.

Mahmoud Jibril, head of international affairs at the NTC, is charged with forming a cabinet. Jibril studied and taught political science at the University of Pittsburgh for a number of years. Abdul Hafez Ghoga, NTC vice-chairman and official spokesman, was another early defector and initially challenged Jalil for the leadership.

The best anyone can hope for is that the country does not turn into another Sunni-Shia cockpit of violence and hatred. The task of avoiding that would test any government and the post-Gadaffi government will need to be strong and provide good leadership while steering clear of any hint of retribution.  It will also need to avoid the trap that the Americans fell into in Iraq by blacklisting all former regime members and failing to draw on the talents of those willing to change sides. Much will be shaped by the choice of nations that the Libyans choose to help them through the transitional stage. In that respect they should be freer to make their choices than the Iraqis were. The French have made an early bid to shape the process by being the lead nation in calling a post-war conference to start the process of nation-building.

Security will be a key element as the nascent state works towards standing on its own feet: already some are saying that will require boots on the ground, both in terms of ensuring basic public safety but also training up a new Libyan police force and army.

Washington is likely to be unenthusiastic and to say that it is up to the European nations in NATO to do the necessary. Having stepped aside and excused themselves from the air campaign, many will turn to Germany and Poland to provide this follow-up expertise and no doubt the French, British and probably the Dutch will help too.  Arab states could well be tempted to join in.

The foreign contracting companies will come in and cream off the major projects, running up bills which the citizens of Libya will take years to pay off, once their oil industry reaches full speed again, some years down the road. Currently the country is producing only 50,000 barrels of oil per day compared to a pre-war figure of 1.6m. Optimists believe the eastern fields, which have been in rebel hands all along, could be producing 300,000 barrels a day within three months, helping supply desperately needed new revenue for the rebuilding process.

This time American companies might not do so well out of that but count on the Chinese to cash in on the now familiar pattern of the Anglo-Americans knocking things over while everyone else profits from building them up again.

Fortunately, like Iraq, Libya has a well-educated elite with all the requisite skills for nation-building and those in the sizeable diaspora of expertise may well be tempted to return home and help build the nation.

But the end of the Libyan campaign will be important in many ways other than the immediate. In a powerful, if understated way, it has redefined the security relationship between the European NATO powers and America and most likely put an end to any thoughts of Western intervention in the Middle East at least in the medium term.

The euphoria at the ending of what has been an ignominious campaign for NATO must not be allowed to overshadow the very basic failures that it has uncovered. NATO went in to the operation without the requisite resources and had clearly hoped to rely on the United States for the greater part of effort. When that was unexpectedly not available, they were seriously floundering and had to call on America to make up their stocks of ammunition. Even in the final days it was United States Air Force drones that were providing the vital intelligence that allowed the end game to be played out. 

The reality is that this is likely to be the scenario for the forseeable future: where the United States' immediate vital national interest is not under threat, Washington will not move militarily for the simple reason that Congress would not approve it and a president struggling for popular appeal ahead of the presidential election next year would not risk it.

This failure calls into question the whole NATO strategy of being able to operate 'out of area', be it Afghanistan or anywhere else. And the immediate answer seems to be that NATO had better stick to business closer to home.
Which leaves us with the final question: what was this whole operation about? Was it an attempt to take control of Libyan oil? Was there some deeper geo-strategic reasoning or was it merely down to two European leaders, Britain's David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy of France, out to make a name for themselves as decisive new figures on the international scene?   

There was no advance justification, however specious, such as the possession of nuclear weapons. Gadaffi had already given those up — or had he?

In any event, the Western about-face came after years of cosying up to him. Why the sudden change of heart? The West had long known the true face of Gadaffi and whatever his faults, he was at least consistent. Something that cannot be said of the West.



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