asianaffairs

What next — a Sunni bomb?

The imminent prospect of both Iran and Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons may be unpalatable, but if it becomes a reality the world might have to learn to live with it, warns Pervez Hoodbhoy.

By Pervez Hoodbhoy

DEFIANCE: Iran's vice-president urged Muslims to collaborate on production of an atomic bomb, despite UN efforts to prevent proliferation

The Islamic Republic of Iran stands at the threshold to the Bomb. In 2010 it had more than enough low enriched uranium (LEU, some 2,152 kilograms) to make its first bomb's worth of weapons-grade uranium, which could have been done in roughly ten weeks if this LEU had been fed into the 4,186 centrifuges that it was then operating . Thousands of other centrifuges are also known to be operating at Natanz. Even if it had not received a bomb design from Pakistan's A Q Khan, the six-decade old physics of implosion devices would still not be a mystery to Iran's sophisticated nuclear scientists. With sufficient technical capacity, it appears that Iran now awaits only a political decision to make the Bomb.

What if Iran chooses to cross the threshold? Among other things, it would be a powerful stimulus for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to follow suit. Should the Kingdom also succeed, it would have created yet another denizen of the nuclear world — the first Sunni bomb. Why the first? Of course, nuclear Pakistan is largely a Sunni state too but its bomb was motivated — at least initially — by the desire to counter India's. Iran enthusiastically hailed Pakistan's test in May 1998; clearly it did not see Pakistan's bomb as being directed towards it. On the other hand, Sunni Saudi Arabia sees Shia Iran as its primary enemy.

Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter rivals that, post-Iranian Revolution, have vied for influence in the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia has the world's largest petroleum reserves, Iran the second largest in the Middle East. Both are theocracies, with their respective theologies in a conflict that began with the death of the Prophet of Islam some 15 centuries ago. Saudi Arabia is Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and the birthplace of Islam. It is the leader of the Sunni world, culturally Arab, and a long-time client of the United States. On the other hand, Iran is a Persian Shia state that, after the Revolution, sought to be the leader of all Muslim revolutionaries, both Shia and Sunni, who wanted to confront the West. While much of that ardour has gone, it seeks to project its power and influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.

Thanks to Wikileaks, it is now well known that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had repeatedly urged the US to destroy Iran's nuclear programme and 'cut off the head of the snake' by launching military strikes. More recently, on 8 June 2011, the influential former head of Saudi intelligence and ambassador in London and Washington, Prince Turki bin Faisal, made a long speech to an audience from the British and American military and security community at Molesworth air force base in England, covering all aspects of Saudi security doctrine. Only a fragment of his speech was reported in the international press; some other parts are worth a careful listen.

Faisal begins by reminding his audience of why the Kingdom feels so confident today: 'She is the cradle of Islam, a religion that has today an estimated 1.2 billion adherents. Saudi Arabia represents over 20 per cent of the combined GDP of the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region….the stock market represents about 50 per cent of the entire stock market capitalization of the MENA region….Saudi Aramco, the Kingdom's national oil company, is the world's largest producer and exporter of petroleum and has by far the world's largest sustained production capacity infrastructure at about 12.5 million barrels-per-day and also has the world's largest spare capacity currently estimated at over 4 million barrels-per-day or about 70 per cent of global unused capacity.'

Describing Iran as 'a paper tiger with steel claws', Faisal accuses the nation of using these claws for its 'meddling and destabilizing efforts in countries with Shi'ite majorities'. After saying that 'in a certain sense, Saudi Arabia and Iran are uniquely positioned to be at odds', Faisal then goes on to express his country's position on nuclear weapons: 'First, it is in our interest that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon, for their doing so would compel Saudi Arabia, whose foreign relations are now so fully measured and well assessed, to pursue policies that could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences. This is why, through various initiatives, we are sending messages to Iran that it is their right, as it is any nation's right, and as we ourselves are doing, to develop a civilian nuclear programme, but that trying to parlay that programme into nuclear weapons is a dead end.'

The Saudi opposition to Israeli nuclear weapons was mild and ritualistic: 'A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction is the best means to get Iran and Israel to give up nuclear weapons. Such a Zone must be accompanied by a rewards regime that provides economic and technical support for countries that join; plus a nuclear security umbrella guaranteed by the permanent members of the Security Council.'
Clearly, Saudi enthusiasm for the Bomb comes from Iran, not Israel.

An Islamic bomb?
Once upon a time the Bomb was neither Sunni nor Shia, just plain 'Islamic'. Appending 'Islamic' to 'Bomb' would cause some Muslims to take umbrage; how could the weapon of ultimate destruction be associated with their religion? Others welcomed it as a sign of power. Regardless, the concept of an Islamic Bomb was first introduced by a Muslim leader rather than any westerner. Addressing posterity from his death cell in a Rawalpindi jail, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the architect of Pakistan's nuclear programme, wrote in 1977: 'We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position [is] about to change.'

Another Muslim leader stressed the need for a bomb belonging collectively to Islam. Addressing an Islamic conference in Tehran in 1992, the Iranian vice-president, Sayed Ayatollah Mohajerani said, 'Since Israel continues to possess nuclear weapons, we, the Muslims, must cooperate to produce an atomic bomb, regardless of UN efforts to prevent proliferation.'

In the celebrations following the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami paraded bomb and missile replicas through city streets. It saw in the bomb a sure sign of a reversal of fortunes and a panacea for the ills that have plagued Muslims since the end of the Golden Age of Islam. In 2000, I captured on video the statements of several leaders of religious and jihadist political parties in Pakistan — Maulana Khalil-ur-Rahman and Maulana Sami-ul-Haq — who also demanded a bomb for Islam.

One important bin Laden supporter, Pakistan's General Hameed Gul — an influential Islamist leader and former head of the ISI — has made clear how he feels. In a widely watched nationally televised debate with me, General Hameed Gul snarled: 'Your masters [that is, the Americans] will nuke us Muslims just as they nuked Hiroshima; people like you want to denuclearize and disarm us in the face of a savage beast set to devour the world'.

The Islamic Bomb is indeed a popular concept in Pakistan. Although General Gul is an extremist and does not mind being called one, it is true that the unequivocal US military, economic and political support for the Israeli occupation of Arab lands has created enormous bitterness across the Muslim world. After the devastation of Gaza in 2008, many newspapers in Muslim countries contained letters from their readers expressing the wish for nuclear weapons. The desire for an atomic weapon to seek vengeance — though immoral and foolish in my opinion — is not limited to extremists.

For all these strong expressions, barring extreme circumstances, the 'Islamic Bomb' cannot become reality. It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of any Muslim state declaring that it has an Islamic bomb that would be used for defence of the Ummah against the United States or Israel (though it is worth recalling that this kind of 'extended deterrence', as it was called, was practised aggressively by both superpowers in the Cold War, including during the Cuban Missile Crisis). Nothing in the history of Pakistan has shown a substantial commitment to any pan-Islamic cause, although from time to time there has been empty speculation that Pakistan would provide a 'nuclear umbrella' for Arab countries in a crisis.

This does not, of course, mean that individual engineers and scientists will not respond to a 'higher calling'. For example, it is widely known that two highly placed nuclear engineers, Syed Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudhry Majid — both known to espouse radical Islamic views — journeyed several times into Afghanistan in 2000 and met with Osama bin Laden. Some months earlier, Mahmood had resigned from his position as director of the Khushab reactor in angry protest at the government's apparent willingness to sign the CTBT. While bin Laden did discuss with Mahmood and Majid the possibility of making nuclear weapons, no further steps appear to have been taken.

There is also the clandestine nuclear cooperation with Iran — initiated by Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan and his network — which began sometime in the late 1980s and lasted until the mid-90s. This was followed by similar sales to Libya that continued till 2003 and the exposure of the network, leading to a public confession by A Q Khan in January 2004. On 31 August 2009, Dr Khan — who had earlier admitted to supplying centrifuges to Iran — told a television interviewer in Karachi that if Iran succeeds in 'acquiring nuclear technology, we will be a strong bloc in the region to counter international pressure. Iran's nuclear capability will neutralize Israel's power.' According to the Washington Post, his assistance 'allowed Iran to leapfrog over several major technological hurdles to make its own enriched uranium'.

In 2011, Dr Khan made available documents that he says support his claim that he personally transferred more than $3 million in payments by North Korea to senior officers in the Pakistani military, who he claims subsequently approved his sharing of technical know-how and equipment with North Korean scientists. If the released letter is genuine, then this episode demonstrates a remarkable instance of corruption, not any ideological sympathy with godless North Korea.

Pakistan-Iran
There were times when Iran was considered among Pakistan's closest allies. It was the first country to recognize the newly independent Pakistan in 1947. In the 1965 war with India, Pakistani fighter jets flew to Iranian bases in Zahidan and Mehrabad for protection and refuelling. Iran's Shah was a popular figure in Pakistan, both countries were members of the US-led SEATO and CENTO defence organisations in the mid-60s, and Iran opened wide its universities to Pakistani students. Although it is 80 per cent Sunni with only a 15-20 per cent Shia minority, Pakistan nevertheless considered Iran as a brother Muslim country. Farsi, Iran's national language, had long been taught in Pakistani schools as a second language.

Nineteen seventy-nine was a turning point. Khomenei's Islamic Revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to set in motion fundamental realignments in the region. Iran exited the US orbit, but Pakistan was setting out on a course that would bring it far closer to the US than ever before. Pakistan and the US, with financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, created the mujahideen that would challenge the Soviets and eventually force them to withdraw. With full backing from the US, General Zia-ul-Haq proceeded to create a hyper-religious fighting force and to drive Pakistani society down the road of Islamization.

As religion assumed centrality in matters of the state in both Pakistan and Iran, rifts appeared. These were to widen in later years: Pakistan supported the Pashtun Taliban while Iran supported the Tajik Northern Alliance. The Taliban takeover in 1996 was followed by the selective killing of Shias, including an Iranian diplomat. Soon there was a massacre of over 5000 Shias in Bamiyan province. Subsequently Iran amassed 300,000 troops at the Afghan border and threatened to attack the Pakistan-supported Taliban government unless Pakistan took measures to protect lives of Iranians in Afghanistan. Today Iran accuses Pakistan of harbouring terrorist anti-Iran groups on its soil and allowing Sunni extremists to ravage the Pakistan's Shia minority. Farsi is no longer taught in Pakistani schools.

On the nuclear front, Pakistan has always publicly defended Iran's right to nuclear technology. Further, as noted earlier, Pakistan secretly helped Iran's nuclear weapon programme until the mid 1990s. But even at that time, hidden still further beneath the surface, voices within the Pakistani establishment spoke against giving nuclear support to Iran. This came both because of anti-Shi'ism as well as US pressure.

These suspicions were confirmed by confidential American cables revealed by Wikileaks and highlighted by the Pakistani newspaper Dawn. The cables detail Pakistan's efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing its weapons programme. Gen Pervez Musharraf, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri held at least seven meetings, whether face-to-face or by telephone, with the Iranians. There were 11 meetings with the Americans in 2006 alone. Pakistani officials also served as interlocutors between Iran and the US.

In a May 2006 cable about Gen Musharraf's meeting with Iranian First Vice President Parviz Davoodi, it is reported that 'according to Kasuri, Musharraf told the visitors that Iran should stop all efforts to enrich uranium now, adding that Tehran was making life difficult for its neighbour, Pakistan'. Later that year, Mr Kasuri would tell the Americans that over the past three years he had 'made it his mission to persuade Tehran not to provoke a conflict over Iran's nuclear programme thus endangering regional — and Pakistan's domestic — security'. In an April 2006 meeting with US Senator Chuck Hagel, Mr Kasuri provided a list of other reasons why Pakistan was so keen to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. 'We are the only Muslim country [with such weapons],' he said, 'and don't want anyone else to get [them].'

Later that month, when the US announced its willingness to join the EU-3 in talks with Iran, the American ambassador informed Mr Kasuri that 'the US expects Pakistan to vigorously support the US action. FM Kasuri agreed, saying that he would ensure that the MFA issued a statement of support immediately'. By 11pm that night a statement had been issued, and Mr Kasuri followed this up with a call to the Iranian foreign minister urging Iran 'to announce an immediate suspension of its enrichment programme in order to give dialogue a chance'. This phone call was, again, promptly reported to the American ambassador, who commented that 'Kasuri may be wildly worried that he has gone out on a limb by endorsing the Secretary [of State's] statement so vigorously'.

Pakistan-Saudia
Former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki bin Sultan was on the mark when, speaking about Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, he said: 'It's probably one of the closest relationships in the world between any two countries.' Indeed, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have many commonalities — both are Sunni, conservative, and have ruling oligarchies which are dynastic and military respectively. They were the first to recognize and support the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Their relationship to the US has similarities too: both are American client states but their populations deeply resent this fact.

Saudi Arabia's footprint in Pakistan and its politics have grown steadily since the early 1970s. A huge migration of Pakistani workers to newly rich Arab countries brought them into contact with a conservative brand of Islam that was different from the one they had grown up with at home. Many came back transformed. Some became vigorous proselytizers, aided by generous grants for creating madrassas. Pakistan has received more aid from Saudi Arabia than any country outside the Arab world since the 1960s. Major funding for Pakistan's nuclear programme came from Saudi Arabia; it is said that suitcases of cash were brought into Pakistan from Saudi Arabia (as well as Libya). In gratitude, Bhutto renamed the city of Lyallpur as Faisalabad (after King Faisal).

The Pak-Saudi-US jihad in Afghanistan was to further cement Pak-Saudi relations. Madrassas belonging to the Wahabi-Salafi school of thought exploded in numbers and enrolment. Pakistani leaders, political and military, frequently travelled to the Kingdom to pay homage. Their dependency on Saudi money grew. After India had tested its Bomb in May 1998 and Pakistan was mulling over the appropriate response, Saudi Arabia's promise of 50,000 barrels of free oil a day helped Pakistan decide in favour of testing its Bomb. Oil cushioned the impact of sanctions subsequently imposed by the US and Europe. The Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, was a VIP guest at Kahuta, where he toured its nuclear and missile facilities just before the tests. Years earlier the then serving prime minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, had been denied a similar privilege,

The quid pro quo for the Kingdom's largesse has been for Pakistan to provide it with soldiers, airmen, and other military expertise. Saudi officers are trained at Pakistan's national defence colleges and the Pakistan Air Force, with a high degree of professional training, helped create the Royal Saudi Air Force. Pakistani pilots flew combat missions against South Yemen in the 1970s. Saudi Arabia is said to have purchased ballistic missiles produced in Pakistan.

So what happens if Iran goes nuclear and Saudi Arabia wants to follow? How will it try to do it, and by what path?
For all the wealth that it possesses, Saudi Arabia does not have the skilled technical and scientific base necessary to create a nuclear infrastructure. It has many universities staffed largely by expatriates, and tens of thousands of Saudi students have been sent overseas to universities in the US and Europe. But because of an ideological attitude that is unsuited to the acquisition of modern scientific skills, there has been little success in producing a significant number of accomplished Saudi engineers and scientists. Too weak to defend itself and too rich to be left alone, the country has always been surrounded by those who eye its wealth.

Perforce, Saudi Arabia will turn to Pakistan for nuclear help. This does not mean outright transfer of NWs by Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. This would certainly lead to extreme reaction from the US and Europe, with no support offered by China or Russia. Even if a few weapons were smuggled out, Saudi Arabia could not claim to have them. Thus their ability to serve as a nuclear deterrent would be nullified.

Instead, the Kingdom's route to nuclear weapons is likely to be gradual, beginning with the acquisition of nuclear reactors for electricity generation. The spent fuel from reactors can be reprocessed for plutonium. Like Iran, it will have to find creative ways by which to skirt around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which forbids reprocessing. However, it will doubtlessly take heart from the fact that the US 'forgave' India for its nuclear testing in 1998 and eventually ended up rewarding it with a nuclear deal. Saudi Arabia had unwillingly signed on to the NPT in 1988. Its position then was that it would be happy to sign up but only if Israel did the same. That, of course, never happened. But Saudi Arabia had no option but to follow the US diktat.

The first step towards making nuclear weapons may soon be taken. In June 2011, Saudi Arabia said it was planning to build 16 nuclear reactors over the next 20 years at a cost of more than $300 billion with each reactor costing around $7 billion. Arrangements were being made to offer the project for international bidding and the winning company should 'satisfy the Kingdom's needs for modern technology'.

To create, run and maintain the resulting nuclear infrastructure will require importing large numbers of technical workers. Some will be brought over from western countries, as well as Russia and former Soviet Union countries. Engineering and scientific skills from Pakistan would be particularly desirable, especially since pure electricity production would not be the only goal. As Sunni Muslims, Pakistanis would presumably be sympathetic to the Kingdom's larger goals. Having been in the business of producing NWs for nearly 30 years under difficult circumstances, they would also be familiar with supplier chains for various items that are normally hard to get. Since salaries in Saudi Arabia far exceed those in Pakistan, one expects that many qualified people would energetically seek to get leave from their parent institutions at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Kahuta Research Laboratories, and National Development Complex.

As nuclear weapons become easier to make, existing conflicts are also finding nuclear expression more easily. Iran's present direction suggests that the historical clash between the Sunni and Shia brands of Islam could move into the nuclear arena. What can be done to prevent this?

Any solution is deeply complicated by the fact that the world's pre-eminent power, the United States, lacks the moral authority to act effectively in this matter. Whereas it has periodically threatened Iran with a nuclear holocaust for trying to develop nuclear weapons, it has also rewarded to various degrees other countries — Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea — that have developed such weapons surreptitiously. That initial nuclear capability was provided to Iran by the US during the Shah's rule is also something that the world is not liable to forget.

Iran must certainly be dissuaded by all peaceful means, including sanctions, from making a bomb. There is some evidence that current sanctions are having an effect. But nuclear nationalism and Persian pride could overwhelm economic considerations. So, if Iran does make the bomb in spite of everything — or gets close to it — then I feel that the world must accept this as just another nasty fact of life. Attacking Iran must be removed from the list of options. This rash step will unleash dynamics over which the US and Israel will have little control. However unwelcome Iran's bomb may be — and the Sunni Bomb that might follow — it is far better to live with a potential danger than to knowingly create a holocaust

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